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1ABSTRACT
The thesis investigates the risk-related behaviours of financial institutions across the global
financial markets and provides reasonable explanations for the empirical results. The thesis
has a few conclusions and contributions to the existing literature. It investigates various
risks to which financial institutions are exposed, particularly capital risk, real estate risk and
valuation risk. The importance of capital adequacy had drawn public and regulators
attention in the recent financial turmoil, especially when financial institutions face
unexpected credit and liquidity shocks in the financial markets. The thesis shows that
banking organizations show little pecking order behaviour in capital structure. Banks are
different in terms of leverage relative to non-banks, as taxpayers deposit subsidized debt
relative to equity in banking. Therefore, the debt structure in banking is different from non-
financial firms. For the same level of financial deficit, a bank may have higher debt level
than non-financial firms. However, this is not due to pecking order but because the
taxpayers funds deposit in the bank. The thesis also finds that despite of the regulatory
minimum capital requirement, the banking organizations target capital level is linearly and
collectively influenced by bank-specific, macroeconomic and country-specific variables.
In addition, the thesis adopts bivariate GARCH framework and finds significant evidences
that with the development of mortgage loans issuance and related derivatives, financial
institutions are increasingly exposed to real estate markets, and there is a significant and
positive cross-volatility spillover from real estate sector to banks, and the co-movement is in
the same direction. It is also crucial that financial institutions and fund managers can predict
the expected portfolio returns more accurately.
2The thesis also finds that zero-beta CAPM significantly improve the expected returns,
represented as average predicted returns in the month ahead when comparing with three-
factor model, which has difficulty explaining small and growth portfolios returns. We show
that market risk is composed of two components, average market returns and cross-sectional
market volatility.
The findings of the thesis not only contribute and extend the existing literature, but also
have important implication for regulators, risk and asset managers as well as investors at
both company and public policy levels. The regulators and financial institution managers
can monitor banks targeted capital structure more closely based on the bank-specific,
macroeconomic and country-specific variables discussed in the thesis. When there is any
changes in these determinant variables, institution managers should make relevant
adjustments in the targeted capital structure.
Moveover, regulators should be aware the influence of real estate market over financial
institutions, especially any significant volatility changes in real estate as it can spillover into
financial institutions. As financial institutions are increasingly exposed to real estate market,
any significant changes in real estate market can also have influential impact on the capital
adequacy in bank organisations. Therefore, it is suggested institutional managers need to
control the real estate exposure in their financial assets and include real estate factor in the
stress testing.
Furthermore, it is also important that financial institution and fund managers can estimate
the expected returns more accurately, so that they can make correct collection of assets for
required risk and return. In the thesis we find that the zero-beta CAPM outperforms the
traditional asset pricing model, particularly three-factor model, by providing better
prediction on portfolio expected returns. Therefore, the fund managers can adopt the zero-
3beta ZCAPM framework along with other asset pricing framework when predicting
portfolio returns. As high returns often come with high risk, predicting returns more
accurately means we can predict and monitor risk more precisely. The financial institution
managers can also apply zero-beta CAPM on their institutional asset holdings to monitor
whether the institutions are exposed to higher risk assets. The regulators can use the
framework to control the financial intermediaries risk and return behaviour to maintain the
financial market stability. By identifying and quantifying the risk and return behaviours of
financial intermediaries, stakeholders can assess and improve their management and
investment performances. The empirical findings also help the regulatory bodies to make
effective and suitable policies for financial sectors to ensure a stable, prosperity and
sustainable growth of financial market.
4
5CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Financial institutions are highly regulated institutions that facilitate the flow of funds and
exchange of information due to market imperfections. They provide financial products and
services to the economy, which are different from other industries due to the specialness in
functions. The major special functions of financial institutions are the brokerage services and
asset transformations. Financial Institutions act as agents for the savers by providing
information and transaction services at reduced cost because of the economy of scale. As
asset transformers, financial institutions purchase the financial claims issued by corporations
as primary securities that are financed by selling financial claims in other forms as
secondary securities to investors. The financial risks are thus in turn transformed from the
primary securities to secondary securities. Another specialness of financial institutions is
their key roles as transmitters of monetary policy from the central bank to the rest of the
economy due to high liquid nature of bank and depository institutions which have resulted
in their acceptance by their public as the most widely used medium of exchange in the
economy. Other special functions of financial institutions include credit allocation as sources
of financing and time intermediation for savers to transfer wealth across generations.
The types of financial institutions are categorised by the roles in facilitating the flow of funds
from individual surplus unit, usually known as investors, to deficit units. One stream of
funds shows that deposits from surplus units are transformed by depository institutions into
loans for deficit units. Another stream is purchasing of securities and shares issued by
6finance and investment companies which are then transformed into finance company loans
or used by investment companies to purchase debt and equity securities of deficit units. The
third stream of funds flow is from institutional investors, such as insurance companies and
pension funds. Last but not least, security companies acting as brokers that are responsible
for executing transactions between financial institutions and deficit units, during which
funds flow directly from surplus to deficit units.
The first financial intermediary can be dated back to 2000 years ago, originating from rich
cities, such as, Florence, Venice and Genoa. They were money changer, situated usually at a
table in the commercial district of a city, aiding traveller by exchanging foreign coins for
local money or discounting commercial notes for a fee in order to supply other merchants
with working capital1. The banking industry gradually spread from the classical civilization
of Greece and Rome into northern and western Europe, and later into the New World, North
and South America where colonies were established. Since then, United States has gradually
established its influential role in the global financial market.  From the early 1980s through
the early 2000s, deregulation allows different types of financial institutions to expand the
types of services they offer and capitalize on economies of scope. As a result, consolidation
within financial industries was prevalence, and such a financial conglomerate is expected to
be less exposed to risks of decline in customer demand for any single financial service. In
addition, financial institutions have expanded globally, especially to emerging market, to
capitalize on their expertise. By combining specialized skills and customer bases, the
expanded financial institutions are capable of offering more services to clients with an
international customer base.
1 Peter S. Rose and Sylvia C. Hudgins, Banking Management and Financial Services, 6th Edition, MaGraw-Hill
Publisher, ISBN 007-123931-6.
7The recent financial turmoil has drawn regulators and public attention on the deficiencies in
the financial industry. As the financial market becomes increasingly interconnected, the
financial industry is more vulnerable to financial shocks than ever before across all types of
financial institutions, and the spill-over effect is dramatic internationally. Therefore, in order
to provide more efficient regulatory policy on financial institutions and to prevent financial
market failure, this thesis provides detailed research in identifying and quantifying the risks
faced by the financial institutions, understanding the risk management practice currently
implemented by financial institutions, evaluating on the efficiency of the existing regulatory
framework and assessing the effectiveness of different asset pricing frameworks. In the
following sections, we will discuss the objectives, contributions and implications of this
thesis to the current literature. In the last section, we provide a summary discussion of the
general layout of the thesis.
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS
The objective of the thesis is to empirically examine the relationship between major risk
factors exposed by the financial institutions, particularly capital risk, real estate risk and
valuation risk.. The thesis tries to identify and quantify the risks, review risk management
practice, evaluate the efficiency of the regulatory framework and assess the effectiveness of
various asset pricing frameworks.
We start the thesis by reviewing the current literature on financial institutions from risk and
regulatory aspects. We discuss the formation of financial market and reasons that make the
financial institutions special in chapter two. We then go on to evaluate the impact of major
risks that financial institutions are facing, and how the risks are measured and controlled by
the financial institutions. As there is a large shift of financial institution loan portfolios and
8development of real estate backed financial instruments, financial institutions are
increasingly exposed to real estate related risk. We review current research on the real estate
factor influence on the financial institutions and the topic is further examined across US, UK
and Japanese markets in the later part of the thesis. The recent financial crisis has raised the
discussion of regulatory deficiencies in controlling capital adequacy. This chapter reviews
the development of Basel policy and the potential impact of Basel III on the financial market.
We assess measures of the Basel III policy on improving quantity and quality of the capitals
by increasing the capital ratios and introducing additional capital buffers. Basel III also
extends the previous policy by emphasizing on the leverage ratio, counterparty risk and
liquidity management. The potential overall impact of the new policy on the economy is
unclear. However, capital and liquidity regulation affect economic activity via an increase in
the cost of bank intermediation. In order to meet the regulation criteria, banks increase the
capital by deleveraging and increasing their lending spread. This will result in a decline in
steady state output and welfare consumption.
In response to the observed regulation deficiencies from recent financial crisis, Basel
Committee introduces Basel III aiming to increase the quality and quantity of capital.
Further measures of recent Basel reforms also include: tightening the definition of common
equity; limitation on qualification as Tier 1 Capital; introduction on a set of system-wide
prudential filters to address systemic risk within the global financial system; and the
enhancement of transparency and market discipline through new disclosure requirements.
In order to monitor the capital adequacy, it is important to understand the factors that affect
the bank capital structure. The thesis examines the extent of pecking order behaviour in the
banking organizations and finds that banks show little pecking order behaviour. We then
evaluate the factors that can affect the capital level from bank-specific, macroeconomic and
country-specific regulation aspects for a panel data for fourteen countries over period from
91991 to 2011. The results show that all bank-specific, macroeconomic and country-specific
variables collectively make a significant linear contribution in explaining banking
organization target capital level.
The traditional risk factors faced by financial institutions have already been extensively
examined in the literature, such as market risk and interest rate risk. In this thesis, we show
similar results as in previous literature that the market risk is positive and significant for
financial institution returns, while the interest rate effect is not very significant. As the
increasing in the mortgage loans and rapid expansion in real estate related financial
instruments since 1980s, movements in the real estate market can have a spillover effect into
financial institutions. This thesis investigates the return sensitivity and volatility spillover of
banks upon changes in the real estate market illustrated by returns of Real Estate Investment
Trusts by using bivariate GARCH. We compare the return and volatility behaviour of banks
returns across three markets, US, UK and Japan from year 1999 to 2011.  Our findings
indicate that the real estate factor has a significant impact on the bank return generating
process for all three countries, and bank stock returns are more sensitive to real estate sector
when the economy is booming. The results of significant and positive cross-volatility factor
show that there is a volatility spillover from real estate sector to banks, and the co-
movement is in the same direction.
The last issue addressed in the thesis is how to better estimate the expected stock and
portfolio returns. It is also crucial that financial institutions and fund managers can predict
the expected portfolio returns more accurately.  The thesis investigates the influences of the
cross-sectional market volatility on the portfolio returns, especially financial institution
portfolio returns, based on zero-beta CAPM. We find that the zero-beta CAPM provides a
better approximation of expected stock returns than traditional CAPM and Fama-French
approaches. We used the iterative estimation method to initially obtain convergent binary
10
latent variables that indicate the positive and negative market volatility effects. We then use
Fama-MacBeth procedure to run rolling window time series regression to obtain factor
loadings and run out-of-sample cross-sectional regressions for each factor. We apply the
procedure on eight portfolios in total which include a combination of common stocks and,
particularly, financial institution stocks. We find out the results of widely used Fama-French
three- and four-factor models are less significant. However, the effect of cross-sectional
market volatility of zeta-risk is very significant and robust to different estimation periods in
the first pass regressions and out-of-sample periods in the second pass regression. We also
apply the ZCAPM specification on the financial institution portfolios, the results also
suggest the cross-sectional zeta risk is highly related to both financial institution and
common stock portfolios. The thesis finds that zero-beta CAPM significantly improve the
expected returns, represented as average predicted returns in the month ahead when
comparing with three-factor model, which has difficulty explaining small and growth
portfolios returns .
1.3 CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The contributions of this thesis not only extend the existing literature, but also have
important implication for regulators, risk and asset managers as well as investors at both
company and public policy levels. The regulators and financial institution managers can
monitor banks targeted capital structure more closely based on the bank-specific,
macroeconomic and country-specific variables discussed in the thesis. When there is any
changes in these determinant variables, institution managers should make relevant
adjustments in the targeted capital structure. In addition, regulators should be aware the
influence of real estate market over financial institutions, especially any significant volatility
changes in real estate as it can spillover into financial institutions. As financial institutions
11
are increasingly exposed to real estate market, any significant changes in real estate market
can also have influential impact on the capital adequacy in bank organisations. Therefore, it
is suggested institutional managers need to control the real estate exposure in their financial
assets and include real estate factor in the stress testing. Furthermore, it is also important
that financial institution and fund managers can estimate the expected returns more
accurately, so that they can make correct collection of assets for required risk and return. In
the thesis we find that the zero-beta CAPM outperforms the traditional asset pricing model,
particularly three-factor model, by providing better prediction on portfolio expected returns.
Therefore, the fund managers can adopt the zero-beta ZCAPM framework along with other
asset pricing framework when predicting portfolio returns. As high returns often come with
high risk, predicting returns more accurately means we can predict and monitor risk more
precisely. The financial institution managers can also apply zero-beta CAPM on their
institutional asset holdings to monitor whether the institutions are exposed to higher risk
assets. The regulators can use the framework to control the financial intermediaries risk and
return behaviour to maintain the financial market stability. By identifying and quantifying
the risk and return behaviours of financial intermediaries, stakeholders can assess and
improve their management and investment performances. The empirical findings also help
the regulatory bodies to make effective and suitable policies for financial sectors to ensure a
stable, prosperity and sustainable growth of financial market.
The contribution of the first literature chapter of the thesis is to provide an overall review of
current literature on risk management and regulatory impact of financial institutions. Apart
from the traditional risks faced by financial institutions, such as interest and foreign
exchange risk etc., the thesis particularly reviews the current literature that study on the real
estate impact of the financial institution.  It has been noticed that financial institution returns
have been directly and indirectly influenced by the underlying real estate market. In
12
addition, the recent financial crisis has unveiled the regulatory deficiency in the capital
adequacy requirements. Capitals of financial institutions are in significant stress during the
crisis, which leads to a chain effect of the credit crisis in the overall financial market. This
thesis reviews frameworks and critics of former Basel capital adequacy policies. The revised
new Basel III proposal continues assessing the definition of risk-weighted asset, and
emphasizing on improving the quality and quantity of capital by increasing the capital ratio
requirement and introducing an additional capital conversation and countercyclical buffer.
The thesis also reviews the literature on the importance of leverage ratios, counterparty risks
and liquidity management. Studies show that financial institutions with better leverage ratio
and liquidity management are less vulnerable to unexpected financial shocks. This provides
supporting evidence for Basel III proposal which sets guidelines for international active
financial institutions to manage leverage ratio, counterparty risks and liquidity monitoring.
In the next three empirical chapters, the thesis provides empirical evidences from three
perspectives. In chapter three, the thesis examines the determinants of bank capital
structures for 358 large banking organisations from 1991 to 2011 across 14 countries. The
contribution of this paper to the literature is that we extend the methodology used in non-
financial firm in examining the extent of pecking order behaviour to banking organizations,
and we found both financial and non-financial organizations share certain similar
behaviour. The results of pecking order theory show that we have not found strong evidence
for the existence of pecking order in banking organizations. The thesis also adds value in the
current range of literature by providing results including most recent sample period in the
analysis of factors influencing banking organization capital structure. In addition, we extend
the conventional framework of capital structure determinants by including variables related
to country-specific macroeconomic and public regulatory variables. The results indicate that
bank-specific, regulatory and public policy variables collectively make a significant
13
contribution in explaining banking organizations’ target capital level. We found that if the
greater proportion of a country’s financial system is bank-based, banks within the country
tend to maintain less capital since they have a greater influence on the financial industry and
are able to access to easier and cheaper finance within a short period. Changes in capital
ratio tend to be higher in countries with better provisions for prompt corrective action,
better external governance, and greater emphasis on explicit regulatory requirements
regarding the amount of capital banks must maintain relative to specific guidelines. The
findings also show public policy and regulatory variables affect changes in the capital ratio
linearly since the results of including interactive variables provide weak evidences and
dramatically reduce both the statistical and economic significance of the macroeconomic and
standalone public policy and regulatory variables.
The next chapter uses bivariate GARCH framework to study the impact of real estate market
on banks returns across three international markets, United States, United Kingdom and
Japan over a period of thirteen years between 1999 and 2011. The paper contributes to the
current literature in three ways. Firstly, more recent period is used in the thesis, and it
allows the comparison between current bank return behaviours with those in previous
periods in the literature. Secondly, three sub-periods are examined separately, which allows
to compare the return behaviours of banks and REITs under different economic cycle.
Thirdly, the paper extends the previous studies by comparing the impact of real estate factor
to bank stock return across three different international financial markets. The results show
that there is a significant volatility spillover effect from real estate sector to financial
institutions. When comparing between different countries and sub-periods, we notice the
level of sensitivity of all factors varies, which indicated the banks return and volatility
behaviours are influenced by the countries and economic cycle factors.
14
The last empirical chapter examines the impact of cross-sectional market volatility on the
portfolio returns by using zero-beta CAPM model. We test eight portfolio sets in total that
include a combination of common and financial institution stocks. The study contributes to
the current range of literature in four ways. Firstly, it provides further empirical evidence on
the influence of upside and downside volatility on asset returns into consideration.
Secondly, we apply the ZCAPM particularly on the financial institution stocks which have
not been examined before. The results suggest the cross-sectional zeta risk is highly related
to the financial institution portfolios returns as shown in common stock portfolios. Thirdly,
we extend our data range from January 1964 to December 2012 comparing with previous
studies that have a shorter period. Despite difference data range, we continue to find that
the cross-sectional market volatility is consistently significant at high level. The results show
that  the  ZCAPM  does  not  depend  on  the  period  of  the  sample.  Furthermore,  we  find
evidence that ZCAPM provide better expected portfolio returns than the well-known three-
and four-factor models. We compare the predicted realized excess returns versus actual
excess returns for the combined common stock portfolios, the results show that average
fitted excess returns for the ZCAPM spread out and fall fairly closely to average realized
excess returns. On the other hand, the average fitted excess returns from three-factor model
bunch up into a smaller range of values than that of average realized excess returns, and it is
expected that the Fama-French model has difficulty explaining small and growth portfolios
from literature. We see this result as market risk is composed of two components, average
market return and cross-sectional market volatility. Therefore, in order to access the impact
of market risk, we need to include both components in the analysis. Therefore, the results
show that ZCAPM significantly improve the expected returns, represented as average
predicted returns in the month ahead. Therefore, the major advantages of zero-beta CAPM
in this chapter is that it can provide better prediction on portfolio expected returns than
other traditional asset pricing model. The result also explains the unexplained return
15
behaviour from previous studies when only average market returns are included. Therefore,
we conclude that the cross-sectional market volatility is indeed a significant factor in
explaining the cross-sectional expected portfolio returns and zero-beta CAPM model can
provide better prediction on portfolio expected returns than other traditional asset pricing
model
1.4 LAYOUT OF THE THESIS
There are six chapters within the thesis with each of them concentrating on one
aforementioned research question. Chapter one is the general introduction of the thesis
which discusses the objectives, implications and contributions of the thesis. Chapter two is a
survey chapter that reviews current literature on financial institutions from risk and
regulatory perspectives. The following three chapters are empirical chapters which focus on
different areas of risk, regulation and return behaviour of financial institutions. Chapter
three examines the determinants of bank capital structures across fourteen countries. The
results indicate that bank-specific, regulatory and public policy variables collectively make a
significant contribution in explaining banking organizations target capital level. In chapter
four, the thesis investigates the return and volatility spillover from real estate market to
financial institutions across major markets and quantifies their magnitudes before and after
the financial turmoil. The last empirical chapter five examines the influence of cross-
sectional market volatility on the portfolio returns by using zero-beta CAPM model. The
study shows that the cross-sectional market volatility is indeed a significant factor in
explaining the cross-sectional expected financial institutional stock returns and should be
included in estimating the expected returns. Finally, chapter six concludes the thesis by
providing an overview of the research and general summary of issues examined.
16
Furthermore, the chapter discusses and identifies issues of risk management and return
estimation of financial institutions that worth future investigation.
17
CHAPTER TWO
OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS RISK MANAGEMENT
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Financial market is a market in which financial instruments can be purchased and sold,
which facilitates the flow of funds and transfer funds from those who have excess funds to
those who need funds. If financial market were perfect, all information would be
continuously and freely available to investors; all securities would be broken down into any
size desired by investors, and securities transaction costs would be non-existent. Under
these conditions, financial intermediaries would not be necessary.  However, because
markets are imperfect, investors do not have full access to information. In this case, financial
institutions are needed to facilitate the exchange of information and resolve the problems
caused by market imperfections.
Financial institutions provide products and services to the economy, which are different
from other industries due to the specialness in functions. The risks of financial institutions
are also closely associated with their special functions. There are two major functions of
financial institutions in the world in terms of flow of funds. One is the brokerage services, in
which financial institutions acts as an agent for the saver by providing information and
transactions services. The financial institution plays an important role by reduction
imperfections, such as information and transaction cost, due to economies of scale between
households and corporations. The other major function is as asset transformers. Asset
transformation function is that a financial institution issues financial claims that are more
18
attractive to household customers than the claims directly issued by corporation2.  To act as
asset transformers, financial institutions purchase the financial claims issued by corporations
as primary securities, such as equities, bonds and other claims. These purchases are financed
by selling financial claims in other forms to household investors and other sectors. Financial
institutions generate secondary securities by issuing the financial claims which are backed
by the primary securities issued by commercial corporations investing in real assets. The
financial risks are then transformed from the primary to secondary securities. Other special
aspects of financial institutions include the transmission of monetary policy, credit
allocation, time intermediation, payment services and denomination intermediation.
Financial institutions play a key role in the transmission of monetary policy from the central
bank to the rest of the economy (Saunders and Yourougou 1990).  One possible example of
the transmission is that the liabilities of depository institutions are a significant component
of the money supply that impacts the rate of inflation. Therefore, the depository institutions
are the conduit through which monetary policy actions impact the rest of the financial sector
and the economy in general. Financial institutions act as credit allocators due to the fact that
they are often viewed as a major and only source of financing for some particular sector of
the economy. The time intermediation nature of financial institutions is demonstrated as the
ability of saver to transfer wealth across generations. This function is especially encouraged
in pension funds and life insurances by giving special tax relief and other forms of benefits.
Due to the special services financial institutions provide, they are regulated by special
regulatory policies. We will discuss the special regulatory policies imposed on the financial
institutions later.
The major objective of financial institution management is to increase the returns for its
shareholders; however, the increase of returns sometimes comes with the increase of the
2 Saunders, A. and Cornett, M. M. 2008, Chapter 1, Financial Institutions Management: A Risk Management
Approach, 6th Edition, McGraw-Hill Publisher, ISBN 978-007-126704-5.
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risks. Financial institutions can be classified into different types by its main functions and
business activities; however the risks faced by them are more or less similar because of the
main function as financial intermediaries.  Types of financial institutions are outlined as
following:
Depository Institutions3: they are financial institutions that take deposits and make
loans. They control the largest proportion of financial assets. This category includes
commercial banks, savings institutions (savings banks and savings and loans
associations), and credit unions.  Their primary financial liabilities are deposits.
Finance Companies: similar to depositories in the financial assets that they specialize
in loans to businesses and consumers. Their financial liabilities are different from
those of depositories. They acquire most of their funds by selling commercial paper
and bonds and by borrowing from their rivals, commercial banks.
Contractual Intermediaries: this category is consisting of insurance companies, both
life insurance and property insurances companies, and pension funds, which
together are considered as contractual savings institutions, because they operate
under formal agreements with policyholders or pensioners who entrust their funds
to these firms.
Investment Companies: include mutual funds, money market funds, and REITs.
Securities Firms: they assist customers with purchasing and selling stocks, bonds,
and other financial assets. According to their activities, this industry is divided into
investment banking and brokerage. Investment bankers assist in the creation and
3  Mona J. Garden, Dixie L. Mills and Elizabeth S. Cooperman, Managing Financial Institutions – An Asset-
Liability Approach, 4th Edition, Harcourt College Publisher, ISBN 0-03-022054-8
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issuance of new securities. Brokers assist  in  transfers  of  ownership  of  previously
issued securities.
The remaining sections of this paper are structured as following: Section Two discusses the
different types of risks of financial institutions. We review the previous literature on interest
rate risk, market risk, credit and default risk, foreign exchange risk and liquidity risk
separately in detail; Section Three discusses the impact of real estate factor on the financial
institutions through two ways, direct and indirect real estate investments. Direct real estate
investments affect the financial institutions through on-balance sheet and indirect real estate
investments affect the financial institutions through off-balance sheet. In Section Four, we
review the importance of capital adequacy and development of Basel frameworks. We
continue with the discussion on the Basel III framework, and review the literature on the
potential impact on the financial institutions and the overall economy. We conclude the
chapter in Section Five.
2.2 RISK OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
There are several risks that are commonly faced by the financial institutions. Widely known
risks are interest risk, market risk, credit risk, foreign exchange and liquidity risk. Another
important risk is off-balance sheet risk, which is the risk incurred as the result of activities
related to the contingent assets and liabilities held off the balance sheet. Financial
institutions also face the risk of default by itself and particular countries. Insolvency risk is
the risk that a financial institution may not have enough capital to offset a sudden decline in
the value of its assets. Sovereign risk is the risk that repayments to foreign lenders or
investors may be interrupted because of restrictions, intervention, or interference from
foreign governments. Finally, financial institutions also face operational risk due to
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malfunction or break down of support system and technology risk when technological
investments do not produce anticipated cost savings.  In the following sections, we will
identify and review the recent literature of significant risks in more details.
2.2.1 INTEREST RATE RISK
Dinenis and Staikouras (1998) discuss there are at least three reasons that financial
institution stocks should be affected by the interest rate changes. Firstly, market portfolio
should be approximated by both equity and debt return due to risky debt instruments
(Stone 1974). Secondly, Flannery and James (1984b) introduce an explanation based on the
maturity mismatch. The equilibrium returns for financial institution assets and liabilities are
based on certain expectation of interest rate. Unexpected fluctuation in interest rate will
change duration match, and financial institutions would suffer significant income
fluctuations so that equity returns will be affected. Finally, financial institutions equities can
be considered as a call option on assets and, as a result, their stock returns should be affected
by changes in interest rates (Galai and Masulis 1976). The primary interest rate risk comes
from the special function of financial institutions as asset transformer of which financial
institutions buy primary securities or assets and issue secondary securities or liabilities to
fund asset purchases. The primary and secondary securities often have different maturities
and this mismatch of assets and liabilities results in interest rate risk. One of the most
familiar engagements of financial institutions involving in asset transformation is that
financial institutions borrow from economic agents with excess funds and lend to agents
with liquidity constraints. Both borrowing and lending contracts are determined based on
the interest rate; therefore, interest rate risk occurs when financial institutions mismatch
maturity and liquidity characteristics of rate-sensitive assets and liabilities. When financial
institutions have more rate-sensitive liabilities than assets, they are exposed to refinancing
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risk; therefore a rise in these short-term rates would lower their net interest incomes since
financial institutions have more rate-sensitive liabilities than assets. Conversely, if they have
more rate-sensitive assets than liabilities, the positive gap exposes them to reinvestment risk,
in that a drop in rates over this period would lower the net interest income. In addition,
financial institutions are also exposed to interest rate risk that is passed through from
market risk when interest rate changes. This is because when interest rate increases, the
discounted rate increase; therefore the market value the underlying assets and liabilities
decreases, which is based on the discounted present value of future and current cash flows.
In order to hedge the interest rate exposure, financial institutions use several models and
measures to monitor the interest rate risk. The first simple approach is the repricing model,
which is analysing the repricing gap between the interest income earned on assets and
interest expenses paid on liabilities over a particular period. The assets and liabilities are
classified into different buckets according to maturity, and reported at their historic values
or cost. Under repricing model, the interest rate changes affect only income statement rather
than the market value of assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. Therefore, one of the
critics of the repricing model is that it ignores the market value effect of interest rate
changes, as in reality the present value of all assets and liabilities changes as interest rate
changes. Another critic about repricing model is over aggregation across a range of
maturities ignoring information regarding the distribution of assets and liabilities. In
addition, repricing model only includes the assets and liabilities listed on the balance sheet.
While repricing model ignores the market value of balance sheet items, more comprehensive
duration model presents a market value-based model of managing interest rate risk.  The
duration concept was first introduced in Samuelson (1945). In his work, he proposes that if
weighted average duration of liabilities is greater than weighted average duration of assets,
an increase in interest rates will adversely affect the financial institution’s net worth
23
position. Under the duration model, financial institutions try to match the duration of their
interest sensitive assets and liabilities and evaluate the overall interest rate exposure by
measuring the duration gap on its balance sheet. The critics of the duration model have
often claimed that it is difficult to apply in a real-world situation. The immunization aspect
of the duration model was initially discussed in Redington (1952). It shows that the cash
flows of a bond with a specific duration are immunized against an instantaneous change in
interest rate. However, interest rates can change at any time over the holding period and at a
different rate. This requires the portfolio manager to rebalance the portfolio continuously to
ensure that the duration of the investment portfolio exactly matches the investment horizon.
Matching duration and restructuring the balance sheet of a large and complex financial
institution can be both time-consuming and costly. Therefore, there is a trade-off between
perfectly immunized and costs, and most portfolio managers only seek to be approximately
dynamically immunized against interest rate changes by rebalancing at discrete intervals.
The duration model does not provide a complete protection against the interest rate risk
when there are large interest rate changes due to the convexity. Duration model is able to
measure the price sensitivity of fixed-income securities for small changes in interest rate.
When a change is large, duration model is less accurate to measure the interest rate
sensitivity. Under duration model, the expected relationship between interest rate and price
changes is proportional to the duration. However, when experiencing large interest rate
increases, the duration model over-predicts the fall in bond price, and under-predicts the
rise in bond price for large interest rate decreases. This is a result of convexity nature of
bond price-yield relationship rather than linearity as assumed in the duration model.
Curvature of price-yield curve is favourable by financial institutions as it is similar to buying
partial interest rate risk insurance. In order to predict the price of fixed-income instrument
more accurately, financial institution managers also incorporate convexity into duration
model. Furthermore, the increased involvement in off-balance sheet activities in financial
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institutions creates significant exposure to risks not captured accurately by the duration
model. Some of interest rate risks arise from the option embedded in assets, liabilities and
off-balance sheet positions, such as loan repayment or guaranteed insurance contracts. This
impact on interest rate risk from embedded option is studied in Lee and Stock (2000). The
study shows both asset and liability durations decline when embedded options are present,
and liability duration declines more substantially. Thus, the duration mismatch arises. When
interest rates rises, the equity value of the financial institution decreases, and vice versa. In
the sophisticated model incorporating the convexity, Lee and Stock (2000) show  that  a
simple convexity hedging strategy with putable assets and callable liabilities reducing the
interest rate risk substantially. Moreover, duration matching approach does not take into
account the default or credit risk of assets. Drehmann et al (2010) derive a comprehensive
and consistent stress testing framework to measure the integrated impact of both risks. The
study takes account the fact that both credit and interest rate risks are driven by a set of
common macroeconomic risk factors. The result shows that credit and interest rate risks
have an impact on the FIs equity value, and interaction is quantitatively significant. A shock
of a significant increase in interest rate may lead to serious credit failure as macro condition
deteriorates. Based on the above critics, the duration gap analysis does not provide a
complete strategy to shelter interest rate risk, and the approach is also complicated because
of the lack of consistent information available.
For less condition constraint approach, the previous academic literature analyse the effect of
interest rate change on the capitalised value of a financial institution’s future cash flow by
applying market efficiency and equity market data to capture the interest rate sensitivity of
financial firms’ equity prices. The equity measure approach was gradually introduced with
the development of the portfolio theory asset pricing studies. Stone (1974) is the first few
study on two-index asset pricing and it extends the market model by including the debt
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factor which captures the influence of unexpected development in the yield curve on asset
price. The coefficient of debt factor is treated as the interest rate exposure beta. The
significant relationship between interest rate and equity price particularly implies that asset-
liability composition transmits interest rate fluctuation to the market as signals of changing
in earning prospects. Since the study of Stone (1974), the asset pricing approach has become
increasingly popular as it can be directly used for pricing the asset or liability whose value is
linked to nominal rather than a real term. Many literature, such as, Fama and Schwert (1977)
and Fogler et al (1981), has demonstrated the empirical significance of including interest rate
factor to a single factor model. The Stone’s model was later applied by Lloyd and Shick
(1977) on two samples of securities over 1969-1972 period, 60 large commercial banks and 30
firms included in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Long-term corporate bond index is
used to represent interest rate effect. The results show that only a relatively small proportion
of the sample exhibits significant coefficients and banks are only marginally significant to
the bond index fact. The reason is that the bond index factor used in the study is long-term
rather than short-term rate, and banks should be more sensitive to changes in short-term
rate. Although the interest rate effect is not as strong as expected, it is still more significant
than the market portfolio factor in the banking sectors. Gultenkin and Rogalski (1979)
challenge the approach and results in Lloyd and Shick (1977) by using the same set of data.
Gultenkin and Rogalski (1979) show that they are unable to duplicate the two-index model
result due to a possible discrepancy in the bond index data used in Lloyd and Shick (1977).
They also suggest that, in fact, Stone’s model related to returns as a function of covariances,
and Lloyd and Shick (1977) are actually testing for the existence of covariances. Chance
(1979) also  points  out  the  deficiency  in  the  conclusion  drawn from Lloyd and Shick (1977)
due to deficiencies concerning their data, statistical tests and misinterpretation of results.
Chance and Lane (1980) emphasize the lack of appropriate return generating model which
explains the mechanism through which interest rate movement is transmitted through the
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financial institution stock return performance. Contrary to the previous result which shows
the importance of interest rate effect on financial institutions, Chance and Lane (1980) show
that of 119 banks tested, less than 2 percent of stocks exhibit significant interest rate
sensitivity, suggesting that the interest rate factor should not be significant in explaining the
returns. Yourougou (1990) shows that interest rate risk is priced by the capital markets.
However, it failed to show the importance of interest rate risk premium, and the result
further indicates that the failure is due to insufficient sensitivity rather than from inadequate
interest rate volatility.
Lynge and Zumwalt (1980) include short- and long-term interest factors into two and three
index models for 57 commercial banks. The results show that although the level of
sensitivity is different among sample periods, a significant percent (ranging from 24 to 74
percent) of commercial banks exhibit significant interest rate coefficients. Booth and Officer
(1985) extend the previous studies by employing a pooled cross-section time-series model
with longer period sample. They also consider the effect of investors’ expectation by using
Meiselman-type (1962) error model of the term structure. The results support the findings in
Lynge and Zumwalt (1980) by showing significance of interest rate. It further shows that
banks show stronger sensitivity to anticipated and unanticipated changes in short-term
interest rates, and financial institution securities are more interest rate sensitive than non-
financial securities.
Although both sides of results have been shown, there is a common deficiency of empirical
research as there is no particular hypothesis on the reason of interest rate movements on
financial institution stock returns. Flannery and James (1984a) introduce the theory based on
the empirical evidence to relate the interest rate sensitivity of stock returns to the maturity
composition  of  the  firms’  nominal  asset  and  liability.  The  findings  show  that  the  stock
returns are highly correlated with interest rate changes. The size of the maturity difference
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between the bank’s asset and liability is positively related to the co-movement of stock
returns with changes in interest rate. Cross-sectional variation in the interest rate sensitivity
measure is significantly related to the maturity mismatch of the bank asset and liability.
Scott and Peterson (1986) follow the study of Flannery and James (1984a) by employing
seemingly unrelated regression procedures on hedged (commercial banks and life insurance
companies) and unhedged (savings and loans) financial institutions. Life insurance firms
were for the first time studied in the literature, and as expected, their behaviours are affected
similarly to those banks by unexpected interest rate changes. Financial institutions, such as
commercial banks and insurance companies that traditionally well-hedged against interest
rate risk by duration matching are not as substantially affected by interest rate changes as
less hedged financial institutions like savings and loans.
Bae (1990) re-examines the interest rate sensitivity of common stock returns and investigates
the effect of three interest rate indices of different maturities, short-, intermediate-, and long-
term. The study shows that current and unanticipated interest rate change is found to affect
negatively financial institution stock returns with stronger sensitivity for a longer-maturity
interest rate index. Bae interprets the reason of significance of current interest rate changes
due to a large portion of the changes corresponds to unanticipated changes. Most financial
and nonfinancial companies are not sensitive to anticipated interest rate changes since it is
expected in an efficient market, anticipated changes should be already embedded in stock
prices. The only exception is that saving and loan and REIT stock return is highly sensitive
to anticipated interest rate changes in intermediate-term rates. Similar to the findings in
Scott and Peterson (1986), less-hedged financial institutions are more sensitive to interest
rate changes than better-hedged financial institutions like finance companies.
The effect of interest volatility on financial institutions is also studied in the literature.
Aharnoy et al (1986) employ an event study on the impact of 1979 monetary policy regime
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change on the bank stock returns. It finds that, after decomposing the abnormal return of
stocks during the change of regime into unanticipated interest rate changes, the bank stock
returns are related negatively to unexpected interest rate changes and volatility. The adverse
relationship between returns and interest rate changes support the findings in previous
literature. The negative link between return and interest rate volatility reflects the fact that
an increase in rate variability may be at the cost of closure expense and regulatory tax
considerations of any favourable call and put options. Saunders and Yourougou (1990) also
incorporate the interest rate volatility into the model as an additional risk factor; however,
the volatility factor exhibits a mix of results depending on the period employed. They find
evidence as in previous studies that savings and loans are more sensitive than commercial
banks. They also show that companies from commercial industry do not exhibit interest rate
sensitivity, thus, they propose a possibility of eliminating the separation of banking from
commerce to facilitate efficiency in financial institutions. Most of the literature on interest
rate and its volatility effect are focusing on the US data. Dinenis and Staikouras (1998) study
the relationship by employing a three-index model on UK financial institutional equities.
The data reveals a significant negative relationship between stock returns and interest rate
changes as expected. Additionally, under UK data, the interest rate volatility has a positive
effect on both financial institutional and industrial equity returns.
2.2.2 MARKET RISK
Market risk is the risk related to the uncertainty of a financial institution’s earnings on its
trading portfolio caused by changes in market conditions, such as, price of an asset, interest
rates, market volatility and liquidity, etc4. As previously discussed, interest rate can affect
4 Saunders, A. and Cornett, M. M. 2008, Chapter 10, Financial Institutions Management: A Risk Management
Approach, 6th Edition, McGraw-Hill Publisher, ISBN 978-007-126704-5.
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market risk, however, in general, market risk refers and focuses on the risk of financial
institution’s trading portfolios, which is the asset and liability that actively trade rather than
holding for long-term purposes on both on- and off-balance sheet. With an increase in
securitization of bank loans, more and more assets have become liquid and tradable and
incomes from trading activities increasingly taking over incomes from traditional activities.
Market risk impact on the financial institution has been extensively studied in the literature.
Sharpe (1964) was the first to constructively include market risk premium into asset pricing
model. Bae (1990) investigates the effect of the market return on different types of financial
institutions, such as commercial banks, savings and loans, insurance companies, finance
companies as well as REITs. The results show that the market return has positive significant
impact on all financial institution portfolios. Akella and Chen (1990) and Choi et al (1992)
obtain similar results by using the same multi-index CAPM framework. Although different
data frequency is used, the significant impact of the market return to bank return remains
the same. Apart from market risk premium, the market volatility effect on financial
institutions has also been studied in recent literature. Variable conditional variance
methodologies, such as GARCH framework, are increasingly adopted (Elyasiani and
Mansur 1998, 2003, 2004 and Elyasiani et al 2007). Without any doubt, results of later studies
all show that financial institutions are sensitive to the changes of the general stock market.
Elyasiani et al (2007) show that the market beta for financial institutions is to be size-
dependent, with larger financial institutions displaying greater market beta values. The
difference in the market beta may be because larger financial institutions tend to be highly
leveraged, less liquid and more orientated towards no traditional banking activities such as
exotic derivatives, which can be highly risky. Furthermore, different types of financial
institutions have different market risk exposure (Allen and Jagtiani 1997). Security firms
have the lowest market risk premium with most market risk exposure.
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There are studies on various ways that financial institutions use to monitor market risk
exposure internally. Most widely-discussed measures are RiskMetrics and Value-at-Risk
models, including Historical and Monte Carlo Simulation. RiskMetrics was first introduced
by J.P. Morgan based on the Value-at-Risk (VaR) concept. Since then, RiskMetrics has
become increasingly popular for measuring market risk exposure. The RiskMetrics approach
is a member of ARCH/GARCH family that uses the exponential smoothing model in which
today’s volatility forecasts is a weighted average of yesterday’s volatility forecast and actual
volatility. RiskMetrics approach broadly tracks day-to-day volatility changes, and it focuses
on the recent rather than distant returns (McMillan and Kambouroudis 2009). Another
benefit of RiskMetrics is that it requires little data to be stored and contains only one
unknown parameter, which is a significant benefit in large portfolios. Despite that
RiskMetrics is widely used, there have been discussions on the reasonableness of the
method. One of the critics is the unrealistic assumption of normally distributed returns,
which does not take into account the presence of fat tail in most of financial data
distribution; thus, the model underestimates the risk. In addition, Johansson et al (1999) find
that because of the normal distribution assumptions, financial institutions with small
undiversified portfolios will significantly underestimate their actual risk exposure if using
RiskMetrics, while RiskMetrics produces reasonable estimates of downside risk for financial
institutions with highly diversified portfolios,. Furthermore, RiskMetrics model ignores the
payments of accrued interest on debt securities; thus, it will underestimate the true
probability of default and the appropriate level of capital to be held against this risk (Kupiec
1999). One the other hand, It is usually found that RiskMetrics performs satisfactorily well
given the unrealistic assumption. This is because the effect of fat tails is minor when one
calculates Value-at-Risk at commonly 95 percent. If higher significance level is used, fat tails
in the distribution of return will make RiskMetrics underestimates risks (Pafka and Kondor
2001). McMillan and Kambouroudis (2009) assess whether the RiskMetrics model can
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provide sufficient forecasts of volatility comparing to GARCH models. They find that using
mean error forecast metric the RiskMetrics model outperforms all other models. However,
the result suggests similar results as previous literature that the RiskMetrics model is
sufficient in providing volatility forecast when calculating the 5 percent Value-at-Risk for all
markets, and GARCH model is generally superior when calculating the 1 percent Value-at-
Risk forecasts.
Because of the criticism discussed above about RiskMetrics, majority of financial institutions
monitoring market risk compute Value-at-Risk of their trading portfolio. Value-at-Risk
model measures the downside market risk of a portfolio of financial assets and estimates
how much the value of a portfolio could decline over a given period with a given probability
(Hendricks 1996). Value-at-risk model aggregates several components of price risk into a
single quantitative measure of the potential loss of portfolio value. The most common VaR
model is equally weighted, exponentially weighted and historical simulation approached.
Historical simulation analysis is a procedure for predicting Value-at-Risk by constructing
the cumulative distribution function of asset returns over time. The main idea of historical
simulation is to take the current market portfolio of assets and revalue them on the basis of
actual returns that existed on those assets yesterday, the day before and so on. The empirical
performance of historical simulation based method for computing VaR has been examined
by Hendrick (1996) and Beder (1995). The advantages of historical simulation are that it is
relatively easy to implement; it does not assume any distribution on the asset return, and it
does not require calculation on correlations or standard deviations of asset returns.
However, the disadvantage of historical simulation is that it imposes a restriction on the
estimation assuming assets returns are independent and identically distributed. In reality, it
is not the case since asset returns usually exhibit pattern of volatility clustering that large
changes tend to be followed by large changes and small changes tend to be followed by
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small changes (Mandelbrot 1963). The second disadvantage is that traditional historical
simulation applied equal weight to all returns over the entire period considered, and it is not
realistic as there is diminishing predictability of data that is further away from the present.
This shortcoming can be overcome by using weighted historical simulation to give higher
weight to the more recent past observations, and semi-parameter filtered historical
simulations (Barone-Adesi et al 1999), which introduces additional terms to account for
time-varying correlations and the additional refinement is assumed to be independent and
identically distributed rather than actual asset returns. Another limitation of historical
simulation is that there may be a limited number of actual historical observations. To
overcome this limitation, financial institutions usually generate further observations by
using a Monte Carlo simulation to reflect the probability occurred in recent historical
periods.
Hendricks (1996) studies and compares twelve approaches to VaR model and tends to
produce risk estimates that do not vary greatly in the average size. However, the results
show the historical approach to be superior to others. Hull and White (1998) use weighted
average historical simulation and incorporate a volatility updating scheme such as GARCH
for calculating value at risk.  The results show that the simulation appears to provide better
estimates of daily returns and show substantial improvement at eliminating bunching of tail
events. Pritzker (2006) also adopts historical simulation based method for computing VaR,
and examines the way to test the problems associated with historical simulation. He shows
that back testing is not successful to detect the problem with historical simulations. The
filtered historical simulation method provides better results; however, the method for
choosing the length of the historical data series and augmenting additional extreme
observations needs further investigated.
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2.2.3 CREDIT AND DEFAULT RISK
Credit risk is defined as the potential degree of fluctuation in the value of debts and
derivative instruments due to changes in the underlying credit quality of counterparties. The
development in credit risk modelling has been rapidly over the past twenty years, and it has
become a key component of financial institution risk management. There is a wide variety of
credit risk models that differ in their fundamental assumptions such as the definition of
credit losses as mentioned both in Federal Reserve System Task Force on Internal Credit
Risk Models (FRSTF 1998) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS 1998). Apart
from the difference, the general purpose of these models is to forecast the probability
distribution function of losses that may arise from a bank’s credit portfolio. Since the credit
default or rating change is not common events, and debt instruments have set payments that
limit the possible returns, the loss distribution is generally not symmetric and skewed
toward zero with a long right-hand tail (Lopez and Saidenberg 2000). There are increasingly
proposals from many financial associations argue that credit risk models should also be
used to determine formally risk-adjusted regulatory capital requirement. However, the
development of corresponding regulatory standard for credit risk model is much more
challenging than for market risk model. One of the major difficulties of credit risk modelling
is the small number of forecasts available with which to evaluate the model’s forecast
accuracy. While the VaR model for market risk can generate more than 200 forecasts within
one year, the credit risk model can only produce one forecast per year due to longer
planning horizon. Furthermore, due to the nature of credit risk data, only a limited amount
of historical data on credit losses is available and certainly not enough to cover some credit
cycles (Lopez and Saidenberg 2000).
The development of credit risk management starts relying on subjective analysis on
borrower characters to assess the credit risk on issuing loans. The key factors included in the
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assessment are borrower-specific and market-specific factors. Borrower-specific factors are
specific characters to an individual borrower. Market-specific factors are those that have an
impact on all borrowers at the time of the credit decision5. These subjective judgmental
decisions are often referred as expert systems. Borrower-specific factors include borrower
reputation, capital structure, volatility of earnings and collateral. Market factors include
economic business cycle and level of interest rate. However, as a result of inefficiency of
banker expert system, financial institutions have increasingly moved away from subjective
system towards more objective based system (Altman and Saunders 1998).  More advanced
quantitative models are developed in recent year, such as accounting based credit scoring
system. The credit-scoring models are quantitative models that use observed loan
applicants’ characteristics either to calculate a score representing the applicants’ probability
of default or to sort borrowers into different default risk classes. Credit-scoring models
include four types of approaches: linear probability models, logit models, probit models and
discriminant analysis models. In order to apply credit-scoring models, the credit manager
must identify objective economic and financial measure of risk for any particular class of
borrowers. Unlike the previous less quantitative and judgmental based expert system,
credit-scoring models enable credit issuers predict a borrower’s performance more
accurately without having to use more resources. The probability and logit models use a set
of accounting variables to predict the probability of borrower default. The discriminant
model divides borrowers into high or low default risk classes contingent on their observed
characteristics, and both accounting and market variables that maximize the variance
between two risk types while minimizing within group variances. Altman and Saunders
(1998) have reviewed the literature in credit risk management models, and conclude the
most widely used model is discriminant analysis model. Martin (1977) uses both logit and
5 Saunders, A. and Cornett, M. M. 2008, Chapter 11, Financial Institutions Management: A Risk Management
Approach, 6th Edition, McGraw-Hill Publisher, ISBN 978-007-126704-5.
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discriminant models to predict banks failures in 1975-1976 period, and similar results are
obtained in terms of risk classification. West et al (1985) and Lawrence et al (1992) both use
the logit model on assessing the probability of default of financial institutions and home
loans respectively. They find that payment history is the most important predictor of
default. Altman et al (1977) examine the reliability of seven variables in predicting default
risk under discriminant analysis, of which the seven-variable discriminant analysis model is
usually called ZETA model. Scott (1981) compares several empirical credit models, and
concludes that the ZETA model provides the best forecast to the theoretical bankruptcy
construct.
Although the credit-scoring models provide a good result in forecasting default risk, there
are many criticisms. The first criticism is that the majority of credit-scoring models are based
on the accounting data which fail to include capital market data that reflects the fast-moving
changes in borrower’s conditions. Furthermore, the linearity assumption of the model does
not forecast actual market non-linear property accurately. Therefore, there are a few new
approaches have been developed in assessing the credit risk in the literature. The first class
is bankruptcy models of default risk, such as option models. The option pricing models in
Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) are similar to the risk of default in many aspects.
In the option pricing model, the probability of a firm going default depends crucially on the
beginning period market value of that firm’s asset relative to its outside debt, as well as the
volatility of market value of firm’s asset (Altman and Saunders 1998).  The utilisation of
option pricing model gains increasing popular such as in KMV (1993) and Kealhofer (1996)
models. The underlying theoretical relationship between credit risk and option pricing
model and can be viewed as a call option on the value of a firm’s asset, which reflects the
relationship between the observable volatility of a firm’s equity value and its unobservable
asset value volatility. However, as in any model, the option pricing model approach in
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assessing  credit  risk  has  criticism.  Firstly,  there  are  concerns  on  the  accuracy  of  using
volatility of a firm’s stock price as a proxy to derive the expected or implied variability in
asset value. Secondly, as some of the borrowers are non-public companies, there is a concern
on the efficiency of using public company information as comparable. Another quantitative
approach is capital market based mortality rate model by Altman (1988 and 1989) and the
aging approach model by Asquith et al (1989).  These models try to derive actuarial-type
probability of default from past bond default data by credit grade and year to maturity.
Again, given for the potentially extended use of the mortality rate model, it has been
criticized by the lack of sufficient loan default data. McAllister and Mingo (1994) show that
in order to develop very stable estimate of default probability, financial institutions would
need to have 20,000-30,000 data points. However, in reality, few financial institutions can
achieve this sample size.
With the development of increasing variety of loans within a particular portfolio, financial
institutions have realised the importance of measuring credit concentration risk. The credit
concentration risk is the overall spread of the bank’s outstanding accounts over a number of
borrowers. Earlier approaches on the concentration risk focus on the expert judgemental
decision on the maximum percent of loans to be allocated to the economic sector or
geographic location and on limiting exposure in the area to a certain percent of capital.
Financial institutions also use migration analysis, such as CreditMetricsTM 19976 approach, to
measure the transition probability of relatively homogenous loan moving from current to
any number of possible default states (Altman and Saunders 1998).  The  aim  of
CreditMetricsTM is to create a benchmark for credit risk measurement; promote credit risk
transparency and better risk management tool leading to improve market liquidity;
6 CreditMetricsTM 1997 is the first readily available portfolio model for evaluating credit risk developed and
introduced by J.P. Morgan in 1997. The CreditMetricsTM approach enables a company to consolidate credit risk
across its entire organization, and provides a statement of value-at-risk (VaR) due to credit caused by
upgrades, downgrades and defaults.
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encourage a regulatory capital framework that more closely reflects economic risk; and
complement other elements of credit risk management decisions7. Moreover, in recent years,
the application of modern portfolio theory (Markowitz 1959) to loans and fixed income
instruments has been increasingly recognized. Although not many studies have been found
in the literature, there are still some have made good attempts. Chirinko and Guill (1991) use
a macro-econometric model of US economy to generate future possible states of the world
and industry sector loan payoffs. Mean, variance and covariance are then calculated from
the loss distribution and efficient loan portfolio is constructed.
2.2.4 FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND LIQUIDITY RISK
With the globalization of the financial industry, financial institutions are increasingly
exposed to foreign exchange risk. There are several ways through which financial
institutions are exposed to foreign exchange risk. Firstly, financial institutions are affected
through foreign currency trading. Foreign exchange market is one of the largest world
financial markets. According to BIS survey in 2010, the average daily turnover was $3.98
trillion. Of all participants, Deutsche Bank is the main player followed by Citi, with market
share of 15.18% and 14.90% in 20138. Barclays and UBS have similar market share of 10.24%
and 10.11% respectively. There are four major FX trading activities. In the first two activities,
financial institution acts as an agent of its customers for a fee but does not assume the
foreign exchange risk itself: purchase and sale of foreign currencies to allow customers to
complete international commercial trade transactions and to take position in foreign real and
financial investments. The third activity is the purchase and sale of foreign currencies for
hedging purposes to offset customer or institution exposure in any given currency. The
7 J.P. Morgan release, Introduction to CreditMetricsTM 1997.
8 Source: Euromoney FX survey 2013: The Euromoney FX survey is the largest global poll  of foreign exchange
service providers.
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fourth activity is directly taking speculative trade in the sight of anticipating future
movement in foreign exchange rate so that foreign exchange risk exposure is essentially
related to open unhedged positions taken as a principle by the financial institution. In
addition, the second way of foreign exchange exposure results from any mismatch between
foreign financial asset and liability portfolios. Financial institutions usually control the
foreign currency exposure in both on- and off-balance-sheet hedging. Many literatures have
investigated the foreign exchange influence on firms (Allayannis and Ofek 2001, Brown 2001
and Chamberlain et al 1997). Studies particular on the financial institutions are relatively
less. Choi et al (1992) show that exchange rate factor is significant to bank stock returns,
especially returns of money-centre banks. However, there is no strong evidence to show to
what extent that banks have hedged their foreign currency positions. Wetmore and Brick
(1992) show support for Choi et al (1992), and find as interest rate risk declines, foreign
exchange risk increases. They find evidences that that foreign exchange risk is positively
related to foreign or less developed country loan exposure and negatively related to off-
balance sheet exposure, which implies foreign exchange risk is explained by unhedged
foreign loan activity.
Liquidity is another significant risk that all financial institutions face, especially during any
major economic crisis in history. Liquidity risk arises from both liability and asset sides of
financial institutions. Liquidity risk occurs when a liability holder, such as depositor or
insurance beneficial, seeks to cash in its financial claim immediately, so that financial
institutions need to borrow additional funds or even sell assets to meet the withdrawal.
Asset side liquidity risk arises including the ability to fund the exercise of off-balance sheet
loan commitment, which allows a customer to borrow fund on immediate liquidity demand.
The liquidity risk is closely related to liquidity buffers requirement in the Basel III to
enhance the resilience to shocks of the financial system under a broad range of market
conditions. Issues related to capital structures are discussed in the later section in the paper
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in more detail. Cifuentes et al (2005) show the importance of liquidity stability as a forced
sale of the asset may feedback on market volatility and produce a downward spiral in asset
price, which in turn will affect adversely other financial institutions. Their findings show
that liquidity buffer plays an important role similar to the capital buffer and more effective
than capital buffer in forestalling systematic effect. To keep an adequate liquidity level is
even more vital in the period of the economic downturn. Cornett et al (2011) assess the
liquidity risk management and credit supply during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. During
the period, liquidity dries up because of the collapse of asset- and mortgage-backed
securities and freezing in the interbank market, especially in the fourth quarter of 2008 after
the failure of Lehman Brothers and AIG bailout. They find that banks with more illiquid
asset portfolios increased their holding of liquid asset and decreased lending. Off-balance
sheet liquidity risk materialized as borrowers took loan commitments, which constrained
new credit origination even further. Therefore, the finding supports that liquidity risk
exposure plays a vital role and can explain bank credit production during the crisis.
2.3 REAL ESTATE INFLUENCE ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Since 1980s, there is a large shift of loan portfolios into real estate in banking firms in United
States, and it has been observed as a trend in the banking industry worldwide. The banking
industry has changed substantially since the saving-and-loan crisis of the 1980s. Before the
crisis, there are a large number of small and specialized firms, and traditional banking
industry was fragmented. Since 1980s, segmented banking firms are consolidated, and a
new financial service industry was gradually formed. One of the significant reforms is
commercial banks shifted their product and asset portfolios into consumer lending, which
was traditionally a specialty of thrifts and credit unions. The number of real estate banks,
which hold more than 40% of loans secured by real estate,  has increased from 1,724 in 1989
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to 2,835 in year 1996 (Blaško and Sinkey 2006). On the other hand, the total number of banks
has dropped from 12,702 to 9,529 in 1996.
Real estate has been considered as a relatively high average return investment relative to its
risk. Institutional investors have favoured to include real estate in their portfolio as a good
diversification instrument since 1980s. Real estate returns are as predictable as the stock
returns, and performs well in an asset-liability framework. In addition, the chance of
experiencing a large loss on real estate in the long term is very small (Chun et al 2004). The
changes in the real estate returns reflect the changes in the property values, and it can have
greater effects on bank risk and profitability (He et al. 1996). Therefore, real estate returns
should have an explanatory power on the risk and return of the financial institution stocks.
Although the importance of real estate has drawn many researchers’ attention, there are not
much literature on the study of the sensitivity of financial institution stocks to real estate
returns. The early research on the impact of real estate loans can be found in Eisenbeis and
Kwast (1991), in which they study the economic viability of the financial institution
concentrating on real estate loans for period 1978-1988. They classify the banks into two
groups: one group containing banks with 40% or more real estate loans, and the other group
with 40% or more real estate loans for five or more years. This classification is later adopted
in Blaško and Sinkey (2006). The results show that banks with longer real estate loan history
have higher returns with less risk than more diversified banks over the period 1978-1988,
and those high return banks exhibit substantial flexibility in their ability to adjust their real
estate loan holdings.
Mei and Lee (1994) find the presence of a real estate factor, in addition to both stock and
bond factors in asset pricing, which addresses the importance to include real estate exposure
in asset portfolios. Allen et al (1995) first explicitly introduce the idea of the impact of real
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estate market condition on the banking industry. They argue that for bank stocks to be
significantly related to the real estate market they have to have significant exposure to the
real estate, i.e. the amount of real estate holdings and the effectiveness of real estate market
impact on the holdings. They use the seemingly unrelated regression framework to estimate
a three-factor index model on bank stock returns to market, interest rate and real estate over
1979-1992. The findings show that, apart from market and interest rate, stock returns on
large and medium size bank portfolios are positively and significantly related to the level of
returns on real estate. Also, the sensitivity of bank returns to a real estate index has
increased over time, which reflects a shift to real estate investment over the period in 1980s.
Similarly, He et al (1996) use the same method, and he compares the results when different
proxies of return series are used. He uses six proxies for the real estate returns: equally-
weighted indices of monthly and weekly returns on all tax qualified REITs, equity REITs
and mortgage REITs. He divides the bank holding company portfolios into 18 segments
according to the feature of the loan, e.g. constructions, farmland or residential. Different
combinations of portfolio returns and proxies are analysed by the three-factor model. The
results show that mortgage and all value REIT returns have better performance. Among all
the combinations, the most appropriate proxies of market returns, interest rates and real
estate returns are equally weighted market index, the unexpected changes in yields on long-
term government bonds, and the MREITs returns respectively. He also notes that banks with
a large proportion of loan investments are more sensitive than those with a smaller
proportion. However, farm loans do not experience sensitivity on the bank stocks returns.
In his later research, He et al (1997) further test how different types and quality of real estate
loans affect the sensitivity of bank stocks to real estate returns by using the most appropriate
proxies obtained in He et al (1996). The quality of real estate loans is tested according to the
nature of loans. The results confirm the previous studies on the bank real estate sensitivity.
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Different from the results before, he shows that farmland loans have a negative impact on
bank real estate return, of which could perform as diversification role in terms of reducing
bank real estate return sensitivity. As for the quality of real estate loans, when using
mortgage REITs returns, charge-off real estate loans have a negative impact on the bank
stock returns to real estate returns, however, the impact of recovery real estate loan is
positive.
Mei and Saunders (1995) use the GMM approach to test the multi-factor model restriction on
the returns of five portfolios, including general stock market, bond, real estate, and bank
stock portfolios. The bank stock returns are divided into a money centre bank group and a
non-money centre bank group, and two return series on equally-weighted bank stock
portfolios are used. The model allows flexibility of the influencing factors on the bank stock
return by not restricting particular factors. They find that the time variation in bank risk
premiums has been partly determined by interest rate and real estate market conditions.
Real estate return has been most important for large nonmoney center banks. Mei and
Saunders (1997) extend the study by including real estate investment data of savings and
loan associations and life insurance companies along with bank stock returns. When
estimating the real estate returns, they not only use equally weighted equity REITs as in Mei
and Saunders (1995), but also they include the equally weighted returns on real estate
company stocks and mortgage REITs. They argue that mortgage REITs returns offer a
particularly good proxy to the underlying returns on financial institution’s real estate loan
portfolios since from investment perspectives, the ‘payoff’ structure of the real estate loan
portfolio of the financial institution is similar to underlying the mortgage loan asset portfolio
of mortgage REIT. The study discovers a trend-chasing behaviour that the real estate
investment made by US commercial banks and saving and loans have been driven by ex
post real estate returns as well as ex post market returns.
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Ghosh et al (1997) examine the event study on financial institution stock price behaviour
from a different aspect. They analyse the stock price behaviour around the announcement of
declining real estate values during the crisis late 1980s and early 1990s. They show that
financial institutions have significant negative stock price reaction to the announcement of
adverse real estate news. The study further supports the indication of real estate impact on
the financial institution stock returns. In He (2002), monthly percentage change in median
sale price of the new house sold is used as a proxy for the real estate return. The results
show that a common set of variables is useful in explaining the return of commercial banks,
insurance companies and diversified financial institutions. He also shows that the inclusion
of real estate market factor in the model can significantly raise its explanatory power.
Therefore, it suggests that the real estate market factor indeed represents a systematic risk
and plays an important role in explaining the returns on financial institution stocks. He also
finds real estate market factor has very stable significant coefficients, except for two sub-
periods in the 10 year periods, 1978-1987, which reflects the dramatic bank deregulation and
unprecedented interest rate volatility. This supports the assumption that real estate market
experiences similar but less pronounced cycle as stock and bond markets.
In the recent literature, more studies have been focusing on relaxing the time-constant
restrictions on the estimation process. He and Reichert (2003) use Flexible Least Square
method on a three-factor Fama-French model to determine the returns of financial
institution stocks for period 1972-1995. The study includes an index of overall financial
institution performance, and indices for bank stocks and insurance companies to examine
any difference in the return behaviour among sectors. The results find evidences that the
real estate sensitivity of FI stock returns was statistically significant during most of the
period 1972-1995. However, there are only two short sub-periods, 1972-73 and 1979-80 in
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which the real estate market factor did not play a significant role in explaining risk premium
of financial institutions.
Since most literature on financial institution stocks has been focusing on the more matured
United States market, and Lu and So (2005) are the first few studying the real estate impact
on the bank stocks in Asia. They study the return relationships between listed banks and
real estate firms in seven Asian countries before and after the Asian financial crisis in 1997,
including Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand.
They use a three-factor model to capture the impact of general stock market, interest rate
and real estate returns on bank stock portfolios over 1995-1999. The Grange-Causality results
between real estate and bank stock returns show that the real estate returns do have an
explanatory power in the bank stock returns in the Asian market; however, the reverse
relationship is not established. In addition, Asian banks are exposed to the real estate risk
both before and after the crisis like those in United States, and risk increases in the post-
crisis period, which implies the underlying collateral on the bank real estate lending process
is recognized.
2.4 CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
2.4.1 DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Financial institutions need to protect against the risk of insolvency and shield it from the risk
sufficiently large to cause the institution to fail. The mean of protection is the capital of
financial institutions. Capitals in financial institutions extend beyond the role to perform a
number of functions related to ensure the long-run viability of the organizations (Valentine
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1999)9. In general, the first function of capital is to absorb unanticipated losses with enough
margins to inspire confidence and enable the financial institution to continue as going
concern. In addition, capital protects uninsured depositors, bondholders and creditors in the
event of insolvency and liquidation. The capital of a financial institution also offers
protection to insurance funds and the taxpayers who bear the cost of insurance fund
insolvency. It also protects the industry from larger insurance premiums. Furthermore,
capital is an important source of financing for a financial institution to fund the branches
and other real investments necessary to provide financial services10.
There is extensive literature in studying the determinants and optimal capital structure of
financial institutions (Modigliani and Miller 1958, Berger et al. 1995, Stolz 2002, Santos 2001).
The starting point of all modern research on capital structure is from Modigliani and Miller
(1958), which shows in a frictionless world of full information and complete market, a firm’s
capital structure cannot affect its value. This result is in contrast with the intuitive notion
that a firm with risk-free debt could borrow at an interest rate below the required return on
equity, reducing its weighted average cost of financing and increasing its value by
substituting debt for equity. If depositors are perfectly informed about the bank’s
investment strategies, they will demand deposit rates that fully reflect the bank’s risk.
Hence, shareholders cannot exploit their controlling position, and maximizing the share
value is equivalent to the maximization of the bank’s total value (Modigliani and Miller
1958). Under this framework, the value maximizing portfolio and social optimal risk levels
are always chosen, and the market value of a bank is independent of its capital structure,
and hence, there would be no need for regulation. Therefore, under Modigliani and Miller
9 Valentine, T. J. and Ford, G. (1999) Readings in Financial Institution Management: Modern Techniques for A
Global Industry, St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin Publisher, ISBN: 186448747X.
10 Saunders, A. and Cornett, M. M. 2008, Chapter 20, Financial Institutions Management: A Risk Management
Approach, 6th Edition, McGraw-Hill Publisher, ISBN 978-007-126704-5.
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(1958)’s assumption of frictionless world, the market prices will compensate for any leverage
decision by the firm. When the leverage is higher, so is the risk to shareholders, increasing
the cost of equity so that the weighted average cost of financing remains constant. However,
banks differ from other non-financial firms in two important respects that affect their capital
structures according to Berger et al (1995). The first feature is the presence of regulatory
safety net that protects the safety and soundness of banks and the likely lower bank capital.
The second aspect is the regulatory capital requirement that raises the capital of some banks.
Capital regulation influences the bank’s decision by acting as a constraint to their
optimization. The bank’s market capital requirement is defined as the ratio of equity to
assets that maximizes the value of the bank to distinguish it from regulatory capital
requirements (Berger et al 1995). The safety net for banks, which includes federal deposit
insurance, unconditional payment guarantees, access to the discount window, and other
bank safety regulations, possible lowers market capital requirements by insulating banks
from potential market discipline. Berger et al (1995) shows during 19th to 20th century, there
is  a  continuous  drop  in  the  capital  ratio,  during  which  the  capital  ratio  of  banks  in  the
United States drops from 50% in 1840 to 7% in 1990s. The constant decrease in the equity to
asset ratio over the year may be as a result of banks’ safety net, capital requirement and
regulations since banks generally have the lowest equity to asset ratio of firms in any
industry. Apart from the impact of capital requirements and regulation, factors like taxes,
expected cost of financial distress, transaction cost, signalling behaviour, agency cost arising
from asymmetric information between shareholders and creditors and between owners and
managers can also influence the banks’ capital structure.  In addition, banks may have an
incentive to increase portfolio risk due to moral hazard resulting from incomplete
contracting and together with the safety net, such as limited liability and deposit insurance
(Thies and Gerlowski 1989, Wheelock 1992). Under the deposit insurance, depositors do not
incur  any  risk  by  depositing  their  funds  with  a  bank  under  full  cover.  Their  pay-off  is
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deterministic and independent of the riskiness of the banks’ assets, and they lose any
incentive to monitor banks behaviour. Wheelock (1992) shows that the balance sheet of
insured banks reflecting greater risk-taking, and insured banks are more likely to fail than
non-insured banks. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2006) find evidence that during 1980-
1997, explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the likelihood of banking crisis. The impact
is stronger where bank interest rates are deregulated, and institutional environment is
weaker, which shows higher moral hazard due to deposit insurance.
Another factor influence the capital structure is charter value and reputation of a financial
institution. In a dynamic framework, banks that go bankrupt are likely to suffer losses
related to future payoffs, such as, reputation, financial regulations, and charter value (Suarez
1994). The higher the bank’s charter value, the higher is the bank’s private cost of portfolio
risk and leverage. In addition, financial liberalization tends to increase the intensity of
competition between financial institutions while financial institutions are given greater
flexibility to allocate assets and to determine interest rates. If the competition erodes the
charter value, then the bank will increase leverage and risk. As a consequence, they tend to
engage in higher risk activity in order to pursue higher profit (Hellman et al. 2000). Keeley
(1990) shows empirical evidence that the increase in competition causes bank charter value
to decline. He argues the decline in charter value will increase the default risk through
increase in asset risk and reduction in capital.
All of the above discussions are from shareholders’ aspects. We assume shareholders control
the financial institutions and the managers act fully in the shareholders’ interest. However,
in many situations, manager may have preference diverging from shareholders’ interest
(Stolz 2002). Saunders et al. (1990) discuss the conflict of interests between shareholders and
bank managers, and show that agency problem arising from the conflict of interests between
shareholders and managers may also impact the bank capital structure. Furthermore, the
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recapitalization of capital-constraint banks is found to have an impact on the bank capital
structure. Furlong and Keeley (1989) examine the difference in stock price reaction after
voluntary capital injection by commercial banks and involuntary recapitalization required to
meet regulatory capital requirement, and find evidences of a significant drop in the share
price of capital-constrained banks after recapitalization. However, if banks have high
capitalization rate, the stock price does not show a significant response and less decrease in
magnitude. Cornett and Tehranian (1994) also support the drop in share price after
recapitalization. Berger et al (2008) found banks that would face a lower cost of raising
equity at short notice tend to hold significantly more capital. Therefore, shareholder and
banks managers need to take into account of the recapitalization cost and effect on the share
price when making decision on their capital position.
2.4.2 BASEL CAPITAL ADEQUACY FRAMEWORK
The conclusions of the study on whether regulatory capital requirements in the banking
industry are the first order determinant of banks are mixed. It is widely considered that FIs
would retain less capital as it is more costly for banks than other types of funding. And it is a
common view that capital regulation reduces moral hazard, as there is an incentive for
financial institutions to take on excessive risk with high leverage level. However, there are
some studies show that banks are more often willing to hold positive levels of capital well
above the regulatory minimum, that the actual capital holdings tend to vary independently
of regulatory changes internationally (Allen et al 2010, Flannery and Rangan 2008, Ashcraft
2001, Alfon et al 2004, Barrios and Blanco 2003, Gropp and Heider 2010). Although the
capital holding ratio is well above the regulatory minimum and continues to increase over
the past few decades, the financial crisis that started in 2007 raised the question of whether
banks were, in fact, undercapitalized. Banking crisis associated with sudden changes in asset
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quality and value are often systemic in nature, arising from the interconnectedness of
financial arrangement (Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson 2010). From historical experiences,
banking crises have been associated with major economic disruptions and recessions.
Therefore, policy makers regulate the amount of capital that banks are required to hold, and
require high standards of corporate governance, such as liquidity management, accounting,
audit and lending practices (Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson 2010). The most significant
regulatory affecting the banking industry perhaps is the capital adequacy framework for
internationally active banks. In this section, we will present and overview of the third Basel
Capital Accord, known as Basel III, and its potential impacts on the banking industry and
the overall economy which have been discussed in the current literature. Studies have
shown that the 2008 global financial crisis was triggered and aggravated as a result of
insufficient level of capital and inadequate level of quality capital. Therefore, Basel III is a
direct response to the global financial crisis and to revise the shortcomings of Basel I and
Basel II in addressing the capital requirements of internationally active banks. In the
following section, the paper starts with a discussion on the previous capital adequacy
framework, Basel I and Basel II, and their criticism associated with the each framework.
2.4.2.1 BASEL I AND BASEL II FRAMEWORKS
Basel I - 1988
The basic theory in the financial industry is asset transformation, in which financial
institutions, especially banks, borrow from the market and depositors and lend to
borrowers. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was formed in 1974 to advise
national financial regulators on common capital requirements for internationally active
banks. During later 1980s and 1990s, there is a worldwide deregulation in banking and
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financial industry. Financial institutions fiercely compete for larger market share both
domestically and internationally at the cost of institution capital bases. Internationally active
banks take advantages of different national standards in the treatment of asset, capital and
risk level. Due to perceived failings of deregulation, Basel Committee introduced Basel I in
1988 in the hope to set out a global standard for guidance on the proper capital levels for
internationally active banks. As summarized in King and Tarbert (2011), Basel I consists of
three main components. Firstly, it standardizes the minimum regulatory ratio for
internationally active banks11. Covered banks are required to hold at least 8% capital of their
total risk-weighted assets. Secondly, it provides a basic definition on qualifying regulatory
capital, which is consist of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Tier 1 capital generally includes the
highest quality capital, such as common equity and preferred stocks. Tier 2 capital is lower
quality and riskier instruments, such as subordinated term debt and certain hybrid
instruments. Basel I requires that at least half of bank’s regulatory capital is Tier 1 capital.
Thirdly, Basel I introduce a risk-weighted asset measure to account for the different risk
levels inherent assets. Risk-weighted assets categorize different assets according to their
credit risk, and assets in the same category are given the same weighting. However, the risk-
weighted categories have been largely criticized by the uniform bucket weighting regardless
of the credit standing of individual assets. It facilitates the banks chase higher yield at
greater risk without necessarily incurring additional capital. Another criticism on Basel I is
its failure to form a concise definition of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, which results in banks to
rely on the instrument of questionable quality as part of their capital cushion (King and
Tarbert 2011).
11 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank For International Settlements, Publication: International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standard (July 1988, updated to April 1998); Available on
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf
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Basel II - 2004
Improving from the criticism in Basel I, the Basel Committee issues a more comprehensive
and risk-sensitive capital regulation approach known as Basel II in 2004. Basel II includes
three pillars: minimum capital requirements, supervisory review process and market
discipline. The first pillar focuses on the maintenance of regulatory capital. In Basel I, only
credit risk of assets is considered when calculating risk-weighted assets. In Basel II,
operation risk and market risk are added in risk-weighted asset calculation. There is also an
improvement in the asset weighting system. In order to give more accurate weighting to
match the riskiness of its assets, Basel II provides three methods of evaluating credit risk: a
basic standardized approach and two variants of an internal rating-based approach-
foundational and advanced (King and Tarbert 2011). The standardized approach allows
banks to calculate risk-weighted assets by reference to both Basel I’s elementary buckets and
external credit ratings, such as Standard & Poor, Moody and Fitch Ratings. The other two
internal rating-based approaches allow banks to use more sophisticated their own risk
management models to calculate their risk-weighted assets and capital needs. There is an
obvious improvement in Basel II framework comparing with Basel. However, the global
financial crisis in 2008 had demonstrated the limitations of Basel II in a number of areas.
Firstly, although the definition of RWA and Tier 1 has significantly improved, the financial
crisis still demonstrates the ambiguities in the definition. The loose definition gives banks
opportunity to structure financial products to comply with Basel II with lower cost of capital
when the actual equity capital holding is as little as 1 percent. Secondly, there are concerns
on the way banks structure their liabilities.  Thirdly, there are critical deficiencies in the risk
management models used by internationally active banks and rating agencies. Fourthly, the
financial crisis has shown that Basel II is inefficient in capturing major on- and off-balance
sheet risks and derivative related exposures.
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2.4.2.2 BASEL III FRAMEWORK
In response to the observed regulation deficiencies from recent financial crisis, Basel
Committee aims to increase the quality and quantity of capital that banks must hold, and
Basel III is officially endorsed by member states of the Group of Twenty in November 2010.
Additional measures of recent Basel reforms also include: a tightening of the definition of
common equity; limitation on qualification as Tier 1 Capital; introduction on a set of system-
wide prudential filters to address systemic risk within the global financial system; and the
enhancement of transparency and market discipline through new disclosure requirements
(Ojo 2010). The revised Basel framework has addressed criticism raised from Basel I and II
substantially.  In  the  following  section,  we  will  discuss  the  Basel  III  framework  and
improvement from Basel II in further details.
2.4.3 SPECIAL CHARACTERS OF BASEL III FRAMEWORK
QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF CAPITAL
After the financial crisis, the highest priority of Basel committee needs to strengthen the
quality, consistency and transparency of the regulatory capital base12. Therefore, the new
Basel III in general requires the capital base of every internationally active bank is backed by
a high-quality buffer that can absorb losses during periods of economic distress. Blundell-
Wignall and Atkinson (2010) show that the crisis is, in fact, due to the insufficient quality of
capital rather than to the lack of capital. In Basel III, it continues to maintain the requirement
that the total capital must be at least 8 percent of risk-weighted assets as in Basel I and II.
However, Basel III increases the Tier 1 capital percentage within the total capital from 50
percent to 75 percent, and only up to 25 percent of total capital consisting of Tier 2 capital.
12 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank For International Settlements, Publication: Strengthening
The Resilience Of The Banking Sector – Consultative Document 13 (2009); Available on
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc164.pdf
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Comparing with previous Basel framework, Basel III breaks down Tier 1 into two categories,
Common Equity Tier 1 and Additional Tier 1. Within Tier 1 capital, Common Equity Tier 1
capital is required to take at least 75 percent of total Tier 1 capital, and up to the remaining
25% is Additional Tier 1 capital. Therefore, in proportion, Basel III requires at least 6 percent
of risk-weighted assets as Tier 1 capital,  which is  consist  of  at  least  4.5 percent of  RWAs as
Common Equity Tier 1 and up to 1.5 percent of RWAs as Additional Tier 1 capital. Within
total 8 percent Total Capital, Tier 2 capital should be no more than 2 percent of total RWAs.
Basel III strengthens the definition of Tier 1, including Common Equity Tier 1 and
Additional Tier 1, and Tier 2 capital. In general, Common Equity Tier 1 consists of the bank’s
common stock and any common stock surplus, such as share premium or additional paid-in
capital. Basel III strictly establishes criteria for shares to be classified as common equity.
Criteria include that instruments at issue must represent the most subordinated claim in the
liquidation of a bank; have a perpetual principal; not be bought back, redeemed or
cancelled; have dividend features that are not entirely discretionary at the option of the
bank; be recognized under applicable accounting standards as equity; and be issued as part
of an arms-length transaction with a third party (King and Tarbert 2011).  Thus, Additional
Tier 1 capital includes various types of preferred stocks and additional paid-in capital that
do not otherwise satisfy the standards of Common Equity Tier 1 as discussed above. Apart
from these, Additional Tier 1 capital also includes instruments issued by consolidated
subsidiaries of a bank held by third parties. Furthermore, as Tier 1 capital is to provide
banks with an equity cushion as going-concern, Tier 2 capital is usually referred as ‘gone-
concern’ to provide loss absorption for junior equity and liabilities. Therefore, Tier 2
includes capitals which can not be classified as Tier 1, such as, preferred stock with non-
perpetual and debt-like feature, as well as various types of subordinated debt.
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ADDITIONAL CAPITAL BUFFER – CAPITAL CONSERVATION
The experiences of financial services have shown that some banks continued to distribute
dividends and bonuses which further weakened capital reserves to absorb further losses.
Therefore, Basel III sets new requirements for two additional buffers as further capital
cushion against future losses. The first one is capital conservation buffer. The capital
conservation buffer will require banks to retain an additional 2.5 percent of Total Capital in
the form of Common Equity Tier above the minimum 4.5 percent, which effectively brings
the Common Equity Tier 1 requirement to 7 percent of RWAs. In a period of stress, Basel III
temporarily allows banks to go below 7 percent ratios, however, banks must rebuild the
buffer through reduction of discretionary distributions, such as, share buybacks and
employees bonuses distribution.
ADDITIONAL CAPITAL BUFFER – COUNTER CYCLICAL BUFFER
Another additional buffer under Basel III is the countercyclical buffer, which is introduced
to achieve as a second pool of additional capital accumulated during periods of high credit
growth. It requires banks to build up extra buffer when supervisors are aware of excessive
credit in the system. This is because when there is excessive credit in the market, loans are
built up, and price increased leading to asset bubbles. When the bubbles eventually burst,
prices  drop  and  loans  are  left  unpaid.  Banks  start  to  reduce  lending  which  pushes  down
asset prices even further, thus, the level of defaults (Hannoun 2010). Therefore, the
countercyclical buffer aims to act as a brake on the credit availability in the event of the
economic downturn with restricted credit after the excessive credit growth (King and
Tarbert 2011). Basel III requires national authorities to monitor the level of credit growth in
the system, and the buffer should range from additional zero to 2.5 percent of RWAs on top
of previous Tier 1 capital ratio. Therefore, after accounting for both additional buffers, the
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potential maximum capital ratio required by Basel III is 13 percent of RWAs. Cosimano and
Hakura (2011) show that the excess credit growth could have a significant countercyclical
impact on the developed countries’ economies, and suggest such measure should be closely
coordinated with monetary policy decision-making to avoid an excessive policy-tightening.
There are arguments over the Basel III, and one of them is on the calculation of risk-
weighted assets RWAs. Basel III does not revise the methodology of risk weighting on
complex instruments. Ennis and Price (2011) argue the reason is lack of clear alternative with
a clear superior track record. They argue that the influence of increasing minimum capital
requirement under Basel III is still unknown. The potential benefits of large capital buffer
are to against losses and provide better incentives for controlled risk-taking, and thus fewer
bank failures and less potential for systemic crises. Demirguc-Kunt et al (2010) compare
behaviour of banks with different capital ratios before and during the financial crisis in 2008.
They find that differences in capital ratio do not have an impact on bank stock returns when
the market is stable. However, during the crisis, banks with stronger capital position have
better stock market performance. They also find a positive association with subsequent stock
return is stronger for higher quality capital, particularly Tier 1 and tangible common equity.
The results in Demirguc-Kunt et al (2010) support the development of Basel III policy for the
importance of stronger capital position and greater emphasis on higher quality capital in the
form of Tier 1 capital and tangible equity.
On the other hand, apart from the costs of raising Tier 1 capital, instead of issuing new
equity, banks may reduce lending or even liquidating bank-specific productive assets, which
will result in constrain in the credit market Ennis and Price (2011). Cosimano and Hakura
(2011) estimate that the large banks worldwide on average would raise their lending rates by
on average 16 basis points in order to increase their equity-to-asset ratio by 1.3 percentage
points needed to achieve the Basel III regulation of 7 percent equity to RWAs. The result also
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suggests that banks in different countries show variations with respect to changes in loan
rates due to variations in capital constraints, the net cost of raising equity and elasticity of
loan demand. Another critic of the countercyclical buffer measure is using a single global
risk factor that ignores the country economic differences. Blundell and Atkinson (2010) show
that idiosyncratic credit risk and security market portfolio risk associated with individual
borrowers in different business and regions is not well catered under Basel III that may
undue reliance on cumbersome supervisory override as in the past Basel framework.
LEVERAGE RATIO
In addition to the extra buffers, Basel III also recognises the importance of the leverage ratio
in monitoring the healthiness of financial institutions. The introduction of the leverage ratio
is intended to avoid the build-up in excess leverage that can lead to a deleveraging credit
crunch in a crisis (Blundell and Atkinson 2010). However, a financial institution with strong
capital ratio still suffers from excessive leverage especially during the financial crisis. Basel
III introduces the leverage ratio by comparing the proportion of Tier 1 capital to total
exposure instead of RWAs. It requires the leverage ratio to be at least 3 percent, which
means the Tier 1 capital should be at least 3 percent of total exposure. The key issue in the
leverage ratio is the clear definition of total exposure. The discussion on what should be
accounted in the total exposure is still in progress. The introduction of a minimum leverage
ratio to supplement minimum risk-adjusted capital requirements is supported by Demirguc-
Kunt (2010), as they find during the crisis stock returns of large banks are more sensitive to
the leverage ratio than the risk-adjusted capital ratio. Blundell and Atkinson (2010) show
that the leverage ratio has a negative relationship with losses in the crisis because of high
risk-taking due to capital arbitrage under the Basel weighting of assets and banks
willingness to take on more risk. If the leverage ratio is set too high, bank will have an
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incentive to arbitrage the weights to ensure they do not hold any more capital than needed.
However, Blundell and Atkinson (2010) argue that the introduction of leverage ratio is only
a limited measure to enhance risk coverage of counterparty and off-balance exposure, and
further development is needed.
COUNTERPARTY RISKS
Apart from strengthening the capital adequacy of financial institutions themselves, Basel
Committee also makes several proposals on mitigating counterparty risk. This aims to
capture on and off balance sheet risk (Blundell and Atkinson 2010). Two major concerns of
Basel Committee are counterparty credit risk, and external rating and cliff effects. Basel
Committee proposes several measures in controlling counterparty credit risk. The first
potential measure is the stress testing of default risk, in which banks are required to
calculate their default risk capital charge using a stress calibration as part of the exposure
calculation. In addition to the capital default, Basel Committee proposes that banks should
hold capital against marked-to-market losses arising from a decline in counterparty
creditworthiness. Another measure to improve counterparty credit risk evaluation is the
identification and mitigation of wrong-way risk. The wrong-way risk arises when a bank’s
exposure to a counterparty increases as the counterparty’s creditworthiness declines.
Further measures include assessing asset value correlation for large organisations to account
for the potential systemic risk arising from the default of large market players; and a variety
of measures to improve collateral calculation and management (King and Tarbert 2011).
Basel Committee also emphasizes the improvement of quality of counterparty risk
assessment procedures and practices, and particularly the operation of these functions in
times of market turbulence. It also requires banks to regularly and extensively carry out
stress testing on the counterparty exposures and risks in a timely manner (King and Tarbert
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2011). The second counterparty risk mentioned in Basel III is the risk of external ratings.
Basel III allows banks to assess risk by using both external and their own internal risk
assessment measures. Bank may be over reliant on external rating organizations, which
could lead to cliff effects when there is a sudden credit downgrading. Angelini et al (2011)
study the impact of the adoption of countercyclical capital buffers on economic fluctuations.
They show that the adoption of countercyclical capital buffers could have a sizeable
dampening effect on output volatility that is consistent with expectations of Basel
Committees. The size of dampening effect is sensitive to a number of factors: the types of
shocks hitting the economy; the parameters included in the model; and the details of the
prudential rule itself.
LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT
It has been widely acknowledged that liquidity is as important as capital in the assessment
of healthiness of a financial institution and stability of the financial sector. This is because
the tightening ability to access short-term funding by financial institutions usually comes
with difficulty in readiness of converting assets into cash. Together with a significant decline
in the illiquid asset during any financial crisis, the weak liquidity status leads to erosion in
capital levels.
In response to these issues, Basel III introduces two new liquidity standards, the liquidity
coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio. The liquidity coverage ratio is the ratio of
bank’s stock of high-quality liquid assets to the total net cash outflow over the next 30
calendar days. It aims at promoting banks’ short-term resilience to potential liquidity
disruptions (Ojo 2010).The liquidity ratio is required to be at least 100 percent, which means
the high-quality liquid assets is at least equal to its total net cash outflow for the next 30
days, and in order to ensure that an internationally active bank has sufficient high-quality
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asset to potential sudden net cash outflow under a month-long acute stress scenario that
includes both systemic and institution-specific shocks13. High-quality assets are required to
be unencumbered assets with low credit and market risk that can be convertible into cash at
little  or no loss under financial  stress.  Another liquidity buffer proposed by Basel  III  is  the
net stable funding ratio. The net stable funding ratio is proposed, in addition to liquidity
coverage ratio, to address the mismatches between the maturity of a bank’s assets and
liabilities, and to promote medium- and long-term funding by establishing minimum
amounts of liquidity based on the bank’s assets and activities including off-balance sheet
commitments over a one-year period of extended stress (King and Tarbert 2011). The net
stable funding ratio is calculated as the ratio of the available amount of stable funding (ASF)
to required amount of stable funding (RSF). The available stable funding is defined as the
total amount of the bank’s regulatory capital along with preferred stocks and liabilities with
a maturity of a year or more, and deposits and funding with maturity of less than a year but
would be expected to stay with the institution longer during the stress period.  Required
stable funding is based on the liquidity of risk profiles of a bank’s assets and off-balance
sheet exposure, which is calculated as the total amount of assets and off-balance sheet
activity multiplied by its RSF factor. The RSF factor is used to approximate the amount of
assets and off-balance sheet commitments that could not be readily converted into liquidity.
Another importance of liquidity is its interconnectedness with risk-taking behaviour. Borio
and Zhu (2012) discuss that lower perceptions of risk and greater risk tolerance weaken
external funding and transferability constraints. On the other hand, weaker constraints can
support higher risk-taking.
Increase in capital and liquidity level will strengthen banks’ ability to absorb losses,
however, it will not fully protect financial institutions from systemic risk posed by
13 Basel III Framework
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institutional interconnectedness, so-called ‘too-big-to-fail’ (King and Tarbert 2011).  A
number of literature has discussed the measures and suggested solutions on the ‘too-big-to-
fail’ risk. Hart and Zingales (2011) explain the too-big-to-fail problem arises from a
combination of economic and political problem: the cost of bankruptcy on systemic
obligations is too large to bear, and the government sacrifices the long-term effect on
incentives to avoid the short-term costs of a possible collapse. Hart and Zingales (2011)
examine a new approach to capital requirement for large financial institutions. They show
that the financial institution should maintain an equity and long-term bond cushion
sufficiently large so that their own credit default swap price stays below the threshold level
to ensure the solvency of financial institutions. In order to address this risk, Basel Committee
develop a series of measures, such as capital and liquidity surcharges, tighter large-exposure
restrictions, mandatory recovery and resolution plans, and contingent capital and bail-in
debt requirement. One of the important proposals is Basel III requires all non-common Tier 1
and Tier 2 instruments contain terms that ensure the instruments must be written-off prior
to  any  infusion  of  capital  from  the  public  sector.  These  requirements  aim  to  make  the
pooling of risk less likely and reduce the chance of ‘too-big-to-fail’ risk.
2.4.4 BASEL III IMPLEMENTATION AND POTENTIAL INFLUENCE
Basel III is designed to improve the safety and healthiness of financial institutions. However,
as the potential impact on the financial system of implementing Basel III is still unclear, and
the global economy is still recovering from the crisis, regulators plan to implement Basel III
gradually with cautions. Increasing capital level is one of the most critical challenges as it is
expensive. Especially, in order to adapt to Basel III, banks around the world need to change
their business models, which can also be very costly. The original plan for implementation
of Basel III starts in January 2013 and aims to fully implemented by January 2019. However,
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due to the recent stress in the global economy, the initial implementation date from January
2013 has been delayed. The original plan from Basel Committee firstly starts with the
leverage ratio in January 2013 with ‘parallel run period’ till 31 December 2016, during which
banks are required to calculate the leverage ratio and its components will be tracked and
disclosed publicly. The minimum leverage ratio of 3 percent will become in force on January
2017. As for capital requirement, the minimum capital requirements start to gradually
phase-in from 2014, and by 2015, banks are required to achieve common equity Tier 1 ratio
of 4.5 percent and an overall Tier 1 capital ratio of 6 percent. The conservation buffer is
required to phase in from 2016 and become fully implemented by 2019. The timeline of
implementing liquidity ratio is still in discuss, and the proposed introduction of liquidity
coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio will occur in 2015 and 2018 respectively, with full
achievement of 100 percent ratios by 2019.
Capital and liquidity regulation affect economic activity via an increase in the cost of bank
intermediation. In order to meet the regulation criteria, for existing amount of assets, banks
increase the capital by deleveraging. In addition, banks need to increase their lending spread
when the cost of funding increase for the same required return on equity and cost of debt.
Angelini et al (2010) assess the impact of higher capital and liquidity requirement on long-
term economic performance from two aspects: steady state output and welfare. The results
show a loss of output and welfare is linearly related to the increase in capital and liquidity
requirement. This implies that the decline in steady state output and welfare consumption is
to be expected if the capital requirements are increased by one percentage point. If the
liquidity ratio increases by 25 and 50 percent, the estimated state output will reduce by 0.08
and 0.15 percent respectively. They interpret the 0.08 reduction in output proxies for the
adoption of the NSFR accounting for the synergies between capital and liquidity. As for the
impact on economic fluctuations, Angelini et al (2010) show that tighter capital rules induce
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a decline in output volatility. A one percentage point increase in the capital-to-asset ratio
reduces the standard deviation of output by 1 percent, and tighter liquidity requirements of
25 percent increase liquidity ratio will reduce the standard deviation of output by a further 1
percent.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
Financial institutions are financial intermediaries that facilitate the exchange of information,
and provide products and services to the economy which are different from other industries
due to their special functions, asset transformation and brokerage services. The risks of
financial institutions are closely associated with theirs special functions. We discuss types of
risks faced by financial institutions and relevant literature on each of the risks. Interest rate
risk is studied most extensively in the literature. The financial institutions are exposed to
interest rate risk because of three reasons. Firstly, financial institutions possess debt
instruments whose returns are associated with the interest rate; secondly, the equilibrium
returns for FIs assets and liabilities are based on certain expectation of interest rate. Any
unexpected fluctuations in interest rate will change financial institutions duration match and
equity return will be affected. Thirdly, financial institution equity can be considered as a call
option on assets and their stock returns should be sensitive to the interest rate changes.
Another risk faced by financial institutions is the market risk. Market risk is the risk related
to the uncertainty of a financial institution’s earnings on its trading portfolio caused by
changes in market conditions. A family of Value-at-Risk models are commonly used by
financial institutions in monitoring market risk exposure. The historical or Monte Carlo
simulation is usually used to generate additional observations. In addition, credit risk is
defined as the potential level of fluctuation in the value of debt and derivative instruments
due to changes in the underlying credit quality of counterparties. Credit risk management
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starts with relying on subjective analysis on borrowers’ characters to evaluate the credit risk
on issuing loans. More advanced quantitative models are developed in recent year, such as
accounting based credit scoring systems, including four types of approaches, linear
probability models, logit models, probit models and discriminant analysis models. Due to
the criticism of credit scoring systems on failure to capture capital market data and linearity
assumption, bankruptcy models based on option pricing models are adopted by researchers.
Apart from credit risk, the increasing variety of loans within a particular portfolio has made
it important to measure the overall spread of financial institutions’ outstanding accounts
over the number of variety of borrowers, known as credit concentration risk. Furthermore,
the expansion of financial services industry worldwide has made financial institutions
expose to foreign exchange risk through foreign currency trading for the purpose of agents,
hedging and direct speculation. Liquidity risk is another significant risk all financial
institutions face which arises from both liability and asset sides of financial institutions.
After the recent financial crisis, regulator has imposed liquidity buffer requirement in the
proposed Basel III to enhance the resilience to shocks of financial systems under a broad
range of market conditions.
Financial institutions have observed a trend of increasing exposure of real estate sector
worldwide since 1980s. Comparing with traditional debt instruments, real estate has been
considered as a relatively high average return investment relative to its risk. Therefore, real
estate has been appealing to institutional investors as a good diversification instrument.
From the literature research, we find that there are two ways real estate have been included
in the financial institution investment portfolios. One way for financial institutions investing
in real estate is through the traditional real estate loan. Studies show that banks with longer
real estate loan history had higher returns with less risk than more diversified banks, and
those high return banks exhibited substantial flexibility in their ability to adjust their real
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estate loan holdings. The other way of investing in real estate is through indirect
investments, such as real estate stocks, derivative instruments and Real Estate Investment
Trusts. There is an increasing trend of investing in Real Estate Investment Trusts in recent
years. REITs stocks can be viewed as a form of securitized indirect real estate investment
representing claims on real property or mortgage. However, the view on to what extent
REITs reflect the return to their underlying assets is mixed. Some studies show that the
behaviours of REITs returns are very similar with private real estate after valuation
parameter adjustments. In other literature, the relationship between REITs and their
underlying real estate property is weak, and some even show they are not correlated.
However, there is an increasing number of recent literature have used REITs as a real estate
indirect exposure measure due to its readily accessible market information than direct real
estate property investments especially for international real estate investments.
Financial institutions need to protect against the risk of insolvency and shield it from the risk
sufficiently large to cause the institution to fail. One of the most important protections of the
financial institution is their capitals. Therefore, the most significant regulatory policy
affecting the banking industry is the capital adequacy framework for internationally active
banks. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was formed in 1974 to advise national
financial regulators on common capital requirements for internationally active banks. Due to
perceived failings of deregulation, Basel Committee introduced Basel I in 1988 in the hope to
set out a global standard for guidance on the proper capital levels for internationally active
banks. Later in 2004 the Basel Committee issued a more comprehensive and risk-sensitive
capital regulation approach known as Basel II. Basel III proposed in 2010 by Basel
Committee is a direct response to the global financial crisis and to revise the shortcomings of
Basel I and Basel II in addressing the capital requirements of internationally active banks.
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Basel III enforces a higher standard of quality and quantity capital requirements, corporate
governance, such as liquidity and leverage ratio management.
There are extensive literature in studying the determinant and optimal capital structure of
financial institutions. Findings in the previous studies show that financial institution capital
structure can be affected by institutional specific, macroeconomic and regulatory specific
factors, such as the size of total assets, return of assets, credit risk exposure, GDP, level of
external governance and degree of independence of countries’ supervisory authorities etc.
There is also evidence showing that financial institutions require around four to five years to
be adjusted to the target required capital equilibrium. The discussion on whether regulatory
capital requirement in financial institutions is the first order determinant is mixed. It is
widely considered that financial institutions would retain less capital as it is more costly
than other types of funding. However, studies have shown financial institutions tend to hold
a capital buffer well above the minimum requirement.
Basel III is designed to improve the safety and healthiness of financial institutions, however,
the possible influence of the implementation on economy is uncertain. Several studies have
shown  there  is  a  potential  of  increase  in  cost  of  funding  and  decline  in  state  output  and
welfare consumption. Therefore, implementing Basel III requires policy maker to take
careful consideration in terms of the extent and time frame so that financial market and
economy can have a buffer period to gradually adjust themselves to the changes.
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CHAPTER THREE
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF BANK CAPITAL STRUCTURE DETERMINANTS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of the thesis is to empirically examine the relationship between major risk
factors exposed by the financial institutions, particularly capital risk, real estate risk and
valuation risk. This chapter specifically examines the capital risk and the determinants of
bank capital structures for a sample of 358 large banking organisations from 1991 to 2011
from major financially influential countries, including, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherland, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom and United States etc. The contribution of this chapter to the current literature is
that we extend the methodology used in non-financial firms to banking organizations, and
we found both financial and non-financial organizations share some similar behaviors. The
results of pecking order theory show that we have not found strong evidence for the
existence of pecking order in banking organizations. One concern of testing the pecking
order theory on banks is that banks are different in terms of leverage relative to non-banks,
as taxpayers deposit subsidized debt relative to equity in banking. The term deposit is used
by the banking industry in financial  statements to describe the liability owned by the bank
to its depositor, and not the funds that bank holds as a result of the deposit, which are
shown as assets of the bank. When taxpayers put funds into the bank, it is recognized as an
asset by the bank. On the other hand, the bank credits a liability account for the same
amount to show as a liability owed by the bank to its customer. Therefore, the debt structure
in banking is different from non-financial firms. For the same level of financial deficit, a
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bank may have higher debt level than non-financial firms. However, this is not due to
pecking order but because the taxpayers funds deposit in the bank.
The study also adds value to the current range of literature by providing results including
empirical evidence in the analysis of factors influencing banking organizations’ capital
structure using most recent sample period. In addition, we extend the conventional
framework of capital structure determinants by including variables related to country-
specific macroeconomic and public regulatory variables. The results indicate that bank-
specific variables collectively make a significant contribution in explaining banking
organizations’ target capital level. When country-specific macro-economic and public policy
variables are included in the analysis, a series of results are found. The results show that if
the larger proportion of a country’s financial system is bank-based, banks within this
country tend to maintain less capital since banks have a large impact on the financial
industry, and they are more accessible to cheaper financing within a short period. The rate
of changes in capital ratio tends to be higher in countries with better provisions of prompt
corrective action, better external governance, and a greater emphasis on explicit regulatory
requirements regarding the amount of capital banks must maintain relative to specific
guidelines. The coefficients on supervisory authority independence and the difference
between control rights and cash flow rights variables are negative and significant. The moral
hazard of depository insurance has a positive impact on the capital structure level but not
statistically significant. The indicator of government ownership of banks variable is
negatively correlated with the change of the leverage ratio, which shows the higher degree
of government ownership of banking organizations, the slower the change of leverage ratio.
The statistics indicate that the regulatory and public policy variables collectively make a
significant contribution to explaining changes in banking organizations’ leverage ratio. The
results of lagged capital ratio coefficients indicate that the average banking organization
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requires around four to five years to be adjusted to the target equilibrium.  The findings also
indicate public policy and regulatory variables affect changes in the capital ratio linearly
since the results of including interactive variables provide weaker evidences and
dramatically reduce both statistical and economic significance of the macroeconomic and
stand-alone public policy and regulatory.
We begin the chapter from the literature review of current findings from literature and
background information on the capital structure theories and variables influencing the
capital level. We then discuss the possibility of applying theory and framework developed
from non-financial firm to financial organizations. We follow on with discussions of the
framework used to examine the pecking order behaviour and capital structure determinants
of banking organizations in this paper in Methodology section. In addition, we provide
descriptive results of the data sample in section Data and Descriptive Statistics. We continue
with discussions on the Empirical Results in the following section. Finally, we provide a
summary of the Conclusion of the empirical findings.
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEWS ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Capital is important in business organizations to acquire the physical assets that are
necessary for commence and expanding operations. Capitals in banks and other deposit-
taking institutions extend beyond this role to perform a number of functions in ensuring the
long-run viability of the institutions Valentine (1999)14. Firstly, capital provides a temporary
cushion against the risk of failure. Bank capital is used to absorb unexpected losses arising
from  the  risks  incurred  in  the  business  of  banking,  and  acts  as  the  final  line  of  defence
14 Valentine, T. J. and Ford, G. (1999) Readings in Financial Institution Management: Modern Techniques for A Global
Industry, St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin Publisher , ISBN: 186448747X.
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against insolvency behind current profits and provisions. This function is achieved by
enabling a bank to meet claims against its external liabilities during periods where
unexpected losses force the writing down of the value of some assets. The regulatory
minimum capital requirement is implemented to reduce the risk of insolvency. Secondly,
capital promotes public confidence in the banking system. Since banks act as financial
intermediaries, it is obvious that only a relatively small proportion of funds are available at
any one time to meet the deposit withdrawals. Therefore by ensuring that a bank can
operate at the same level of capacity, capital acts to promote public confidence in the
banking system to meet unexpected deposit withdrawals during the economic downturn.
Last but not least, capital serves as a regulator of bank growth. A bank that increases its risk
exposure is required to increase its capital base. This means the buffer provided by capital
against unexpected losses is aligned with increases in a banks’ risk exposure. Investors can
restrict the banks’ expansion by either not providing additional capital or by only providing
it at less attractive terms to the banks.
There are extensive literatures in studying the determinants and optimal capital structure of
both non-financial and financial firms (Modigliani and Miller 1958, Berger et al 1995, Stolz
2002, Santos 2001, etc.). The beginning of all modern research on firms’ capital structure is
from Modigliani and Miller (1958), which shows that a firm’s capital structure cannot affect
its value in a frictionless world of full information and complete markets. This result is in
contrast with the intuitive notion that a firm with risk-free debt could borrow at an interest
rate below the required return on equity, reducing its weighted average cost of financing
and increasing its value by substituting debt for equity (Modigliani and Miller 1958). If
depositors are perfectly informed about the bank’s investment strategies, they will demand
deposit rates that fully reflect the bank’s risk. Hence, shareholders cannot exploit their
controlling position, and it shows that maximizing the share value is equivalent to the
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maximization of the bank’s total value. Under this framework, the value maximizing
portfolio and social optimal risk levels are always chosen, and the market value of a bank is
independent of its capital structure, and hence, there would be no need for regulation.
Therefore, under Modigliani and Miller (1958) assumption of frictionless world, the market
prices will compensate for any leverage decision made by the firm. When leverage is higher,
so is the risk to shareholders. Therefore, increase the leverage also increase the cost of equity
so that the weighted average cost of financing remains constant.
However, banks differ from other non-financial firms in two important respects that affect
their capital structures according to Berger et al (1995). The first feature is the presence of the
regulatory safety net that protects the safety and soundness of banks and a possible lower
bank capital. The second aspect is the regulatory capital requirement that raises the capital
of some banks. Capital regulation influences the bank’s decision by acting as a constraint to
their optimization. The bank’s market capital requirement is defined as the ratio of equity to
assets that maximize the value of the bank to distinguish it from regulatory capital
requirements. The safety net for banks, which includes federal deposit insurance,
unconditional payment guarantees, access to the discount window, and other bank safety
regulations, possible lowers market capital requirements by insulating banks from potential
market discipline. Berger et al (1995) show during 19th to 20th century, there is a continuous
drop in the capital ratio, during which the capital ratio of banks in the United States drops
from 50% in 1840 to 7% in 1990s. The constant decrease in the equity to asset ratio over the
year may be as a result of banks’ safety net, capital requirement and regulations, since banks
usually have the lowest equity to asset ratio of firms in any industry. Apart from the impact
of capital requirements and regulations, factors like taxes, expected cost of financial distress,
transaction cost, signalling behaviour, agency cost arising from asymmetric information
between shareholders and creditors and between owners and managers can also impact the
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banks’ capital structure. In addition, banks may have an incentive to increase portfolio risk
due to moral hazard resulting from incomplete contracting and together with the safety net,
such as a limited liability and deposit insurance (Thies and Gerlowski 1989, Wheelock 1992).
Agency problem arising from conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers may
also influence the bank capital structure (Saunders et al. 1990). Competition also plays a role
via its impact on bank rents (Hellman et al. 2000, Keeley 1990). In the following sections, we
discuss the factors which impact banks’ capital structure, and regulation issues faced by the
financial institutions.
The primary purpose of the risk regulations is to prevent systematic risk or the risk of the
collapse of the entire system due to interconnections between financial firms. However,
controlling systematic risk raises difficult challenge and dilemmas.15
3.2.1 COMPETITION AND REGULATION
Regulation and competition might be conflicting, since regulations limited the scope of
operations of banks, interfering directly with free competition. On the other hand, new rules
may create unpredictable behaviours to bypass constraints. There is a long-standing
argument for providing more freedom to financial firms and avoiding too many regulations.
The unfair competition resulting from non-economic rules combined with competition
among players motivated the deregulation, and the barriers to competition are progressively
lifted. Deregulation dramatically widens the range of products and services offered by the
banks since 1970s16. Most credit institutions diversify their operations out of their original
businesses. The pace of creation of new products remains constantly high, especially for
those acting in the financial markets, such as derivatives. As a result, the risk in the banks
15 Joël Bessis, Risk Management in Banking, 3rd Edition, Wiley Publisher, ISBN: 978-0-470-01912-2.
16 Joël Bessis, Risk Management in Banking, 3rd Edition, Wiley Publisher, ISBN: 978-0-470-01912-2.
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increases because of new competitions, new product innovations, shift from financial
intermediation by banks to capital markets, and the disappearances of old barriers.
However, relying on “code of conduct” rather than rules, implies relying on self-discipline
or self-regulation, which is not likely to inspire trust in the financial system.
There  are  a  number  of  rules  aiming  at  limiting  risks  in  banks,  and  the  main  pillar  of  new
regulations is capital adequacy. While the insurance depositor system on banks is passive
risk control, the capital requirement regulation is pre-emptive measure to control their risks
within acceptable bound. By enforcing a capital level in line with risks, regulators focus on
limiting the risk of failure. Since the capital serves for protecting banks against unexpected
losses, banks should maintain a sufficient amount of capital to absorb unexpected losses.
Guidelines are defined by regulators in Basel at the Bank of International Settlement (BIS),
therefore, the name of regulation on bank capital requirement is called “Basel” Accord. The
first accord to be implemented focuses on credit risk, with famous “Cook Ratio”. The “Cook
Ratio” sets up the minimum required capital as a fixed percentage of assets weighted
according to their nature in 1988.17 The scope of regulations extends progressively later. The
extension to market risk is a major step for market risk in 1996-1997 because Value-at-Risk
model is used for assessing capital charge for market risk (Santos 2001). The New Basel
Accord, or the Basel II Accord enforced in January 2007 considerably enhanced the credit
risk regulation. The Basel II Accord sets new rules for marketing credit risk capital charges
more risk sensitive, recognizing various forms of credit risk mitigation, providing various
enhancements to the former Basel I Accord credit risk measure, adding capital requirements
to operational risk, and detailing the supervision and market discipline pillar18. It treats
interest rate risk of the banking book under supervisory review process rather than
17 Joël Bessis, Chapter 19 Risk Management in Banking, 3rd Edition, Wiley Publisher, ISBN: 978-0-470-01912-2.
18 Joël Bessis, Chapter 20 Risk Management in Banking, 3rd Edition, Wiley Publisher, ISBN: 978-0-470-01912-2.
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imposing capital requirement. The new accord provides a more risk-sensitive framework
that should considerably reduce distortions between standard capital charges of Basel I and
the actual credit risk of counterparties and facilities. It also differentiates the risk according
to the credit standing of borrowers and the transaction-specific guarantees. The timeline of
successive capital regulations enforce in the past is as following:
· 1988: Current Basel I Accord published
· 1996: Market Risk Amendment allowing usage of internal models.
· 1999: First Consultative Package on the New Accord.
· 2007: Implementation of the Basel II Capital Accord.
3.2.2 MORAL HAZARD
The depositor insurance, providing protection of bank depositors, generates moral hazard
since there is no penalty for taking risks because of the insurance. The insurance mechanism
can be seen as an incentive for risk taking because the depositors cannot impose real
discipline on banks. A few literatures suggest that the theory of Modigliani and Miller (1958)
is not applicable to banks. They argue that under the assumption of frictionless and
complete markets, there would not be a need for financial intermediaries. Sealey (1983)
shows that the lack of applicability is due to particular features distinguish financial
institution operation from non-financial firms. He argues that when intermediaries accept
deposit financing, they must produce services such as liquidity and convenience at
considerable expense of real resources. In addition, the introduction of intermediation is
likely to be accompanied by incomplete markets so that shareholder unanimity is not valid
in general. If the information is not equally distributed, and the depositors cannot interfere
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into the bank’s activity, interest rates fail to fully reflect the risk of bankruptcy. Banks will
have an incentive to increase leverage and risk, and moral hazard arises.
Under the deposit insurance, there exists moral hazard since depositors do not incur any
risk by depositing their funds with a bank under full cover. Their pay-off is deterministic
and independent of the riskiness of the banks’ assets, and they lose any incentive to monitor
banks behaviour. Thies and Gerlowski (1989) and Wheelock (1992) examine the US market
and find deposit insurance has a positive impact on bank failure rates. Wheelock (1992)
shows that the balance sheets of insured banks reflecting greater risk-taking, and insured
banks were more likely to fail than non-insured banks. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache
(2006) find evidence that during 1980-1997, explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the
likelihood of banking crisis. The influence is stronger where bank interest rates are
deregulated, and institutional environment is weaker, which shows higher moral hazard
due to deposit insurance.
On the other hand, the results from Gropp and Vesala (2001) are in contrast  to most of  the
previous empirical literature. They find evidences that the establishment of explicit deposit
insurance significantly reduces the risk taking of European banks, hence moral hazard. The
results support the hypothesis that, in the absence of deposit insurance, European banking
systems have been characterized by strong implicit insurance operating through the
expectation of public intervention at times of distress. The results also show that, after the
introduction of explicit deposit insurance, banks with lower charter values and more
subordinated debt reduce risk taking further, which implies that charter values and
subordinated debt may mitigate moral hazard. However, Gropp and Vesala (2001) find that
large banks do not change their risk taking in response to the introduction of deposit
insurance, which suggests that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance does not
mitigate "too-big-to-fail" problems.
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3.2.3 CHARTER VALUE AND REPUTATION
The traditional theoretical approach to the moral hazard problem in banking has been based
on static models of bank behaviours (Furlong and Keeley 1989). Under risk-insensitive
deposit insurance, higher mean-preserving portfolio risk and leverage are to the benefit of
bank shareholders and to the detriment of the deposit insurance agency as show in Furlong
and Keeley (1989). Banker’s lowest payoffs are bounded at zero since they are protected by
limited liability. However, in a dynamic framework, banks that go bankrupt are likely to
suffer losses related to future payoffs, such as, reputation, financial regulations, and charter
value (Suarez 1994). The higher the bank’s charter value, the higher is the bank’s private cost
of portfolio risk and leverage.
In addition, financial liberalization tends to increase the intensity of competition between
financial institutions while financial institutions are given greater flexibility to allocate assets
and to determine interest rates. If the competition erodes the charter value, then the bank
will increase leverage and risk. As a consequence, they tend to engage in higher risk activity
in order to pursue higher profits (Hellman et al. 2000). Keeley (1990) shows empirical
evidences that the increase in competition causing bank charter values to decline. He argues
the decline in charter value will increase the default risk through increase in asset risk and
reduction in capital. Furthermore, Hellman et al. (2000) study two potential instruments of
prudential regulation, capital requirements and deposit-rate control. They show that the
capital requirement is costly because they force banks to hold expensive capital. However,
the minimum capital requirements have adverse incentive effect because increased financing
through expensive capital lowers the profit and banks, therefore, banks will lose less charter
value when going bankrupt. Therefore, capital requirement can only eliminate moral hazard
for financial institutions that give less weight to periods more distant in the future. Hellman
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et al. (2000) argue that a combination of capital requirement and deposit-rate control is more
favourable.
3.2.4 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
All of the above discussions are from shareholders’ aspects. We assume shareholders control
the financial institutions and the managers act fully in the shareholders' interests. However,
in many situations, managers may have preferences diverging from shareholders’ interests
(Stolz 2002). Saunders et al. (1990) discuss the conflict of interests between shareholders and
bank managers, and show that during 1979-1982 period of relative deregulation;
shareholder-controlled banks exhibit significantly higher risk taking behaviour than
managerially controlled banks. They point out that the risk taking incentives of bank
managers will depend on the degree to which their best interests or preference are tied to
those of value-maximizing shareholders. The managers’ wealth is mostly in non-diversified
human capital form; therefore, managers tend to act in risk-averse rather than a value-
maximizing manner to lower the risk of default. This also suggests that high bank charter
values can mitigate moral hazard of shareholders. Saunders et al (1990) also examine the
influence of the ownership structure, regulatory environment and other bank specific
variables. Their results suggest there is an agency problem, that is, bank loan portfolios are
found  to  be  less  risky  when  the  bank  managers  also  hold  capital  of  the  bank  other  than
outside shareholders.
3.2.5 RECAPITALIZATION
In the previous discussion, we have shown the effects of moral hazard, charter value, capital
regulation on bank capital and risk-taking behaviours of managers and shareholders. The
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recapitalization of capital-constraint banks is found to have impact on the bank capital
structure. Furlong and Keeley (1989) examine the difference in stock price reaction after
voluntary capital injections by commercial banks and involuntary recapitalization required
to meet regulatory capital requirement on US bank holding companies during 1975-1986. He
finds evidences of a significant drop in the share price of capital-constrained banks after
recapitalization. However, if banks have high capitalization rate, the stock price does not
show a significant response and less decrease in magnitude. Cornett and Tehranian (1994)
find different results during 1983-1989 in their study. In addition to the reduction in stock
price after both types of recapitalization, they find the stock price experiences greater
decrease during voluntary common stock issue. The results also show that the stock price
reaction is negatively related to the size of the offering and positively related to managerial
ownership structure prior to the security issue. This means the higher the insiders’ holding,
the smaller the decline. Although different results are obtained in the two studies, a drop in
share price after recapitalization is captured in both papers. Berger et al. (2008) find that
banks would face a lower cost of raising equity at short notice tend to hold significant more
capital. Therefore, shareholder and banks managers need to take into account of the
recapitalization cost and effect on the share price when making any decision on their capital
position.
3.2.6 REGULATORY CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
The discussion on whether bank capital requirements are the first order determinant of
banks capital position has been long. A common justification for capital regulation for banks
is the reduction of bank moral hazard. With high leverage level, there is an incentive for
banks to take on excessive risk. It is widely considered that equity capital is more costly for
banks than other types of funding; therefore, many studies analyze the binding relationship
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between bank regulation and capital adequacy. Allen et al (2011) show that banks are more
often willing to hold positive levels of capital well above the regulatory minimums, which
indicates the actual capital holdings tend to vary independently of regulatory changes.
Similar findings have been found in many recent literature. By comparing the actual capital
holdings to regulatory requirements in the United States, Flannery and Rangan (2008) find
that banks’ capital ratio increased substantially in the last decades, with banks holding
capital level that were 75% in excess of the regulatory minimums in early 2000. Ashcraft
(2001) shows that, during 1980s, the increase in the banks’ capital holding ratio is
independent of changes in regulatory requirement. The weak relationship between capital
holdings and regulatory capital requirement is also found in countries other than the United
States. The banks’ capital ratio in the United Kingdom increased in the last decade despite a
reduction in capital requirement with an average capital buffer of 35%-40% (Alfon et al
2004). Similar trend is also observed in countries like Spain. Barrios and Blanco (2003) argue
that Spanish banks’ capital ratios in period 1985-1991 were primarily driven by the pressure
of market forces rather than regulatory constraints. Furthermore, the results from Gropp and
Heider (2010) show that they did not find a first-order effect of regulation on banks’ capital
holdings.
Although the capital holding ratio is well above the regulatory minimum and continues to
increase over the past few decades, the financial crisis that started in 2007 raises the question
of whether banks are, in fact, undercapitalized. However, there is no universal conclusion on
how much capital that banks should hold relative to the ideal social-welfare-maximizing
level. Flannery (1994) examines the capital structure of financial intermediary firms,
commercial banks, savings and loans, finance companies and some insurance companies.
The paper evaluates the optimal means of financing a portfolio of bank-type loans. He
argues that because bank asset portfolios are unusually fluid, standard debt-contracting
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mechanism cannot control leveraged  investment distortions as successfully as they control
those of non-financial firms. The results show that banking firms’ illiquidity risk is not
caused by the transaction nature of their deposits. Policy concerns about financial firms’
liquidity can be distinguished from concerns about payment-system stability. However, he
argues that regulations separating illiquidity from the payment system would not eliminate
illiquidity risk from the economy but would only transfer that risk to institutions that are not
directly involved in the payment system. These results suggest capital requirements are not
the first order determinants for the financial institution capital structure. Diamond and
Rajan (2000) study the determinants of optimal bank capital structure by modeling the
essential functions banks perform and identifying the role capital plays. The results show
three areas affected by bank capital are bank safety, the ability to refinance at low cost and
the ability to liquidate the loans. The paper also suggests that the influence of regulatory
capital requirements and deposit insurance is overlooked over the last two centuries.
The above literature provides theoretical discussion and evidence on the determinants of
bank capital structure. In addition, there are many studies empirically examine the factors
influences the banks’ capital structure. Berger et al (2008) find empirical evidences that US
banks hold significantly more equity capital than required by their regulators. The paper
adopts partial adjustment non-linear regression approach by using the data of period 1992-
2006  for  publicly  traded  US  bank  holding  companies.  They  examine  the  two  possible
reasons for the high capital ratio. One possibility is the pecking order view of capital
structure, which states when banks are profitable they retain those earnings, and, as a result
capital ratios passively rise. Another possibility is that large banks actively target high
capital ratio because market conditions make them optimal. Berger et al (2008) find that,
during the year 1992-2006, banks either partially or fully offset new share issuance with
existing share repurchases, and in six of those years banks repurchased enough existing
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equity to fully offset the new share issuance plus offset a portion of retained earnings. These
patterns indicate that banks actively managed their capital ratios freely by repurchasing
shares to offset other additions to equity capital. The study also finds strong evidence that
target capital ratios decrease with bank size and increase with bank retail deposit franchises.
The capital target ratios also decline with banks’ market-to-book values because cheap
access to capital reduces large banks’ demand for a precautionary capital. Apart from the
findings that large banks have the higher than the required capital ratio, capital ratios at the
average banks are relatively close to the targets, and any deviation from their target capital
ratios are found to be adjusted quite rapidly. Brewer et al (2008) extend the literature on
bank capital structure by modeling capital structure not only as a function of bank specific
variables, country macro-economic conditions and country level financial characteristics, but
also important public policy and bank regulatory characteristics of home country. They
argue that these forces affect the capital structure of banks by affecting the intensity of
competition in the banking sector, the extent of any bank safety-net, the extensiveness of
capital standards, and the ability of bank regulators to intervene promptly and effectively in
troubled banks. The findings show that, bank capital ratios are significantly affected by most
of the bank-specific variables. In addition, Brewer et al (2008) also find there is a difference
in the capital ratio between banks from different countries. Banks maintain higher capital
ratios in home countries in which the banking sector is relatively smaller and in countries
that practice prompt corrective actions more actively, have more stringent capital
requirements, and have more effective corporate governance structures. The observed
differences in capital ratios across countries may be partially explained by the public policy
and regulatory regimes the countries themselves put in place.
The above discussions have shown that there are many factors which can contribute to the
differences in the capital level which firms or banking organizations wish to maintain.
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However, except for these determinants, researchers have identified some relationships and
interaction between capital level, equity, deficit and even timing. In the following section of
this paper, we will discuss the most popular capital structure theories in the literature.
TRADE-OFF THEORY
According to the trade-off theory, capital structure is determined by a trade-off between the
benefits and the costs of debt. The benefits and costs can be obtained in a variety of ways.
One perspective is “tax-bankruptcy” trade-off of which firms tend to balance the tax benefits
of debt against the deadweight costs of bankruptcy. Another perspective is to discipline
managers, and mitigate agency problems of free cash flow since debt must be repaid to
avoid bankruptcy (Jensen 1986). However, the using of debt proposes other conflicts of
interests between shareholders and debt holders (Stulz 1990).
There are also a few discussions of capital structure based on the interaction between
product and factor market (Harris and Raviv 1991). These theories have explored the
relationship between capital structure and either product market strategy or characteristics
of products. The results show that oligopolists tend to have more debt than monopolists or
firms in competitive industries (Brander and Lewis 1986) and the debts tend to be long term
(Glazer 1989). It is also found that firms producing unique or high quality products and
services are expected to have less debt (Titman 1984).
PECKING ORDER THEORY
The pecking order theory refers to the preference that firms finance new investment.
Retained earnings are considered as a better source of funds than outside (Myers and Majluf
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1984). If retained earnings are inadequate, debt financing will be used. Equity is only used as
a last resort. This is because of the asymmetric information between investors and insiders.
If investors are less well-informed than current firm insiders about the value of the firms’
asset, then equity may be mispriced by the market. If firms are required to finance new
projects by issuing equity, underpricing may be so severe that new investors capture more
than the NPV of the new project, resulting in a net loss to existing shareholders (Myers and
Majluf 1984). So, it is also the reason that, in some cases, the project will be rejected even if
the NPV is positive. The underinvestment can be avoided if the firm can finance through
securities that are not so severely undervalued by the market, e.g. internal fund and debt.
Therefore, capital structure will be driven by firms’ desire to finance, firstly from internal
retained earnings, then with low-risk debt, and finally with equity only as a last resort
(Myers and Majluf 1984).
MARKET TIMING THEORY
The market timing theory explains that in term of financing managers look at current
conditions in both debt and equity market. If they need financing, they use whichever
market currently looks more favorable. If neither market looks favorable, finance managers
may defer issuances. Alternatively, if current conditions look unusually favorable, funds
may be raised even if the firm has no need for funds currently (Frank and Goyal 2009).
Many literatures have found various evidences of market timing theory. Graham and
Harvey (2001) find that firms tend to issue equity following a stock pick-up. Baker and
Wurgler (2002) show that capital structure is best understood as the cumulative effect of past
attempts to time the market. All of these results suggest that stock returns and debt market
conditions play an important role in capital structure decisions.
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3.3 RELATION BETWEEN FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Banks are private corporations that are subject to pervasive government regulation in all
countries. Brewer et al (2008) argue that banks that use equity capital to fund its operations
should be determined by the same set of factors that influence other non-financial firms
together with the combined impact of any government safety net policies and capital
regulations. Gropp and Heider (2010) use the empirical evidences on non-financial firms to
explain the capital structure of large and publicly traded banks. The results show that there
are considerable similarities in capital structures between financial and non-financial
institutions. They also find evidences that most of the banks seem to be optimizing their
capital structure in much the same way as other firms, except when their capital comes close
to the regulatory minimum.
Based on the theories of capital structures for the general corporations, Brewer et al (2008)
identify that banks share the same pattern with firms that capital positions are determined
by the trade-off between the benefits and costs of debt financing (Fama and French 2002).
The benefits of debt financing include any tax shield provided by debt but not by equity,
and reductions in the cost of agency conflicts between firms’ owners and manager. The costs
of debt financing include higher expected costs of financial distress and increases in the
greater cost of agency conflicts between the firm’s owners and its creditors (Fama and
French 2002). Another theory of capital structure from non-financial firms is also adopted by
Brewer et al (2008). The short-run costs of adjusting a firm’s capital structure exceed the
benefits of capital structure changes over wide ranges. Firms change their capital structure
in a predetermined pecking order, retained earnings, issuing debt, and then issuing equity
(Myers and Majluf 1984). Firms issue new equity to fund remaining projects only if the
marginal costs of issuing additional debt exceed the costs of issuing equity. Therefore, under
this pecking order, the firm’s capital ratio at any moment of time can vary over potentially
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wide ranges. Furthermore, the standard cross-sectional determinants of firms capital
structures also apply to large and publicly traded banks in the US and Europe, except for
banks close to the minimum capital requirement Berger et al. (2008). However, Berger et al.
(2008) also find the consistency between non-financial firms and banks does not extend to
the components of leverage, i.e. deposit and non-deposit liabilities. From time to time, banks
have financed their balance sheet growth entirely with non-deposit liabilities, which implies
that the composition of banks total liabilities has shifted away from deposits. It is also
observed, in a dynamic framework, bank capital structure and target leverage are time-
invariant and specific to individual bank.
Many literatures have identified the impact of government policies in many aspects
(Flannery 1994, Berger et al. 1995, Marshall and Prescott 2001 etc.). Firstly, the government
provides under-priced guarantees, e.g. explicit deposit insurance and implicit guarantees of
deposit and other liabilities (Berger et al. 1995). The effect of under-priced liability guarantee
is to reduce the marginal benefit of higher private capital and, thus, reduce bank’s use of
equity capital. Secondly, regulators may also change banks’ capital structure by increasing
the costs associated with capital level the regulators seem inadequate. If the regulatory
requirements are higher than the bank’s optimal ratio and the costs of violating the
requirements are sufficiently high, then banks would maintain capital levels exactly at
supervisory minimums. This is the trade-off theory with binding regulation (Marshall and
Prescott 2001), where capital regulation overrides the optimal capital structures as seen in
corporate firms. This suggests that there should be little cross-sectional variation in the
leverage ratio of those banks falling under the Basel regulatory, since it prescribes an
uniform capital ratio. Many literatures have discussed banks tend to hold less bank capital
than is required by the regulatory authorities because of the high costs of holding capital.
Therefore, in this case, the amount of bank capital is determined by the bank capital
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requirements. However, if the costs of adjustment are not large enough to prevent
adjustments in a bank’s capital positions, then the impact of capital adequacy regulation
would depend on whether the supervisor’s requirements were above or below the
individual bank’s value maximizing level. If the regulatory capital requirements are less
than the bank’s optimum capital ratio, the regulations will have no effect, the trade-off
theory of bank capital determination with non-binding regulation. Flannery (1994), Myers
and Rajan (1998) and Allen et al. (2009) study the optimal bank capital structure and find
that capital requirements are not necessarily binding. From market aspects, banks’ capital
structures are the outcome of pressures from shareholders, debt holders and depositors.
In  addition,  if  both  the  cost  of  adjustment  and  the  cost  of  falling  below  the  regulatory
standard are high, banks would seek to maintain capital in excess of the regulatory
minimum. Berger et al. (2008) and Brewer et al (2008) observe that the level of bank capital is
much higher than the regulatory minimum. They show that banks optimize their capital
structure like non-financial firms, which would relegate capital requirement to second-order
importance. In this case, banks maintain a capital buffer above the minimum required ratio.
The size of  the buffer depends on the costs of  falling below the supervisory minimums, on
the distribution of potential adverse shocks to capital, and on the changes in the retained
earnings. Wall and Peterson (1987) are the first few papers to introduce a capital buffer
factor in their empirical analysis of the impact of regulatory factors on bank capital
determination. Peura and Keppo (2006) model the trade-off of banks’ capitalization decision
based on the buffer stock role of bank capital, and find that there is a significant fraction of
the cross-sectional variation in bank capital ratios. The buffer effect is also examined in
countries other than the United States. Ayuso et al (2004) estimate the relationship between
the Spanish business cycle and the capital buffers held by Spanish commercial and saving
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banks over the period 1986-2000. They find significant negative relationship between the
position in the cycle and capital buffers.
3.4 METHODOLOGY
In this paper, we will examine whether the capital level of banking organizations follows the
pecking order theory and what factors can influence the level and change of capital ratio
that banks wish to maintain.
In the real world, company operations and the associated accounting structures are more
complex than the standard pecking order representation. This implies that the aggregation
should be used in order to test the pecking order. In this paper, we adopt the methodology
from the corporate finance theory and applied to the financial institution sector. One
concern of testing the pecking order theory on banks is that banks are different in terms of
leverage relative to non-banks, as taxpayers deposit subsidized debt relative to equity in
banking. The term deposit is used by the banking industry in financial statements to
describe the liability owned by the bank to its depositor, and not the funds that bank holds
as a result of the deposit, which are shown as assets of the bank. When taxpayers put funds
into the bank, it is recognized as an asset by the bank. On the other hand, the bank credits a
liability account for the same amount to show as a liability owed by the bank to its customer.
Therefore, the debt structure in banking is different from non-financial firms. For the same
level of financial deficit, a bank may have higher debt level than non-financial firms.
However,  this  is  not  due  to  pecking  order  but  because  the  taxpayers  funds  deposit  in  the
bank.
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To test the pecking order theory, we adopt and borrow the methodology developed in the
studies in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003), and we define the
notation as follows:
ܦܫ ௧ܸ  Cash dividends in year t;
ܫ௧        Net investment in year t (i.e., ܫ௧= capital expenditures + increase in investments +
          acquisitions + other use of funds – sales of PPE – sales of investment);
∆ ௧ܹ   Change in working capital in year t (i.e., ∆ ௧ܹ = change in operating working capital +
          Change in cash and cash equivalents + change in current debt);
ܥ௧       Cash flow after interest and taxes (i.e., ܥ௧  = income before extraordinary items +
          depreciation and amortization + extraordinary items and discontinued operation +
          deferred taxes + equity in net loss – earnings + other funds from operations +
          gain (loss) from sales of PPE and other investments);
ܴ௧       Current portion of the long-term debt in year t;
∆ܦ௧     Net debt issued in year t, (i.e., ∆ܦ௧  = long-term debt issuance – long-term debt
           reduction);
∆ܧ௧    Net equity issued in year t (i.e., ∆ܧ௧ = sales of common stock minus stock repurchases).
According to the rational of accounting cash flow, we can aggregate the above notation as
following:
ܦܧܨ௧ = ܦܫ ௧ܸ + ܫ௧ + ∆ ௧ܹ − ܥ௧ (1)
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) argue that under the pecking order hypothesis, after IPO
equity issues are only used in extreme circumstances. Therefore,
∆ܦ௜௧ = ܽ + ܾ௣௢ܦܧܨ௜௧ + ݁௜௧ (2)
Where ݁௜௧ is a well-behaved error term.
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If the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) pecking order hypothesis follows, the coefficient
ܽ = 0 and ܾ௣௢ = 1. Despite for the accounting definition, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)
and Frank and Goyal (2003) include the current portion of long-term debt as part of the
financing deficit beyond its role in the change in working capital. The flow of funds deficit is
defined as
ܦܧܨ௧
ௌௌெ = ܦܫ ௧ܸ + ܫ௧ + ∆ ௧ܹ + ܴ௧ − ܥ௧ (3)
The hypothesis is examined in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal
(2003), they try both approaches and find that empirically the current portion of long-term
debt does not appear to belong in the definition of ܦܧܨ௜௧.  On the other hand, cash and cash
equivalents are included with changes in working capital in our aggregation formula. This is
consistent with the previous work, as in Frank and Goyal (2003). Frank and Goyal (2003)
show that although including changes in cash balance could arise in debt and equity issues,
the conclusion results are not affected.
In order to control for the size differences of financial institutions, the variables in the
equation (2) are usually scaled by size factors, e.g. net asset, total book asset, sum of book
debt plus market equity, and sales. Although, algebraically, dividing right- and left- hand
side by the same value does not change the equality of the equation, if the scaling is by a
variable correlating with the variables in the equation, the estimated coefficient can be
seriously affected. However, in the findings of Frank and Goyal (2003), they show that using
the different scaling factor in the estimation does not affect the results of the pecking order.
In this paper, we replicate all the tests by all scaling factors, and we found the results are
very similar and do not affect our conclusions.
Another issue we need to take into consideration is that the pecking order theory treats the
finance deficit as exogenous. However, as financing deficit includes investment and
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dividend, many of previous studies have studied the determinants of these factors;
therefore, it may not appropriate to consider finance deficit as pure exogenous. If finance
deficit is regarded as endogenous variables, the equation (2) is misspecified. If a model is
misspecified, a small change to the specification may lead to large changes in the estimated
coefficients, and the model is likely to be unstable across periods. Such instability would be
an indicator of  the failure of  the model. Frank and Goyal (2003) use two steps to tackle the
concerns. Firstly, they take robustness check on all tests. They show that most of the findings
are  robust.  Secondly,  the  ability  to  predict  debt  issues  by  a  holdout  sample  of  firms  is
examined directly to address the concern that the model may perform well within the
sample but it cannot be generalized out of the sample.
In order to test the pecking order theory, we aggregate the accounting data as in equation
(1)-(3). There may be information in the finance deficit that helps account for changes in
equity issuance, but not in the subject to the pecking order theory. Therefore, to check the
reasonableness of the aggregation, we will test the equation on a disaggregated basis, and
then check whether the data satisfies the aggregation step. The pecking order test implicitly
makes different exogeneity assumptions and uses different information sets that are
conventional in empirical research on leverage and leverage-adjusting behaviour. Similar
approach has been tested in Frank and Goyal (2003).
Consider the following framework,
∆ܦ௜௧ = ܽ + ܾ஽ூ௏ܦܫ ௧ܸ + ܾூ∆ ௧ܹ + ܾ஼ܥ௧ + ݁௜௧ (4)
Under the framework in equation (4), a unit increase in any of the components, ܦܧܨ௜௧ must
have the same unit impact on ∆ܦ௜௧. If the pecking order holds the coefficients should satisfy
the equality ܾ஽ூ௏ = ܾூ = ܾௐ = ܾ஼ = 1, and the equation (4) is justified. If the significance is
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only driven by some of the individual component, then alternative coefficient patterns are
possible.
However, the pecking order theory cannot give a complete justification on the factors that
considered by the banking organizations when deciding the capital level, especially when
considering financial institutions, such as banks. This is because that banks are different in
terms of leverage relative to non-financial firms. Therefore, in order to examine the
determinants of capital level, we need to adopt a more conventional approach. The
conventional set of explanatory factors for leverage has survived many tests and has
traditional interpretations. Excluding such variables from consideration is potentially
significant omission. The traditional leverage regression is intended to explain the level of
leverage, while the pecking order regression is intended to explain the change rather than
the level. As long as the shocks are uncorrelated across year, we can equally run the
conventional specification in first differences.
In the conventional capital structure empirical analysis, a regression of leverage is on four
factors: tangibility of asset (ܶ), market-to-book ratio (ܯܶܤ), log sales (ܮܵ), and profitability(ܲ). In Frank and Goyal (2003) study, they include the finance deficit factor (ܦܧܨ), and all
the factors are made to the first differences between years. The primary hypothesis
examined in the paper is that country-specific economic and public policy factors can help to
explain cross-country differences in bank capital ratios. The regulatory policy influence is
examined empirically in the relationship between changes in the capital ratios of banks in
addition to the variables that explain banks’ capital structure by bank specific factors and
country specific economic variables.
As  used  in Marcus (1983) and Brewer et al (2008), we adopt the methodology of relating
bank target equilibrium capital ratio CR to a set of explanatory variables, X. In the paper, we
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use three sets of explanatory variables, including bank-specific, country-specific economic
and regulatory variables.
ܥܴ∗ = 	 ߛ଴ + ߛܺ (5)
3.4.1 BANK-SPECIFIC FACTORS
The empirical corporate finance literature has identified a set of variables that are reliably
related to the leverage of non-financial firms as discussed  in Titman and Wessels (1988),
Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2004). From previous literature, they find
evidence that, in general, the leverage is related to the size, collateral, profits, market-to-
book ratio and dividends. When considering bank capital structures, we have shown that
the behaviour of bank capital structure shares some similar characteristics with the general
non-financial institutions (Brewer et al 2008, Gropp and Heider 2010 and Berger et al. 2008,
etc). The standard view is that capital regulation constitutes an additional factor influencing
the bank capital structure. Commercial banks have deposits that are insured to protect
depositors and to ensure financial stability. In order to mitigate the moral-hazard of this
insurance, commercial banks are required to hold a minimum amount of capital. Therefore,
under the compulsory requirement, the standard corporate finance determinants should,
therefore, have little or no explanatory power relative to regulation for the capital structure
of banks in our sample. Another theory on the bank capital structure is the existing of capital
buffer, or discretionary capital, above the regulatory minimum in order to avoid the cost of
issuing equity at short notice, as discussed in Ayuso et al (2004) and Peura and Keppo
(2006). Under the buffer concept, Gropp and Heider (2007, 2010) and Shrieves and Dahl
(1992) have analysed the determinants of bank optimal capital structure. They found that the
bank asset-size is negatively related to the capital ratio, i.e. the larger the bank size, the
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lower the capital-to-asset ratio. They explain it is because larger banking organizations
typically have better-diversified asset portfolios than smaller banks, which reduces their risk
exposure and capital needs. Larger banks may also be viewed as more likely to be “too-big-
to-fail” and thus require less private capital to remain in operation. In addition, bank risk
exposure is found to be positively correlated with the bank capital arrangement. Profitability
also influences banks target capital ratio. Gropp and Heider (2001, 2010) find  that  more
profitable banks tend to have more capital relative to assets. This finding is consistent with
the predicted pecking order theory of capital structure that firms tend to firstly rely on their
retained earnings to fund new projects. Dividend paying banks are found to have higher
leverage ratio, and this is consistent with the in influence of bank profitability. This is
because profitable and dividend paying banks can be expected to face lower costs of issuing
equity since they are either better known to the outsiders, and they can obtain a better price.
Moreover, an increase in the banks risk exposure increases its target capital ratio because it
increases the probability of insolvency and the cost of bankruptcy for any given capital ratio.
3.4.2 COUNTRY-SPECIFIC MACROECONOMIC FACTORS
A country’s business cycle and economic growth rates and the extent to which its financial
system is bank-based are important determinants of the capital structure of banking
organizations headquartered in that country (Brewer et al 2010).   The  impact  of  higher
economic growth rate on capital ratio is unclear. Higher growth rate in any given year may
be associated with greater growth possibility in the banking sector and higher target capital
ratio to accommodate the possibility. On the other hand, higher growth rate may be
associated with lower capital ratios under the pecking order theory if assets grow faster than
internally generated capital. Schaeck and Cihak (2009) show that banks tend to hold higher
capital ratios when operating in a more competitive environment. Brewer et al (2008) also
94
find evidences that in countries when the economy is bank-based, the competitions from
capital markets are less than the market-based economy, thus less risk of bank insolvency.
Bank-based financial system makes regulatory easier to capture the movement in the capital
structure in the banks. In an economy where banks are important, the impact of bank safety-
net is more intensive, and private capitalization of banks is lower.
3.4.3 COUNTRY-SPECIFIC PUBLIC POLICY FACTORS
Brewer et al (2010) find evidences that government policies influence capital both directly
and indirectly through their impact on market discipline. Banking organizations are likely to
increase their target capital ratios when they perceive that the regulatory authorities would
impose a significant penalty on them for not being adequately capitalized. In addition, bank
size may also impact supervisory capital requirements to the extent large banks are able to
exercise greater political influence on bank supervisors. Baumann and Nier (2003) show that
higher level and better governance tend to lead to higher profit because it suggests a higher
degree of outside monitoring that encourage banks to be both more efficient and more
heavily capitalized. Furthermore, better governance in banks also tends to have higher
capital ratios and more protection against unexpected losses.
The discussion above show that banks optimize their capital structure in a similar way as
non-financial firm as shown in many literature and plus a number of bank specific factors
(Gropp and Heider 2010, Brewer et al 2008, etc.). The target equilibrium capital ratio (࡯ࡾ∗)
for bank ݅ can now be written as following:
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ܥܴ௜,௖,௧∗ = ߛ௢ + ܾ଴ܤܽ݊݇	ܵ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ	ܸܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ+ ܿ଴ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ	ܵ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ	ܧܿ݋݊݋݉݅ܿ	ܸܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ+ ݀଴ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ	ܵ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ	ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ	ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ	ܸܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ + ଴݂ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ+ ܶ݅݉݁	ܨ݅ݔ݁݀	ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ
(6)
However, in reality we cannot observe the target equilibrium ratios in any period directly.
Instead, the change in the bank capital ratios between periods and ratios of prior periods can
be observed directly. Therefore, the target equilibrium ratio can be seen as a combination of
bank capital ratios from previous periods and change in the ratios. In the studies of Shrieves
and Dahl (1992) and Wall and Peterson (1995), they found that the observed changes in bank
capital ratios at any time can be decomposed into two components, a discretionary
adjustment to its targeted equilibrium ratio and an adjustment caused by exogenous current
event. The same algorithm is shared in the study of Brewer et al (2008).
	∆ܥܴ௜ ,௖,௧ = ∆ௗܥܴ௜,௖,௧ + Ɛ௜,௖,௧ 	 (7)
Where ∆ܥܴ௜ ,௖,௧ is the actual change in the capital ratio, ∆ௗܥܴ௜,௖,௧ is the desired discretionary
change in the capital ratio and ܧ௜,௖,௧  is an exogenously determined random shock.
However, the banking organizations may not be able to adjust to its target equilibrium
capital ratio instantly in the same period; therefore, the discretionary change in capital can
be assumed to consist of another two components, the unobserved target equilibrium in
period ݐ and the observed capital ratio in the previous period ݐ − 1. Therefore, the change in
the capital ratio can be shown as
∆ܥܴ௜,௖,௧ = ∅൫ܥܴ௜,௖,௧∗ − ܥܴ௜,௖,௧ିଵ൯ + Ɛ௜,௖,௧ 	 (8)
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 As in equation (6), the unobserved target equilibrium capital is a function of bank-specific
and country-specific variables; therefore, the change in the capital ratio can be represented
as:
∆ܥܴ௜ ,௖,௧ = ∅ߛ௢ + ∅(ܾ଴ܤܽ݊݇	ܵ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ	ܸܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ௜,௖,௧ିଵ+ ܿ଴ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ	ܵ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ	ܧܿ݋݊݋݉݅ܿ	ܸܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ௖,௧ିଵ+ ݀଴ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ	ܵ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ	ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ	ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ	ܸܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ௖ + ଴݂ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௖,௧)+ ܶ݅݉݁	ܨ݅ݔ݁݀	ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ − ∅ܥܴ௜,௖,௧ିଵ + Ɛ௜,௖,௧ 	
(9)
Explanatory bank specific variables used in this paper in examining the bank capital
structure include log of total asset (SIZE); return on asset (ROA), which is the bank net
income divided by the average on-balance sheet assets; bank credit risk exposure (RISK),
which is proxied by dividing bank Basel I risk-weighted assets by its total on-balance sheet
asset, and it is estimated that the greater is this ratio, the greater is the bank portfolio credit
risk exposure, and dividend paid to shareholders (DIV). The country economic independent
variables are including the growth rate of real domestic product (RGDP),  which  is
computed as the annual percentage change in a country annual rate of real GDP. Another
country specific economic variable is the degree to which a country’s financial system is
bank-based (BANK), which is calculated by taking the total assets of the banking system
dividend by the country’s GDP. As for the country specific policy factors, we adopt the
variables used in Brewer et al (2008), which include the level of external governance
(EGOVERN), the extend of explicit regulatory requirements for the amount of capital that a
bank must maintain relative to various guidelines (CSTAND),  the  degree  to  which  a
country’s supervisory authorities are independent (INDEP),  the  existence  of  a  law
establishing predetermined levels of the bank solvency deterioration that forces effective
automatic enforcement actions by regulators (PROMPT), the extent of deposit insurance
system (MHI),  the  proportion  of  banks  in  the  country  owned  more  than  50%  by  the
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government (GOVCONT50), the extent of country’s ownership structure influence on bank
capital ratio (CONTROLCF). The control variable used in this paper is the accounting
standard adopted by the banks (ACCT).
Therefore, the partial adjustment model for the change in capital ratio can be developed as,
∆ܥܴ௜ ,௖,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܥܴ௜ ,௖,௧ିଵ + ߚଶܵܫܼܧ௜,௖,௧ିଵ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௖,௧ିଵ + ߚସܴܫܵܭ௜,௖,௧ିଵ+ ߚହܦܫ ௜ܸ,௖,௧ିଵ + ߚ଺ܴܦܩ ௖ܲ,௧ିଵ + ߚ଻ܤܣܰܭ௖,௧ିଵ + ߚ଼ܴܱܲܯܲ ௖ܶ+ ߚଽܧܩܱܸܧܴ ௖ܰ + ߚଵ଴ܯܪܫ௖ + ߚଵଵܥܵܶܣܰܦ௖ + ߚଵଶܫܰܦܧ ௖ܲ+ ߚଵଷܩܱܸܥܱܰܶ50௖ + ߚଵସܥܱܴܱܰܶܮܥܨ௖ + ߚଵହܣܥܥ ௖ܶ + ߝ௜,௖,௧ 	
(10)
3.5 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The data we use in this chapter are banking institutions data from year 1991 to 2011, which
are obtained from CRSP, Bankscope and Bloomberg database. We construct a sample of
large banking organisations that may expose to large economic and financial forces. We
identify 358 largest banks by total book assets of financially matured developed countries,
including, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherland,
South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States etc. Banks with
cooperative or government ownership are excluded as these banks’ objective function is
likely to include more maximizing long-run shareholder value and they may be subject to
broader safety net and other government guarantees. Since the data for each bank may not
be available in every year, the same banks are not included in each year, and the sample is
an unbalanced panel. All financial statement data for the banks in the sample are obtained
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from CRSP, Bankscope and Bloomberg database. Data on additional country specific and
control variables are obtained from IMF International Financial Statistics.
There are two different measures of bank capital ratios are specified as the dependent
variables. The first dependent variable is the common equity ratio, which is the ratio of a
banking organization’s book value of equity to the book value of total on-balance sheet
asset. The second dependent ratio variable is the Tier 1 capital ratio, which is bank’s book
value of Tier 1 capital to the book value of Basel I risk-weighted on and selected off-balance
sheet asset. US regulations set minimum requirements for both the risk-based ratio and for a
leverage ratio where the capital measure primarily consists of equity. European capital
regulations usually rely exclusively on the risk-based capital ratio. Another dependent
variable we use when testing especially for the pecking order of bank organizations is the
net debt issued during the year.
In terms of independent variables, from the cash flow statement, we obtain amount of cash
dividend paid, ܦܫ ௧ܸ; net amount of investment made during the year , ܫ௧ ;  any change in the
working capital in the year, ∆ ௧ܹ; cash flow after interest and taxes, ܥ௧ . We also obtain the
variables, total book assets, ܵܫܼܧ and current liability. All the cash flow related variables we
use to test the pecking order theory are scaled by the net asset, which is calculated as total
asset minus current liability in order to eliminate any bias in different sizes between banks.
Explanatory variables used in examining the banks’ capital structure include bank specific
variables, log of total asset (SIZE);  return  on  asset  (ROA),  which  is  the  bank  net  income
divided by the average on-balance sheet assets; bank risk credit risk exposure (RISK), which
is proxied by dividing bank Basel I risk-weighted assets by its total on-balance sheet asset,
and it is estimated that the larger is this ratio, the greater is the bank’s portfolio credit risk
exposure and dividend paid to shareholders (DIV). Countries economic independent
variables include the growth rate of real domestic product (RGDP),  which  is  computed  as
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the annual percentage change in a country annual rate of real GDP. Another country
economic variable is the extent to which a country’s financial system is bank-based (BANK),
which is calculated by taking the total assets of the banking system dividend by the
country’s  GDP.  The  country  specific  economic  information  is  obtained  from  the  IMF
International Financial Statistics database. All the bank specific and country economic
variables are lagged by one period.
The third set of independent variables is country specific public policy variables. Most of the
variables are selected according to the response of relevant questions from the World Bank
Survey19. In the following section of the paper, I will discuss the relevant variables used in
the analysis, and how the variables are selected and constructed. The first public policy
variable is EGOVERN to capture the degree of external governance. As discussed in Barth
et al (2007), we construct the level of external governance using three sets of questions from
the World Bank survey on the strength of external audit, the transparency of financial
statements and the use of external credit rating and reliance on credit monitoring.20 It is
expected that a higher level of external governance should lead to higher capital ratios as
risks would be both recognized and managed more efficiently. There are two way to
construct the index of the policy explanatory variables. Dummy variables are used for both
methods. If the answer to the survey question is yes, then it is counted as 1, and 0 otherwise.
One way to construct the index is to add up all the dummy variables, and the resulted sum
is the policy index. Another way is to use principle component analysis method on the
19 Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey by World Bank. This project includes the first comprehensive, cross-
country survey of how banks are regulated and supervised, including requirements and regulatory powers
regarding bank entry, ownership, capital, powers and activities, auditing, organization, liquidity, provisioning,
accounting and disclosure, incentives for supervisors, deposit insurance, and disciplining powers including
bank exit. The goal of this research is to draw conclusions for policy makers on key priorities in making their
regulatory and supervisory framework more robust.
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20345037~pagePK:642
14825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html
20 The questions we selected from the survey for the degree of external governance are question 5.1, 5.1.2,
10.3, 10.4, 10.4.1, 10.5 and 10.7.
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dummy variables to construct the index. We have examined the results based on both
measures, and there is no significant difference in terms of results. Only the results using the
principle component analysis is reported in this paper.
The second policy variable is CSTAND, which is used to capture whether a country has
explicit regulatory requirements for the amount of capital that a bank must maintain relative
to various guidelines. This index is obtained through the responses of five questions from
the World Bank survey21 (Barth et al 2002): whether the country has a minimum capital-to-
asset ratio that conforms to the Basel standards; whether the minimum capital-to-asset ratio
varies with market risk; whether the market value of loan losses is deducted from reported
accounting capital; and whether unrealized losses in the security portfolio or from foreign
exchange operations are deducted from reporting accounting capital. It is expected that
higher index value indicates greater capital stringency, which is associates with greater
capital maintained by banks. In addition, variable INDEP measures the degree to which a
country’s supervisory authorities is independent. An independent supervisory agency
reduces political capture of the regulatory authorities and should enhance the governance of
banking organizations in the country (Barth et al 2002 and 2007).  According  to Barth et al
(2002 and 2007), a higher level of regulatory governance should lead to increase supervisory
discipline, which can lead to either higher bank capital requirements or, to the extent that
the market perceives the greater supervisory discipline to be effective with lower capital
ratios. We use the response of three questions22 from World Bank survey about how is the
head of supervisory agency and directors are appointed; to whom are the supervisory
bodies responsible; and how the head of the supervisory agency and other directors are
removed. Another policy variable is PROMPT, which measures the existence of a law
establishing predetermined level of the bank solvency deterioration which forces effective
21 The questions we selected from the survey for CSTAND are 3.1.1, 3.3, 3.9.1, 3.9.2, and 3.9.3.
22 The questions we selected from the survey for INDEP are 12.2, 12.2.1 and 12.2.2.
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automatic enforcement actions by regulators. We used the response of seven questions to
aggregate the law establishment index in this paper 23  (Barth et al 2002): whether the
supervisory authorities can force a bank to change its internal organizational structure;
whether failure to abide by a cease-desist type order can lead to the automatic imposition of
civil and penal sanctions on the directors and managers of a banking organization; whether
the supervisory authorities can order a bank’s director or managers to increase provisions to
cover actual or potential losses; and whether the supervisory authorities can suspend the
directors’ decision to distribute dividends, bonuses or management fees. It is estimated that
the greater the cost of poor performance imposed by regulators, the greater the capital banks
wish to hold as protection.
As discussed in the previous sections, moral hazard is resulted as the system of depositor
insurance which provides protection for bank depositors since there is no penalty for taking
risks because of the insurance. It is suggested that deposit insurance has a positive impact on
bank failure rates (Thies and Gerlowski 1989) and balance sheets of insured banks reflecting
greater risk-taking. Insured banks were more likely to fail than non-insured banks
(Wheelock 1992).  Therefore, in order to examine the significance of moral hazard due to
deposit insurance, moral hazard index variables are included in the analysis. We adopt the
method used in Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) to construct the moral hazard index
(MHI) by principle component analysis. The index includes indicators of co-insurance,
broadness of scope, coverage of foreign currency and interbank deposits, extend of explicit
coverage, type and source of funding, management, and nature of membership. It is
expected that the higher value of the index, a broader safety-net that provides for greater
opportunity for moral hazard behaviour of banks. As a consequence, countries with a higher
23 The questions we selected from the survey for PROMPT are 6.1, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3.1, 11.3.2, 11.3.3 and 11.8.
102
chance of moral hazard behaviour are more vulnerable to the banking crisis because of the
potential lower capital ratios.
Furthermore, another country specific variable is GOVCONT50, which proxies for the
fraction of banks in a country that is government owned. We use the response of question
3.8.1 from World Bank survey used in La Porta et al (2002), which demonstrates the
percentage of the top ten banks in which the government owns more than 50% of the stock.
The high level of government ownership should be associated with lower private capital
ratios.  The extent to which a country’s ownership structure influences its bank capital ratio
is measured by variable CONTROLCF, which measures the spread or difference between
the country average control rights and cash flow rights. As in Brewer et al (2008), we use the
data from Caprio et al (2007) on control rights that reflect controlling shareholders’
ownership and on cash flow rights that reflect the fraction of the firm’s cash flow owned by
its controlling shareholder. Caprio et al (2007) argue that a large value of the control spread
may reflect both an owner’s ability and incentives to expropriate bank resources, and it is
more likely to be associated with greater risk taking by the banks with lower capital ratio.
There is also an accounting standard control variable ACCT to denote whether the bank is
using local GAAP or IFRS. If the bank is using local GAAP, it is recorded as dummy variable
0; if the bank is using IFRS, we record it as dummy variable 1. It is expected that the
difference in accounting standard may vary capital ratios that banks hold.
From the capital market, we have observed that companies do not issue much equity after
the IPO. The following Figure.1 shows the year-by-year trends of the change of net long-
term debt and net equity relative to the financing deficit over net assets for the full period
from 1991 to 2011. If banking organizations follow the pecking order, we will expect that the
debt would track the financing deficit more closely than equity. The correlations between
deficit and net debt and equity are relatively low, 0.29 and 0.02 respectively. The correlations
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show  that  the  net  debt  is  more  closely  linked  to  the  financing  deficit  than  the  net  equity,
which supports the pecking order theory. The link of financing deficit can also be seen from
Figure.1. From the graph, between 1995 and 2008, banking organizations issue more debt
than equity to financing. The trend reversed significantly between 2008 and 2012, in which
more equity financing is used due to tightening lending market since the subprime and
European debt crisis. The initial results show that banking organizations follow the pecking
order theory more than non-financial firms (Shayam-Sunder and Myers 1999). In Frank and
Goyal (2003) and Graham (2000) study, they show that non-financial firms use debt
conservatively, and more external financing takes the form of equity. Since there is a
regulatory capital ratio requirement, it is expected that banking organizations use debt
financing cautiously, and except for the equity, banks finance themselves mainly from
retained earnings.
Figure.1
Figure.1 shows the year-by-year trends of the change of net long-term
debt and net equity relative to the financing deficit over net assets of
companies for the full period from 1991 to 2011. DEFt is the net deficit
over net assets; Dt is the net long-term debt over net assets; and Et is
the net equity over net assets.
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The summary statistics for variables used in examining the capital structure are presented in
Table.1.  Due to data availability, the period used in testing the capital structure is from 1999
to 2011. The average equity and Tier 1 capital ratios are 8.6% and 11.3% respectively, which
are higher than the Basel II bank capital ratio requirements. The average change in equity
and Tier 1 capital ratio is small, with mean 0.08% and 0.28% respectively. However, the
standard deviations for both ratios are significant which shows there are substantial
variations in the equity and Tier 1 ratios. The Tier 1 capital ratio changes over time. From the
Figure.2 we notice that from year 1998 to 2011, the capital ratio is above 10.5%, with
fluctuation around its average 11.3%, which is well above the regulatory requirement 6%.
The Tier 1 capital ratio decreases from 11.8% in 1998 to 11.0% in 2000 and to 10.5% in 2007,
with a slight rebound of capital ratio to 11.4% in 2003. The results show that banks tend to
increase the leverage level and take on more risk when the economy is booming until the
economy breaks down. The two troughs in the capital ratio occur at two recent financial
crises in 2000 and 2007 respectively. The financial and credit tension in the economic market
has driven many banks and firms bankrupted. The inter-bank lending is increasingly tight
during the financial crisis and banking organizations increase the capital holding in the case
of freezing credit market. This can be shown on the graph that there is a rebound of capital
ratio after each crisis. The average capital ratio increases sharply after the breakout of the
subprime crisis in 2007, the capital ratio increased from 10.5% to 14.6% in 2011. The trend
shows banking organizations in recent year have increased the capital holdings to hedge the
liquidity risk and to be in compliance with the tightening regulations.
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The average log total asset is 8.64 with standard deviation 2.05. The mean return on average
asset is 0.65%, but the return is very volatile with unconditional volatility of 1.26%. Since
1998, the return on average assets decreases significantly from peak 1.19% around 2002 to
0.35% in 2011. The returns are lowest in 2008 and 2009 of 0.03% and -0.19%, which reflects
the huge impact on the banking profitability and industry as a whole after the subprime
crisis. The banking industry is still struggling since the 2008, and the situation escalates after
the breakout of European debt market. The average percentage change in real GDP is 0.01%
with unconditional volatility of 0.02%. In terms of country-specific policy factors, from the
World Bank survey we notice that countries such as Canada, Switzerland and Germany
have a high degree of external governance than US, UK and Spain. There is more regulatory
requirement for the amount of capital that a bank must maintain in UK and France than in
Belgium and Ireland. In addition, countries with more developed banking industry, such as
UK, Germany and United States, have less independent supervisory authorities. The extent
of country’s safety net shows that Norway, Italy and United States have higher moral
hazard index than Switzerland, Germany and Sweden. Larger extent of safety-net means
there is a high chance for the moral hazard to occur since banks are likely to take the higher
Figure.2
Figure.2 shows the changes of Tier 1 capital ratio over period from 1998 to
2011. Over the entire period, the capital ratio is above 10.5%, with
fluctuation around the average 11.3%, which is well above the regulatory
requirement 6%.
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risk because of the deposit insurance system. The level of government ownership of banking
organizations varies across different countries. Germany has the highest level of government
ownership of all others with 39.9% of top 10 banks owned by government for more than
50%, followed by Portugal, 18.8% and Switzerland with 11.5%. On the other hand, countries
with no top 10 banks owned directly by the government for more than 50% are United State,
Canada, Australia, Belgium, Netherland, Spain and Sweden. It is expected that a high level
of government ownership should be associated with lower private capital ratios.
The correlations between dependent and explanatory variables are shown in Table.2. The
change in leverage and Tier 1 capital ratios are less closely correlated with bank and country
specific variables than the ratios themselves. The bank specific variables are less correlated
with themselves than with country specific variables. Moreover, country-specific variables
are more correlated with economic and regulatory policy variables. However, the
correlations between dependent and explanatory, and within explanatory variables are
relatively small.
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3.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The pecking order behaviour of banking organizations is examined from period 1991 to
2011. We follow the similar approach of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and
Goyal (2003) of reporting results separately for net debt issued and change in debt ratio. We
also examine different restrictions on the data. One of the restrictions requires banks to
report continuously on a variety of other variables. We collect a subset of the sample to only
include banks with complete observations from year 1991 to 2011. The resulted sub-sample
is balanced sample and includes 630 bank-year observations with no gaps. There are 30
banks included in this sub-sample, and since these banks cover the full period, they can be
considered as more matured and well-established banking organizations.  The list of these
banks is not represented in this paper, but it is available upon request. Furthermore, we
relax the continuity restriction, and include banking organizations with more than 15 years
of data, which give us a sample of larger sample size.
The results in Table.3 start with net debt issues as the dependent variables in the full period
sample  without  any  restrictions.  As  reported  in  column  (1)  of Table.3, the estimated
coefficient for this sample is 0.048 with ܴଶ  0.11. When using change in debt ratio as
dependent variables, the estimated coefficient is -0.01 with ܴଶ  0.07. Both coefficients are
significant under 5% and 10% significant level respectively. The positive coefficient shows
that the amount of debt issued increases when the financing deficit increases, indicating the
existence of pecking order. The negative coefficient shows the debt issued decreases while
the financing deficit increases, which indicates there is no potential pecking order exists and
the change in debt does not reflect the deficits. If the more restricted condition is used
requiring banks with more than 15-year information, in column (3) of Table.3, the ܴଶ
increases slightly to 0.11 for net debt issued as dependent variable. The coefficient is still
positive and significant, but the magnitude does not vary much. The coefficient of deficit
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when using change in debt ratio as the dependent variable changes from negative to
positive, but insignificant under more restricted sample. Furthermore, if we apply the
continuity condition with complete observation from 1991 to 2011, it results in a balance
sample. There is nothing in the pecking order theory that requires the use of balanced panel
data. However, if we compare the results of columns (5)-(6) with column (1)-(4), we notice
that requiring banks to have completed and no reporting gaps have a nontrivial impact on
the results. Both the estimated coefficient on the financing deficit and the ܴଶ  increase
considerably when complete continuous sample than the broader population of banking
organizations is examined over the period 1991-2011. With balanced sample, the ܴଶ
increases to 0.14 and 0.09 in column (5) and (6) respectively, which shows 14% and 9% of the
sample can be explained by the model.  The coefficients of financing deficits also increase
from 0.0434 and 0.0001 to 0.0553 and 0.0245 for net debt issued and change in debt ratio
respectively. Both coefficients are positive and significant in restricted sample when
considering only banking organizations that traded continuously over period 1991-2011.
The difference in the results for different samples indicates that the degree of development
of  the  banking  organizations  and  the  time  period  play  a  major  role  in  the  pecking  order
theory.
From  the  comparison  of  results,  we  find  that  the  results  for  more  matured  and  well-
established banks are better and show stronger indication of pecking order than the broader
population. In the previous discussion we predict that if a firm or banking organization
follows the pecking order theory, the amount of changes in the net debt issued equals the
same amount of changes in the financing deficits. Therefore, the coefficient of financing
deficit in the estimation should be equal or close to unity. However, in our results, the
coefficients are between 0.04 and 0.05 for net debt issued, which are significantly lower than
unity. Moreover, the results are still weaker if we compare the results of non-financial firms.
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In Frank and Goyal (2003), the estimated coefficient for financing deficit in the complete
continuous sample is 0.75 for net debt issued and 0.43 for change in debt ratio with ܴଶ of
0.71 and 0.27 respectively during period 1971-1989. However, they find that the results vary
when different sample periods are used. Frank and Goyal (2003) carried out the same test for
period 1990-1998, both the coefficient and ܴଶ are uniformly lower than in period 1971-1989.
However, both results are still larger and stronger than our results for banking
organizations.  Therefore, the above results show that the banking organizations show that,
although the degree of development of the banking organizations and the period play a
relative major role in the pecking order theory, there is a weaker indication of pecking order
behaviour than the non-financial firm in general. One of the interpretations of this result is
that banks are different in terms of leverage relative to non-banks, as taxpayers deposit
subsidized debt relative to equity in banking. When taxpayers put funds into the bank, it is
recognized as an asset by the bank. On the other hand, the bank credits a liability account for
the same amount to show as a liability owed by the bank to its customer. Therefore, the debt
structure in banking is different from non-financial firms.
Table 3  Pecking order tests for period from 1991 to 2011
Institutions with full period data Institutions with more than 15 years data Institutions with continuous 21 years data
Net debt issued Change in debt ratio Net debt issued Change in debt ratio Net debt issued Change in debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.0027 0.0068** 0.0068 0.0032 -0.0002 -0.0112***
(0.7944) (2.1745) (1.6393) (0.8750) (-0.0267) (-1.7552)
Financing deficit 0.0487*** -0.0091** 0.0434**** 0.0001 0.0553*** 0.0245
(12.1483) (-2.0395) (8.5029) (0.0056) (5.0017) (2.0091)**
N 4280 2262 2692 1375 630 630
R2 0.1092 0.0747 0.1142 0.0730 0.1403 0.0904
Adj. R2 0.1048 0.0694 0.1073 0.0642 0.1106 0.0504
*** 1% significant level
** 5% significant level
* 10% significant level
This table reports the pecking order behaviour of banking organizations for period from 1991 to 2011. We report results separately for net debt issued and change in debt
ratio. Three samples of data are examined. Column (1) and (2) include data for the full sample period; Column (3) and (4) include banks with more than 15 years of
observations; Column (5) and (6) include banks with complete continuous observations with no gaps throughout period 1991-2011. The dependent variables are net debt
issued for column (1), (3) and (5); and change in debt ratio for column (2), (4) and (6). The independent variable is financing deficit. All variables are scaled by net asset. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses.
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The aggregation of financing deficit used in this paper is based on the framework developed
from non-financial firms in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999).  In their study, they find that
the pecking order is supported by the aggregation during 1971-1989. The results were later
challenged by Frank and Goyal (2003), in which they have found the results are different if
different samples are considered. In order to test whether the aggregation can be justified in
the banking organization, we examine the aggregation according to different samples as
used in testing the pecking order. The results are shown in Table.4.  From  the  results,  we
notice that the aggregation is supported if continuous with no gap in cash flow data is used
over time from 1991-2011. When we include banks that do not have complete records over
the entire period, the sample becomes much larger, and the observed coefficients change.
The evidence moves further away from supporting the pecking order aggregation
hypothesis. In addition, we look at the estimated coefficients individually. When net debt
issues are considered, the coefficient of the cash dividend is positive under full sample with
no gaps. This support the fact that dividend-paying firms issue less long-term debt, but they
also redeem less when compared to non-dividend paying firms. However, if larger sample is
included, the coefficients become negative, which contradicts the conventional predictions.
The pecking order theory predicts a positive sign and a unit coefficient on investments in
both fixed assets and working capital. According to the theory, after controlling for internal
cash plans, investments in fixed assets and working capital should be matched by increases
in  debt  issues.  The  results  in Table.4 show the coefficients of investment and change in
working capital are all positive and significant under net debt issues. However, the
magnitudes, ranging from 0.05 to 0.08, are far less than unity, which indicates the results on
factor investment and working capital provide weak support for the pecking order
aggregation. Furthermore, the coefficients of internal cash flow for all samples are negative
and significant under both dependent variables. According to large numbers of literature,
internal cash flow does lead to some reduction in debt issues, and there is a negative
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relationship between leverage and profitability. Therefore, our results on internal cash are in
line with the predictions. From the above discussion, we may conclude the result may
provide some weak evidence on the pecking order aggregation; especially the signs of
coefficients on investment, working capital and internal cash flow are like what we expected
from pecking order theory. However, this is not the only expectation from pecking order.
The tradeoff theory also predicts a positive relationship between investments and debt.
Frank and Goyal (2003) argue that higher investment increases tangible assets in general,
which in turn increases debt capacity. The positive relationship between changes in working
capital  and  net  debt  issues  may  also  be  a  result  of  time  issues.  Banks  receive  cash  when
issuing long-term debt, of which they can put into bank accounts or other short-term
investments. As a result, working capital will be increased.  Therefore, we have not found
supportive evidence for the presence of pecking order in banking organizations.  This may
also support our expectation that banks are different in terms of leverage relative to non-
banks, as taxpayers deposit subsidized debt relative to equity in banking. Therefore, for the
same level of financial deficit, a bank may have higher debt level than non-financial firms.
However, this is not due to pecking order but because of the taxpayers funds deposited in
the bank.
Table 4  Aggregation of flow of funds deficit for period from 1991 to 2011
Institutions with full period data Institutions with more than 15 years data Institutions with continuous 21 years data
Net debt issued Change in debt ratio Net debt issued Change in debt ratio Net debt issued Change in debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -0.0360*** -0.0199*** -0.0411*** -0.0224*** -0.0483*** -0.0131
(-7.0283) (-4.2515) (-6.5521) (-4.0361) (-3.4169) (-1.1233)
Cash dividend -0.3114** -0.5892*** -0.2845* -0.4893*** 0.0122 -0.0993
(-2.0760) (-4.0392) (-1.6960) (-3.0513) (0.0304) (-0.2652)
Investment 0.0577*** -0.0097** 0.0532*** 0.0053 0.0848*** 0.0392***
(13.7311) (-2.0496) (9.8381) (0.8589) (7.1331) (2.8299)
∆ Working capital 0.0613*** 0.0088 0.0704*** 0.0147 0.0066 -0.0036
(5.0838) (0.5502) (4.2527) (0.7696) (0.1935) (-0.0977)
Internal cash flow -0.2735*** -0.0232 -0.2686*** -0.1171** -0.5175*** -0.2636**
(-7.2908) (-0.6000) (-6.0789) (-2.5292) (-5.4737) (-2.0651)
R2 0.1293 0.0826 0.1359 0.0872 0.1964 0.1145
Adj. R2 0.1243 0.0760 0.1281 0.0764 0.1645 0.0661
*** 1% significant level
** 5% significant level
* 10% significant level
This table reports the results of aggregation of financing deficit of banking organizations for period from 1991 to 2011. We report results separately for net debt issued and
change in debt ratio. Three samples of data are examined. Column (1) and (2) include data for the full sample period; Column (3) and (4) include banks with more than 15
years of observations; Column (5) and (6) include banks with complete continuous observations with no gaps throughout period 1991-2011. The dependent variables are net
debt issued for column (1), (3) and (5); and change in debt ratio for column (2), (4) and (6). The independent variables are the amount of cash dividend, total investment,
changes in working capital and internal cash flow. All variables are scaled by net asset. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
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The pecking order theory is a competitor to more conventional empirical leverage
specifications. Even if debt level of banking organizations does not follow the pecking order,
it could be still useful to study the traditional leverage and capital structure regression. In
the traditional leverage regression, the capital structure of firms is considered to be
determined by a number of factors, including asset ratio, tangibility, sizes and profitability
etc. However, due to the special feature as financial institutions, the capital structure of
banking organizations may be influenced by other specific variables. As we have discussed
in the previous section, we adopt the framework used in Brewer et al (2008), to include
country-specific economic and public policy factors in addition to the conventional bank-
specific factors as shown in equation (10). The framework is estimated for a pooled cross-
section time series panel of 358 very large banking organizations headquartered in 24
developed countries from year 1999-2011. Because the specific banking organization
included each year varies due to changes in bank size, merger or missing information, the
panel is unbalanced. In this paper, two measures of capital are specified. One is the simple
leverage (common equity) ratio, and the other is Basel I risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio. The
regression results are shown in column (1)-(4) of Table.5 for the leverage ratio and in
column (5)-(8) for the Tier 1 ratio. Column (1) and (5) show the results for a basic model that
specifies each capital measure only as a function of four bank-specific factors plus year-fixed
effect. We progressively expand the analysis to include country fix-effects in column (2) and
(6), and then to include variables of country-specific macro-economic variables in column (3)
and (7). We finally include the rest of country-specific public policy and regulatory variables
in column (4) and (8). The impact of the public policy and regulatory variables across
countries can be quantified by comparing the results of the expanded specifications with the
baseline models. All the bank-specific and country-specific macro-economic variables are
lagged by one period.
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The estimations of the basic model including only bank-specific variables are shown in
column (1)  and (5)  of Table.5. The results show that the changes in both capital ratios are
negatively related with the lagged logarithm of total assets, but the results are only
significant for the Tier 1 capital ratio. Bank risk is positively and significantly related to the
change in the leverage ratio. The coefficient of bank risk is negative under dependent
variable Tier 1 capital ratio, and the coefficient is insignificant. The difference in the different
results of bank risk reflects that the risk-weighted asset appears in both the numerator of our
risk measure and in the denominator of the Tier 1 capital ratio. The profitability of the bank
is represented by return on asset. The coefficients of return on asset for both capital ratios
are positive and significant at 10% for the leverage ratio and at 1% for Tier 1 ratio. The
magnitude of the coefficient under Tier 1 capital ratio is larger than that under equity
leverage ratio. The coefficient for dividend dummy variable for both dependent capital
ratios is negative and significant under 1% significant level. The result supports the
expectations that dividend-paying firms issue less long-term debt, and thus negatively
related to the leverage ratio. The coefficient on the lagged capital ratio which captures the
rate of adjustment towards the target capital ratio is also examined in the framework. Both
coefficients are significant at 1% level and positive, with values of 0.17 and 0.27 respectively
for equity leverage ratio and Tier 1 capital ratio. The result indicates that the average
banking organization moves only 17% and 27% respectively of the way towards their target
on average in a given year and requires around four years to adjust to the target
equilibrium. The rate of adjustment is similar but slightly quicker to the results found in
Wall and Peterson (1988), Marcus (1983) and Brewer et al (2008), in which they find it would
take banks around five years to adjust to the target equilibrium capital ratio. The F-test is
also used to test whether the bank-specific variables collectively make a significant
contribution to explaining the banking organizations’ target capital level. The F-statistics are
14.32 and 22.24 under leverage ratio and Tier 1 capital ratio respectively, which are both
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significant at 1% significant level. The F-tests indicate that the bank-specific variables
collectively make a significant contribution in explaining banking organization target capital
level.
If the country fixed effects is added to the specifications to the previous basic framework, we
obtain the results of estimations in the column (2) and (6).  The results in column (2) and (6)
are qualitatively similar to those in column (1) and (5). The largest difference in the results is
under country fixed effect, the coefficient of the logarithm of total asset is positively related
to the change in equity leverage and Tier 1 capital ratios, and both coefficients are
significant. Bank risk under country fixed effects shares the same estimation results as the
basic model. The risk is positively and significantly related to the change in the leverage
ratio, but negative under Tier 1 capital ratio. As discussed before the difference in the results
reflects that the risk-weighted asset appears in both the numerator of our risk measure and
in the denominator of the Tier 1 capital ratio. Return of Assets (ROA) is positively correlated
with changes in both capital ratios, but only coefficient under Tier 1 capital ratio is
statistically different from zero. The dividend dummy variables are negative and significant
for both capital structures as before, which indicates that dividend-paying firms issue less
long-term debt, thus less leverage. The results of control variable ACCT, indicating the
accounting policy used by the each bank, are negative for both frameworks, except for the
Tier 1 capital ratio under country fixed effects, in which the coefficient of accounting control
variable is positive, but it is not significantly different from zero. The F-statistics are 2.07 and
2.39 for equity leverage ratio and Tier 1 capital ratio, and they are both significant under 1%
significant level. The results indicate that collectively the country binary variables make a
significant contribution in explaining the target capital ratio in addition to bank-specific
factors.
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After testing for the primary and country fixed effects for the bank-specific variables, we
expand the specifications by including two lagged country macroeconomic variables, the
annual percentage change in real DGP (RGDP) and the ratio of aggregate bank assets to
nominal  GDP  (BANK).  The  results  are  represented  in  column  (3)  and  (7)  of Table.5.  The
coefficients on the change of capital in real GDP are positive, but they are not statistically
significant related to either measure of capital ratios. However, the impact of real GDP may
be partially captured by the time fixed effects. The variable BANK measures the extent to
which a country’s financial system is bank-based. The coefficient on BANK is negative for
equity leverage ratio, and it is significantly different from zero under 10% significant level.
The result is in line with the expectations that if the larger proportion of a country’s financial
system is bank-based, banks within this country tend to maintain less capital since banks can
easily access to cheap finance within short time period. The coefficient of BANK is positive
but insignificant when Tier 1 capital ratio is examined as dependent variable. We also notice
that after adding the country-specific macroeconomic variables in the framework, the bank-
specific variables still show expected results as discussed before. The coefficients of
logarithm of total asset and dividend dummy variables are negative and significant for both
capital ratios. The coefficients of return on asset are still significantly positive, which shows
if the bank is more profitably, it is more likely to retain higher capital ratio as a result of
more retained earnings. The bank risk shows positively related to the change in equity
leverage ratio and negatively related to the Tier 1 capital ratio as shown before. The
coefficients of lagged capital ratio are both positive and significant at 1% level, and
magnitudes are the same as the basic framework, which shows on average it takes banks
around four years to adjust to the target equilibrium capital ratio. The values of ܴଶ increase
slightly compared with results in column (1) and (5), but decrease from the value in column
(2) and (6). This suggests that the country effects in column (2) and (6) capture more than
just these two macroeconomic variables. This may reflect that these banking organizations
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tend to operate in countries besides their home country. The F-test statistics are significant at
1% significant level for both capital ratios, indicating country-specific macroeconomic
variables do have contribution to the change of capital ratios.
Last but not least, we add seven country-specific policy and regulatory variables to the
framework: PROMPT, EGOVERN, MHI, CSTAND, INDEP, GOVCONT50 and
CONTROLCF, and the results are shown in column (4) and (8). The coefficients estimated on
the previously bank-specific and country-specific economic variables, lagged capital ratios,
SIZE, ROA, RISK, RGDP and BANK are qualitatively similar to those in regressions
reported in column (3) and (7). As in column (3), changes in the leverage ratio in column (4)
are positively correlated with both RISK and ROA and negatively associated with DIV,
dividend dummy, and all the coefficients are significantly different from zero. The
coefficient of  SIZE is  positive in column (4),  which is  different from the sign in column (3),
but the coefficient is statistically insignificant. Similarly, compared with column (7) results,
changes in Tier 1 capital ratio in column (8) are negatively correlated with RISK, SIZE and
DIV and positively correlated with ROA. However, only coefficients of ROA and DIV are
significant at 1% significant level. Coefficients of RGDP and BANK for both capital ratios are
not significant,  and the signs follow the same as in column (3)  and (7).  As for the country-
specific policy and regulatory variables, five variables are statistically significant for the
leverage ratio in column (4).  Changes in the leverage ratio tend to be higher in countries
with better provision for prompt corrective action, better external governance, and a greater
emphasis on explicit regulatory requirements regarding the amount of capital banks must
maintain relative to specific guidelines. The coefficients on supervisory authority
independence and the difference between control rights and cash flow rights variables are
negative and significant. The moral hazard index variable is positive but not statistically
significant. The indicator of government ownership of banks variable GOVCONT50 is
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negatively related with the change of the leverage ratio, which shows the higher degree of
government ownership of banking organizations, the slower the change of leverage ratio.
Similar to the leverage ratio, the signs of country-specific regulatory variables are the same
under Tier 1 capital ratio with only three variables, PROMPT, INDEP and GOVCONT50, are
statistically significant. The results are presented in column (8). Variables EGOVEN and
CSTAND are still positive associated to the Tier 1 capital ratio, but the t-statistics show that
they are not significant to the change in the Tier 1 capital ratio. Moral hazard index still
shows a positive relationship to capital ratio, and it is still insignificant. Both of the F-
statistics are significant with values 9.74 and 14.75 for changes in leverage and Tier 1 capital
ratio respectively. The statistics indicate that the regulatory and public policy variables
collectively make a significant contribution to explaining changes in banking organizations’
leverage ratio.
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In the above specification, we assume public policy and regulatory variables affect changes
in the capital ratio linearly. However, the public policy and regulatory variables may also
affect desired bank capital ratios nonlinearly and depend on the values of other independent
banks or country-specific macroeconomic variables. For example, regulatory monitoring and
enforcement of capital standards may be stronger for riskier banks, for whom failure is more
likely, or weaker for banks in countries in which the banking system is relatively more
important, so that the banks may retain greater political power and capture regulatory
agencies more easily. Therefore, we expand the model developed in the previous section to
Table 5  Results of regression of estimating the relation between changes in capital ratio and determinant factors over period 1999-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CONSTANT 2.0332 2.0078 2.0060 1.5428 5.6606 2.7963 5.5890 5.5919
(5.5990)*** (0.9401) (5.2946)*** (1.6504)* (9.3449)*** (1.1326) (8.9268)*** (4.9539)***
CR-1 0.1731 0.5178 0.1730 0.1774 0.2715 0.5321 0.2715 0.2739
(10.5120)*** (16.2061)*** (10.5039)*** (10.5780)*** (13.6372)*** (16.9794)*** (13.5009)*** (13.4802)***
Bank Specific
SIZE -0.0310 0.3944 -0.0161 0.0071 -0.1017 0.5780 -0.1025 -0.0937
(-0.9460) (1.6497)* (-0.4745) (0.1952) (-2.6366)*** (2.1425)** (-2.5509)** (-2.1858)
RISK 1.0107 0.6001 0.9720 1.0174 -0.4771 -0.1780 -0.4673 -0.5369
(5.8348)*** (1.1203)*** (5.5567)*** (5.7139)*** (-1.2653) (-0.2868) (-1.2146) (-1.3514)
ROA 0.0940 0.0207 0.0936 0.0901 0.2292 0.2355 0.2300 0.2317
(1.7780)* (0.3395) (1.7686)* (1.6856)* (3.8931)*** (3.5117)*** (3.9009)*** (3.8920)***
DIV -0.8150 -1.3072 -0.8462 -0.9028 -0.9532 -1.3113 -0.9542 -0.9697
(-4.1745)*** (-5.0515)*** (-4.3148)*** (-4.4579)*** (-4.3023)*** (-4.4793)*** (-4.2852)*** (-4.2467)***
Country Macro
RGDP 2.9541 5.4460 3.7837 8.4873
(0.4388) (0.7046) (0.4480) (0.8675)
BANK -0.1457 -0.1246 0.0076 0.0458
(-1.6534)* (-1.1876) (0.0737) (0.3761)
Country policy and regulatory
PROMPT 0.1046 0.2372
(1.6172)* (2.2089)**
EGOVERN 0.1594 0.0200
(-2.5235)** (0.0591)
MHI 0.0762 0.0726
(0.7718) (0.6437)
CSTAND 0.0113 0.0884
(-2.0409)* (-0.2833)
INDEP -0.0638 -0.3384
(-3.2346)** (-3.1033)**
GOVCONT50 -1.5312 -1.3761
(-0.9526) (-1.7662)*
CONTROLCF 0.0146 0.0050
(1.6124)* (0.1897)
Controls
ACCT -0.6065 -0.5362 -0.4633 -0.2080 -0.6391 0.0857 -0.6420 -0.3105
(-2.8001)*** (-0.6197) (-1.9916)** (-0.6781) (-2.6184)*** (0.0852) (-2.4455)** (-0.8675)
Country fixed effects No Yes No No No Yes No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.0730 0.1147 0.0733 0.0728 0.1124 0.1447 0.1118 0.1107
F-statistics 14.3248*** 2.0718*** 13.0415*** 9.7446*** 22.2494*** 2.3963*** 20.0229*** 14.7578***
*** 1% significant level
** 5% significant level
* 10% significant level
∆LEVERAGE ∆TIER1
This table reports the regression results of estimating the relation between changes in the capital ratios and a set of bank-specific, country macro an country policy and regulatory
factors over the period 1999-2011. LEVERAGE is the ratio of a banking organzation's book value equity to the banking organization's book value total asset; TIER 1 is the ratio of a
banking organization's book value Tier 1 capital to the banking organization's book value Basel I risk-weighted assets, RWA. SIZE is the log of total assets; RISK is the banking
organization's Basel I risk-weighted aset (RWA) divided by its total assets; ROA is the banking organizations's net income divided by the average of its on-balance sheet assets at
the begiining and end of the year; DIV is the dividend paid out dummy variable; RGDP is the percentage change in real gross domestic product; BANK is the bank assets to
nominal gross domestic product; PROMPT is the prompt corrective action variable; EGOVERN is a version of the external governance index; MHI is the moral hazard index;
CSTAND is the overall capital stringency variable; INDEP is the degree of independence of supervisory authority variable; GOVCONT50 is the share of the assets of the top ten
banks in a givern country controlled by the government at the 50% level variable; CONTROLCF is the difference between control rights and cash flow rights; ACCT is the acounting
standard dummy variable, taking value of 1 if the bank is reporting in a standard other than its local GAAP, zero otherwise.
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incorporate public policy variables with other independent variable. We include all seven
public policy variables interactively with country-specific macroeconomic variables, RISK
and  BANK.  The  results  of  specifications  are  shown  in Table.6. The results of previously
discussed variables are similar as before. The bank-specific variables, SIZE and dividend
dummy, are negative related to the changes in capital ratio, and most of them are significant
under 1% and 5% significant levels. The RISK is positive under changes in the leverage ratio
and negative for Tier 1 capital ratio, but neither of them is significant. The difference in the
different results of bank risk reflects that the risk-weighted asset appears in both the
numerator of our risk measure and in the denominator of the Tier 1 capital ratio. The
profitability variable, ROA, is positive and significant for both capital ratios as expected. The
country-specific macroeconomic variables, the change of capital in real GDP and BANK, are
positive but insignificant for bank risk under Tier 1 capital ratio. The country policy
variables have similar results as before. The results of interactive variables show that few of
the interactive variables are statistically significant.  Only variables PROMPT×BANK,
INDEP×BANK and GOVCONT50×BANK are statistically different from zero. We have also
noticed that the introduction of interactive variables tends to dramatically reduce both the
statistical and economic significance of the macroeconomic and standalone public policy and
regulatory variables estimated in the previous models. The coefficients of most of the
interactive variables are negative. Therefore, the results of including interactive variables in
the model indicate that this specification may not provide helpful and meaningful
contribution to the estimation of capital ratios.
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Table 6  Results of models of changes in capital ratio with interactions over period 1991-2011
∆LEVERAGE ∆TIER1
CONSTANT 0.0342 (0.01) -5.9379  (-1.01)
CR-1 -0.2036  (-10.95)*** -0.2407  (-11.67)***
Bank Specific
SIZE -0.0127  (-0.33) -0.0857  (-1.90)**
RISK 4.5990 (0.68) -6.5578  (-0.86)
ROA 0.1038  (1.92)** 0.3385  (5.74)***
DIV -0.9171  (-4.49)*** -1.1177  (-4.83)***
Country Macro
RGDP 5.5081  (0.68) 0.4233  (0.12)
BANK 0.4219  (0.25) 5.2436  (2.88)***
Country policy and regulatory
PROMPT 0.2384  (0.27) 0.9688  (0.97)
EGOVERN 1.1790  (0.62) 0.0709  (0.03)
MHI 0.1770  (0.30) 0.0841  (0.12)
CSTAND 0.4413  (0.28) 1.0024  (0.53)
INDEP -1.2180  (-0.73) -5.2600  (-2.93)***
GOVCONT50 -2.4443  (-0.55) -7.7482  (-1.57)
CONTROLCF 0.0046  (0.07) -0.0111  (-0.14)
Controls
ACCT -0.3252  (-0.74) -1.4601  (-3.15)***
Interactions
PROMPT x RISK -0.2508  (-0.23) -1.5053  (-1.20)
EGOVERN x RISK -0.0669  (-0.02) -3.8587  (-1.47)
MHI x RISK -0.1387  (-0.20) -0.5815  (-0.67)
CSTAND x RISK -0.7574  (-0.45) 1.0527  (0.49)
INDEP x RISK -1.2733  (-0.66) -1.5620  (-0.72)
GOVCONT50 x RISK 1.0642  (0.09) -5.8993  (-0.43)
CONTROLCF x RISK 0.0212  (0.20) 0.0170  (0.13)
PROMPT x BANK 0.3178  (1.81)* 1.2317  (3.08)***
EGOVERN x BANK 0.3454  (0.46) 0.1764  (0.20)
MHI x BANK -0.1394  (-0.54) 0.2660  (0.95)
CSTAND x BANK -0.1105  (-0.18) -0.8142  (-1.19)
INDEP x BANK -0.3916  (-0.60) -2.3688  (-3.40)***
GOVCONT50 x BANK 0.5842  (2.08)** -0.3761  (-0.61)
CONTROLCF x BANK -0.0132  (-0.42) 0.0013  (0.04)
Adj. R2 0.0737 0.0889
F-statistics 6.8356*** 11.0472***
*** 1% significant level
** 5% significant level
* 10% significant level
This table reports the regression results of estimating the relation between changes in the capital
ratios and a set of bank-specific, country macro an country policy and regulatory factors and
interactions over the period 1991-2011. LEVERAGE is the ratio of a banking organzation's book value
equity to the banking organization's book value total asset; TIER 1 is the ratio of a banking
organization's book value Tier 1 capital to the banking organization's book value Basel I risk-weighted
assets, RWA. SIZE is the log of total assets; RISK is the banking organization's Basel I risk-weighted
aset (RWA) divided by its total assets; ROA is the banking organizations's net income divided by the
average of its on-balance sheet assets at the begiining and end of the year; DIV is the dividend paid
out dummy variable; RGDP is the percentage change in real gross domestic product; BANK is the
bank assets to nominal gross domestic product; PROMPT is the prompt corrective action variable;
EGOVERN is a version of the external governance index; MHI is the moral hazard index; CSTAND is
the overall capital stringency variable; INDEP is the degree of independence of supervisory authority
variable; GOVCONT50 is the share of the assets of the top ten banks in a givern country controlled by
the government at the 50% level variable; CONTROLCF is the difference between control rights and
cash flow rights; ACCT is the acounting standard dummy variable, taking value of 1 if the bank is
reporting in a standard other than its local GAAP, zero otherwise.
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As discussed before, since our observations are limited by data availability to annually, if
there is an adjustment during the year, we cannot observe them. Therefore, in addition to
equation (10), we carry out a robustness check to test the model under the assumption that
the adjustment is faster and for annual observations the banks are always at their target
capital level. In this case, we substitute the actual capital level at time t for the target ratio
instead of the change of capital ratio. The results of robustness test are shown in Table.7.
ܥܴ௜ ,௖,௧ = ߛ଴ + ߛଵܵܫܼܧ௜,௖,௧ିଵ + ߛଶܴܱܣ௜,௖,௧ିଵ + ߛଷܴܫܵܭ௜ ,௖,௧ିଵ + ߛସܦܫ ௜ܸ,௖,௧ିଵ+ ߛହܴܦܩ ௖ܲ,௧ିଵ + ߛ଺ܤܣܰܭ௖,௧ିଵ + ߛ଻ܴܱܲܯܲ ௖ܶ + ߛ଼ܧܩܱܸܧܴ ௖ܰ+ ߛଽܯܪܫ௖ + ߛଵ଴ܥܵܶܣܰܦ௖ + ߛଵଵܫܰܦܧ ௖ܲ + ߛଵଶܩܱܸܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ௖+ ߛଵଷܥܱܴܱܰܶܮܥܨ௖ + ߛଵସܣܥܥ ௖ܶ + ߝ௜,௖,௧ 	
(11)
The level of both measures of capital ratios is more completely explained than when using
changes of capital ratios. The most of bank-specific variables for both leverage and Tier 1
capital ratio show the expected signs and statistically significant. SIZE and dividend dummy
variables are negatively related to the capital ratios, which show the capital ratio decreases
as the increase of total asset and if banks pay out dividend. Profitability measure ROA is
positively correlated. RISK is positively related to the leverage ratio, and negatively related
to the Tier 1 capital ratio. Compared with annually adjustment specification, the level
measure of capital ratio model has more significant bank-specific variables. The country
macroeconomic variables are also more statistically significant for both capital ratios. The
level of capital decreases as BANK, which is in line with expectations. However, both capital
ratio measures show that if macroeconomic variables are included alone, the capital ratio
decreases as the percentage change of GDP increases, and this is against our expectation.
However, the sign changes when country public policy variables are included, which give
the expected predicted direction as shown in column (4) and (8) of Table. 7. The results may
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indicate that including country public policy variables help to increase the explanatory
power of the specifications. In terms of country specific regulatory and public policy factors,
six out of seven policy variables are significant for the leverage ratio, and three variables are
significant for Tier 1 capital ratio. Majority of variables are at 5% level of statistical
significance. The level of the leverage ratio is statistically significantly higher in countries
that have regulatory prompt corrective action, better external corporate governance, and
greater emphasis on explicit regulatory requirement regarding the amount of capital their
banks must maintain relative to specific guidelines. The leverage ratio is also negatively
related to the degree of supervisory authority independence, government ownership, and
the difference between control right and cash flow right as discussed in the change in the
leverage ratio. Similar movement direction of variables to Tier 1 capital ratio is experienced
as well. However, the number of significant variables for Tier 1 capital ratio is less than the
leverage ratio. For Tier 1 capital ratio only PROMPT and EGOVERN are positively
significant, and INDEP is negatively significant. The rest of variables are not statistically
significant, however, they show the same hypothesis direction between variables and capital
ratio. The ܴଶ and F-test statistics are substantially higher in the level regressions. Therefore
the level regression result suggests that country regulatory and public policy variables are
even more significant determinants of bank capital ratios than for the changes in capital
ratios.
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Table 7  Results of robustness test between changes in capital ratio and determinant factors over period 1999-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
CONSTANT 8.1410 5.6628 8.2699 6.8589 17.3547 13.3411 17.2612 18.2725
(17.5772)*** (2.5623)** (17.0761)*** (5.4973)*** (36.3317)*** (5.4200)*** (34.3530)*** (14.6232)***
Bank Specific
SIZE -0.3640 0.3853 -0.34576 -0.2513 -0.5124 -0.0151 -0.5786 -0.5647
(-8.3765)*** (1.5476) (-7.6436)*** (-5.1399)*** (-11.8443)*** (-0.0546) (-12.9123)*** (-11.6107)***
RISK 5.4769 0.8525 5.4517 5.5303 -1.3050 -1.2725 -1.1115 -1.0874
(27.2185)*** (1.5288) (26.7659)*** (27.0031)*** (-5.4155)*** (-1.9851)** (-4.5749)*** (-4.4364)***
ROA 0.6305 0.2925 0.6351 0.6209 0.1753 -0.0999 0.1745 0.1704
(9.1576)*** (4.8030)*** (9.2105)*** (8.9819)*** (2.5170)** (-1.4468) (2.5152)** (2.4362)**
DIV -0.4368 -1.0121 -0.4726 -0.5589 -0.5827 -0.8123 -0.4451 -0.4300
(-1.6539)* (-3.7659)*** (-1.7816)* (-2.0552)** (-2.1973)** (-2.6910)*** (-1.6779)*** (-1.5801)
Country Macro
RGDP -6.9270 13.2251 -2.0677 7.0390
(-1.7604)** (2.2736)*** (-0.2061) (2.6045)***
BANK -0.1647 -0.0243 0.6403 0.7490
(-2.3800)*** (-0.1730) (5.3684)*** (5.3042)***
Country policy and regulatory
PROMPT 0.3392 0.2262
(2.4892)*** (2.9764)***
EGOVERN 0.8826 0.3899
(-2.1590)** (-1.9608)**
MHI 0.3255 0.0068
(0.0140)** (0.0509)
CSTAND 0.0108 0.2000
(-0.0290) (-0.5372)
INDEP -0.6430 -0.7263
(-1.7619)** (-1.9802)**
GOVCONT50 -4.7240 -0.1513
(-2.1890)** (-0.0706)
CONTROLCF 0.0638 0.0085
(1.9918)** (0.2665)
Controls
ACCT -1.2766 -0.8565 -1.1274 -0.0812 -0.8316 0.3436 -1.4430 -1.0252
(-4.3622)*** (-0.9507) (-3.5858)*** (-0.1969) (-2.8601)*** (0.3405) (-4.6378)*** (-2.4352)**
Country fixed effects No Yes No No No Yes No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.3066 0.6080 0.3067 0.3099 0.1528 0.3946 0.1602 0.1554
F-statistics 80.1823*** 13.8647*** 71.8866 52.9602*** 33.1271*** 6.3782*** 31.4211*** 22.1729***
*** 1% significant level
** 5% significant level
* 10% significant level
This table reports the robustness test between changes in the capital ratios and a set of bank-specific, country macro an country policy and regulatory factors
over the period 1991-2011. LEVERAGE is the ratio of a banking organzation's book value equity to the banking organization's book value total asset; TIER 1 is
the ratio of a banking organization's book value Tier 1 capital to the banking organization's book value Basel I risk-weighted assets, RWA. SIZE is the log of total
assets; RISK is the banking organization's Basel I risk-weighted aset (RWA) divided by its total assets; ROA is the banking organizations's net income divided
by the average of its on-balance sheet assets at the begiining and end of the year; DIV is the dividend paid out dummy variable; RGDP is the percentage change
in real gross domestic product; BANK is the bank assets to nominal gross domestic product; PROMPT is the prompt corrective action variable; EGOVERN is a
version of the external governance index; MHI is the moral hazard index; CSTAND is the overall capital stringency variable; INDEP is the degree of independence
of supervisory authority variable; GOVCONT50 is the share of the assets of the top ten banks in a givern country controlled by the government at the 50% level
variable; CONTROLCF is the difference between control rights and cash flow rights; ACCT is the acounting standard dummy variable, taking value of 1 if the bank
is reporting in a standard other than its local GAAP, zero otherwise.
LEVERAGE TIER1
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3.7 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we examine the extent of pecking order behaviour in the banking
organizations and determinants of bank capital structures. We extend the methodology from
non-financial firm to banking organizations and found both financial and non-financial
organizations share some similar behaviour.  The results of pecking order theory show that
the coefficients of net debt issued are between 0.04 and 0.05, which are significantly lower
than unity of perfect pecking behaviour than those of non-financial firms found in Frank
and Goyal (2003). This indicates that we have not found strong evidence for the existence of
pecking order in banking organizations. The magnitude of coefficient increases when
smaller and continuous samples are used, which suggests that the degree of development of
the banking organizations and the time period play a major role. We interpret this result as
banks are different in terms of leverage relative to non-banks, as taxpayers deposit
subsidized debt relative to equity in banking. The term deposit is used by the banking
industry in financial statements to describe the liability owned by the bank to its depositor,
and not the funds that bank holds as a result of the deposit, which are shown as assets of the
bank. When taxpayers put funds into the bank, it is recognized as an asset by the bank. On
the other hand, the bank credits a liability account for the same amount to show as a liability
owed by the bank to its customer. For the same level of financial deficit, a bank may have
higher debt level than non-financial firms. However, this is not due to pecking order but
because of the taxpayers funds deposited in the bank.
We continue to examine the determinants of bank capital structure from year 1999 to 2011
due to data restrictions. The results show that the effects of lagged logarithm of total assets
vary on changes in both capital ratio measures. Bank risk shows persistently positive and
significant impact on changes in the leverage ratio, and negative for changes in Tier 1 capital
ratio. Similar positive and significant behaviours are seen for return on asset. The
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coefficients of dividend dummy variable for both dependent capital ratios are negative and
significant, which supports the expectations that dividend-paying firms issue less long-term
debt, and thus negatively related to the leverage ratio. The results indicate that bank-specific
variables collectively make a significant contribution in explaining banking organizations
target capital level. When country specific macro-economic and public policy variables are
included in the analysis, the coefficients on the change of capital in real GDP are positive,
but they are not statistically significant related to either measure of capital ratios. The
coefficient on BANK, measuring the extent to which a country’s financial system is bank-
based, is negative and significant for equity leverage ratio. The result is in line with the
expectations that if the larger proportion of a country’s financial system is bank-based,
banks within this country tend to maintain less capital since banks have a large impact on
the financial industry and easy and cheap to finance within short time period. The country
specific public policy factors show significant influence on either change in the leverage ratio
or Tier 1 capital ratio or both. Changes in capital ratio tend to be higher in countries with
better provisions for prompt corrective action, better external governance, and a greater
emphasis on explicit regulatory requirements regarding the amount of capital banks must
maintain relative to specific guidelines. The coefficients on supervisory authority
independence and the difference between control rights and cash flow rights variables are
negative and significant. The moral hazard index variable is positive but not statistically
significant. The indicator of government ownership of banks variable is negatively related
with the change of leverage ratio, which shows the higher degree of government ownership
of banking organizations, the slower the change of leverage ratio. The statistics show that
the regulatory and public policy variables collectively make a significant contribution to
explaining changes in banking organizations’ leverage ratio. The results of lagged capital
ratio coefficients indicate that the average banking organization requires around four to five
years to adjust to the target equilibrium.
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The results above are under the assumption that public policy and regulatory variables
influence the capital ratio linearly. However, the results when including non-linear
combination of country-specific macroeconomic and public policy variables are not
statistically significant. We have also noticed that the introduction of interactive variables
tends to dramatically reduce both the statistical and economic significance of the
macroeconomic and standalone public policy and regulatory variables estimated in the
previous models. Therefore, the results of including interactive variables in the model
indicate that the nonlinear specification may not provide helpful and meaningful
contribution to the estimation of capital ratios.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RETURN AND VOLATILITY SPILLOVER EFFECT OF REAL ESTATE IN
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of the thesis is to empirically examine the relationship between major risk
factors exposed by the financial institutions. The previous chapter specifically examines the
capital risk. In this chapter, we will examine the real estate risk exposure by the financial
institutions. Financial institutions are highly regulated institutions that provide financial
services for it clients or members. In recent decades, the financial services industry is
transforming itself in unpredictable and often contradictory ways. In the study of Crane and
Bodie (1996)24, they explain the reasons of financial services landscape changing so much:
increased competition from non-traditional organizations, new information technologies
and declining processing costs, the erosion of product and geographic boundaries, and less
restrictive governmental relations have all played a role. Despite the realities of a completely
changed marketplace and the need for efficiency by financial institutions, regulations have
not changed fast enough to meet these realities 25 . In United States, organizations and
regulators frustrated with the slow development in recognized standards have initiated
changes by re-interpreting vague legal language, putting pressure on Congress for legal
change. Large banks, in particular, have responded to the increased competition in
traditional lending markets by becoming diversified financial services firms. These
24 Dwight  B.  Crane  and  Zvi  Bodie,  1996,  Harvard  Business  Review.  The  article  is  included  in  the  book:  Tom
Valentine and Guy Ford, Readings in Financial Institution Management: Modern Techniques for a Global
Industry, 1st Edition, 1999, Allen and Unwin Publisher, ISBN 1-86448-747-X.
25 Mona J. Garden, Dixie L. Mills and Elizabeth S. Cooperman, Managing Financial Institutions – An Asset-
Liability Approach, 4th Edition, Harcourt College Publisher, ISBN 0-03-022054-8
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phenomena are likely to have strengthened the interdependence of banking sectors across
these countries, heightened bank sensitivity to outside shocks, and exposed the international
banking system to greater risks (Elyasiani and Mansur 2003).
The first financial intermediary appearing on the earth is banking services, which can be
dated back to 2000 years ago, originating from rich cities, such as, Florence, Venice and
Genoa. They were money changers, situated usually at a table in the commercial district of a
city, aiding travellers by exchanging foreign coins for local money or discounting
commercial notes for a fee in order to supply other merchants with working capitals26.  The
banking industry gradually spread from the classical civilization of Greece and Rome into
northern and western Europe. The development of new overland trade routes and
improvements in navigation in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries gradually shifted the centre of
the world commerce from the Mediterranean region toward Europe and British. The early
banks in Europe were places for safekeeping of valuables as people came to fear loss of their
assets due to war, theft or expropriation by government. When colonies were established in
North and South America, Old world banking practices were transferred to the New World.
At first the colonists dealt primarily with established banks in the countries from which they
had come. Later, state governments in the United States began chartering banking
companies. The US federal government becomes a major force in banking during the Civil
War. Despite the long history and success of banking, fierce financial services competitors
have emerged over the past century to challenge bankers at every turn. Life insurance
companies were the oldest competitors, and the first life insurance company was chartered
in Philadelphia in 1759. Property-casualty insurers emerged at roughly the same time, led by
the  famous  Lloyds  of  London  in  1688,  underwriting  a  wide  range  of  risks  to  persons  and
property. Another type of organizations offering small savings deposits to individual are the
26 Peter  S.  Rose  and Sylvia  C.  Hudgins,  Banking  Management  and Financial  Services,  6th Edition, MaGraw-Hill
Publisher, ISBN 007-123931-6.
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savings and loans association, appeared in the Midwestern US during the 1930s,
encouraging household savings and financing the construction of the new homes. Credit
Unions were first chartered in Germany during the same era, providing savings accounts
and low-cost credit to industrial workers and customers left out by most of banks. Mutual
funds, one of banking’s most successful competitors over the past two decades, appeared in
Belgium in 1822. Hedge funds appeared to offer investors a less regulated and riskier
alternative to mutual fund. These aggressive financial institutions attract a huge volume of
deposits away from the banks and ultimately helped to bring about government
deregulation of the banking industry.
In this paper, we mainly concentrate on the banking industry, and we examine the real
estate factor effect on United States, United Kingdom and Japanese banks. As suggested in
Elyasiani and Mansur (2003) and Allen and Santomero (2001), banking sectors of different
countries do not respond similarly to various shock because of the dissimilarity in terms of
structure and regulatory constraints. The US financial system is the largest and most
advanced in the world. It also has the greatest diversity of institutions, the widest variety of
instruments and the most highly developed derivative markets27.  It  is  also one of  the most
idiosyncratic financial systems in the world, characterized by an oddly parochial set of laws
and regulations that both pair the competition and shield inefficiency. The British financial
system has a dual structure with two parallel financial systems since it is both the national
system of the United Kingdom, but also one of the world’s major international financial
centres  and  hosts  the  largest  component  of  the  Euro  and  bond  markets28. The Japanese
financial system has relied extensively on negotiated financial transactions with implicit
27 George G. Kaufman, Banking Structures in Major Countries, Kluwer Academic Publishers, ISBN: 0-7923-9136-
5.
28 George G. Kaufman, Banking Structures in Major Countries, Kluwer Academic Publishers, ISBN: 0-7923-9136-
5.
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pricing, and less on open-market transactions with explicit pricing, than has been the case in
the United States. In the mid-1970s, however, new economic and technological forces
generated pressure on the Japanese financial system to increase the role of open-market-
based financial transactions. As a result, the financial system is now more open and more
competitive in terms of price competition than before. Elyasiani and Mansur (2003) argue
that the extent of product diversification and organizational structure, within which a bank
operates, can potentially exert a significant degree of influence on the bank's profitability
and risk exposure.
4.2 FACTOR AFFECTING FINANCIAL INSTITUTION EQUITY RETURNS
In recent years, the role of financial institutions as risk intermediaries has come into greater
play  in  the  discussion  of  their  role  in  the  economy.  In  turn,  serving  as  risk-taking
intermediaries, financial institutions need to manage their own risks strategically. Risks are
broadly defined as uncertainties potentially resulting in adverse variations of profitability or
losses29. Most of financial institutions have a great deal of financial risks in their normal
operations. The various types of risks are differentiated according to the source of losses,
market movements or default on payment obligations of borrowers, etc. Since most of the
financial institutions are highly leveraged, hence there is a potential capital risk (the risk of
not being able to cover losses against equity and becoming insolvent30). For many financial
institutions, their financial assets also generally tend to be long-term or intermediate-term
asset that are financed by short-term debt. Hence by the nature of their operations they have
significant credit risk (the risk of default on financial assets) and interest rate risk (the risk of
rates on interest revenues and interest expenses not moving together), and market risk (as
29 Joël Bessis, Risk Management in Banking, 3rd Edition, Wiley Publisher, ISBN: 978-0-470-01912-2.
30 Mona J. Garden, Dixie L. Mills and Elizabeth S. Cooperman, Managing Financial Institutions – An Asset-
Liability Approach, 4th Edition, Harcourt College Publisher, ISBN 0-03-022054-8
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risk of a fall in the value of financial assets and the market value of equity) with
unfavourable interest rate or equity market changed. Other risks are also part of their
standard operations including liquidity risk, the risk of not being able to meet upcoming
obligations, particularly for depository institutions like banks and saving and loans, with
possible deposit withdrawals.  With globalization, large financial institutions operating in
many different countries face additional risks including foreign exchange risk (the risk of
loss on foreign exchange transactions). On the other hand, except for financial risks, financial
institutions also face other types of risks. Operational risk is not financial to the extent that it
arises from internal malfunctions of processes, and it is subject to a capital charge under the
risk  regulations.  Technology  risk  is  also  another  type  of  nonfinancial  risk,  and  with  the
advent of internet transactions, financial institutions face serious fraud and criminal risk as
well. Since the recent subprime crisis and thereafter European debt crisis, there is an
increasing country or sovereign risk, the risk of expropriation, and cultural risks, the risk of
cultural norms. Ethical and regulatory risk exist as well, such as in the Enron scandal, where
large financial institutions assisted corporations to hide their liabilities in complex off-
balance-sheet schemes. In our paper, we use bivariate GARCH framework to study risks
that the financial institutions face. More specifically, we examine the interest rate, market
risk and the risk of real estate sector to banks. There are extensive literatures have shown the
significance of interest risk and market risk to the commercial banks (Stone 1974, Choi et al
1992, Dinenis and Sotiris 1998, Wetmore and Brick 1994, and Flannery et al 1997). However,
the literatures on real estate factor effect are few, with some main papers such as , Allen et al
(1995), Mei and Lee (1994), Mei and Saunders (1995, 1997), and Elyasiani et al. (2010), etc.
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4.2.1 MARKET FACTOR
Market risk is the risk of adverse deviations of the market-to-market value of the trading
portfolio, due to market movements, during the period required to liquidate the
transactions.31 The period of liquidation is critical to assess such adverse deviations, the
longer the period, the longer the deviation from the current market value. Earnings for the
market portfolio, the portfolio of assets held for trading over a period, are the variations of
the market value. Any decline in value results in a market loss. It is possible to liquidate
tradable instruments or to hedge their future changes of value at any time. When liquidity is
high, the adverse deviations of prices are much lower than in poor liquidity environment32.
In the literature, the impact of the market factor to financial institutions has been studied
extensively. Bae (1990) finds the stock market return is sensitive to financial institutions
stock in general during 1974-1985. He further investigates the effect of market return to
different types of financial institutions, such as commercial banks, savings and loans,
insurance companies, finance companies as well as REITs, and the results shows market
return has positive significant impact on all financial institution portfolios. The research of
Akella and Chen (1990) and Choi et al (1992) obtain similar results by using the same
framework, multi-index CAPM, and period of data, from 1970s to 1980s. The difference
between their work is different data frequency used; however, the significant impact of
market return to banks return remains the same. Later periods, from 1980s to 2000s, are also
covered with many literatures, and most importantly, variable conditional variance
methodologies, such as GARCH framework, are increasingly adopted (Elyasiani and
Mansur 1998, 2003, 2004 and Elyasiani et al 2007, etc.). Without any doubt, the results of later
31 Joël Bessis, Risk Management in Banking, 3rd Edition, Wiley Publisher, ISBN: 978-0-470-01912-2.
32 Joël Bessis, Risk Management in Banking, 3rd Edition, Wiley Publisher, ISBN: 978-0-470-01912-2.
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studies all show that financial institutions are sensitive to the changes in the general stock
market.
With our most interest of this paper, we try to investigate the real estate effect to the
financial institution stock behaviours. While a number of papers in the literature, although
in very small proportion, have shown the significant impact of real estate effect to financial
institutions, the general market return still has found to be significant to financial institution
return after counting the real estate risk. He and Reichert (2003) use a three-index model on
US quarterly date from period 1972-1995, and they find the systematic stock market factor
has the most important, significant and stable impact on the risk premium of financial
institutions, banks and insurance companies. While interest rate factor is useful in assessing
bank current conditions, the equity stock market factor is useful in predicting future bank
holding company performance (Flannery 1998). He et al (1996), by using monthly and
weekly, value-weighted and equally-weighted indices, find that the market beta for banks is
less than unity in US market, which shows the banks are generally less risky than the overall
market stocks.
Market beta for financial institutions is to be size-dependent, with larger financial
institutions displaying greater market beta values (Elyasiani et al 2007). The difference in the
market beta may be to the fact that larger financial institutions tend to be highly leveraged,
less liquid and more orientated towards no traditional banking activities such as exotic
derivatives, which can be highly risky. Furthermore, different types of financial institutions
have different market risk exposure (Allen and Jagtiani 1997). Securities firms have the
lowest market risk premium with most market risk exposure. All financial firms,
particularly insurance companies, reduced their market risk exposures after the 1979 change
in monetary targets. Despite tighter regulations and the restriction of governmental
forbearance, both depository institutions and insurance companies increased their market
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risk exposure during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The reason behind the general
higher market risk exposure of commercial banks is because of the argument of moral
hazard; that is, banks take on more risk to take advantage of government guarantees as their
charter value decline.
4.2.2 INTEREST RATE FACTOR
The interest rate risk is the risk of declines of net interest income, or interest revenue minus
interest cost, due to the movement of interest rate. Most of the loans and receivables of the
balance sheet, and terms of saving deposits, generate revenue and cost that are driven by
interest rates. Because interest rates are not stable, the earnings are unstable either.
Borrowers and lenders with variable rate are subject to interest rate risk. In addition, loans
and debts on fixed rate are also subject to interest rate risk because fixed rate lenders could
lend at higher than their fixed rate if the rate increases, and borrowers could pay a lower
interest rate when the rate decreases33. Implicit or explicit options in banking products are
other sources of interest rate risk. Optional risks are indirect interest rate risks because they
do not depend only on the changes of interest rate, but also result from the behaviour of
customers.
The early study of financial institution stock can be dated back to Stone (1974). Many earlier
literature on the interest rate sensitivity impact on the bank stock return focused on the
period 1976-1985, and interest rate was volatile and were at unprecedented high level
(Wetmore and Brick 1994). Stone (1974) find that interest rate risk is inherent risk and cannot
be either captured by market risk beta or diversified away. The two-factor model is, on the
other hand, more efficient in explaining the interest rate risk by including equity market and
33 Joël Bessis, Risk Management in Banking, 3rd Edition, Wiley Publisher, ISBN: 978-0-470-01912-2.
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bond market information. Bae (1990) extends Stone (1974)’s study  by  examining  both  the
current interest rate and anticipated interest rate monthly changes covering the period from
1974 to 1985. When estimating the expected current interest rate, he applies eight-lag
autoregressive model and polynomial distributed lag model with the optimal lag of six
periods, and the residual term is used to capture the unanticipated interest rate change
factor. His results not only supports Stone (1974)’s finding that interest rate has an impact on
the financial institution stock, but also he finds that both current and unanticipated interest
rate changes are found to adversely affect financial institution stock returns. The current
interest rate changes have less impact than the unanticipated interest rate changes, and it can
be considered as changes correspond to unanticipated changes. Furthermore, he discovers
that the sensitivity of financial institution stock return increases for a longer-maturity
interest rate index. Akella and Chen (1990) also come to the same conclusion that long-term
interest rate return is positively associated with bank stock return, and they further noted
that the short-term return is ambiguous on the sensitivity of bank stock return. The study
further points out that the estimation of the bank stock sensitivity appears to be affected by
the period of study as well as by the methods estimation procedure.
The two-factor model is also supported by a number of studies. Song (1994) uses the same
method over the same period 1979-1982 as in Akella and Chen (1990); however, he is the
first to argue that since the market and interest rate risks depend on the conditioning
information, the measure of betas on the conditional covariance and conditional variances of
two factors, they are potentially time varying. Therefore, he applies an ARCH modelling
process to the two-factor model, and the resulting two-factor ARCH model is estimated by
generalized method of moments, GMM. The significant changes in the risk exposure of
deposit institution are captured by the ARCH model, which corresponds to the dramatic
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changes in banking regulations and economic environment in 1980s. This enforces the
importance of modelling the time-varying beta in the market model for bank stock returns.
The idea of time-dependent bank stock return generating process is further supported in the
study of Flannery et al. (1997), Elyasiani and Mansur (1998), Kane and Unal (1988) and
Kwan (1991), and they all express that the return should be modelled to capture the feature.
Instead of Song (1994)’s ARCH model, Flannery et al. (1997) apply generalized GARCH-M
estimation process on two-factor model on the bank stock return generating process.
Elyasiani and Mansur (1998) use  the  same  GARCH-M  process  based  on  the  multi-factor
model to introduce the volatility of interest rate into the bank stock return generating
process and allow for volatility to vary with time and relate the risk premium to the bank
stock return volatility. The results support the previous studies that bank stock returns vary
with time, and the long-term interest rate is significant with a negative impact on the bank
stock return. The results also suggest that interest rate volatility is an important determinant
of the bank stock return volatility and bank stock risk premium.
Similarly, Brewer et al. (2007) apply the same GARCH-M to life insurance stock returns
rather than bank stock returns for period 1975-2000. They categorize the sample and form
portfolios based on the high-beta and low-beta firms as well as different size of the
insurance firms. The results show that the returns of insurance firms are sensitive to the
long-term interest rate as shown in the bank stock returns, and the interest rate sensitivity of
insurance firms is negatively related to changes in the interest rate. The study particularly
notes that insurance firms with low market betas exhibit significant interest rate sensitivity,
and equity returns of smaller life insurance firms are more sensitive to movements of the
stock market than to the movement of interest rates.
The previous studies on volatility have been using univariate GARCH model, and Elyasiani
and Mansur (2004) adopt a multivariate GARCH model to test the relative sensitivities of
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bank stock returns to both short-term and long-term interest rates. In the later work,
Elyasiani and Mansur (2007) apply the same method to examine the return interdependence
and risk transmission across banks, securities firms and insurance companies.  The findings
suggest that bank stock returns are sensitive to the interest rate, and the direction of the
effect is negative, with the magnitude depending on the portfolio- and model-specific
characteristics. Long-term interest rate has a stronger impact on the bank stock returns, and
the volatility of long-term and short-term interests have an important influence in
determining the bank equity return and volatility. There is interdependency among three
financial industries, and the relationship is size sensitive. Larger institutions show stronger
volatility spillover effect than smaller organizations.
4.2.3 REAL ESTATE FACTOR
Since 1980s, there has been a large shift of loan portfolios into real estate in banking firms in
the United States, and it has been observed as a trend in banking industry worldwide. The
banking industry has changed substantially since the savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s.
Before the crisis, there are a large number of small and specialized firms, and traditional
banking industry was fragmented. Since 1980s, segmented banking firms are consolidated,
and a new financial service industry is gradually formed. One of the significant reform is
commercial banks shifted their product and asset portfolios into consumer lending, which
was traditionally a specialty of thrifts and credit unions. The number of real estate banks,
which hold more than 40% of loans secured by real estate,  has increased from 1,724 in 1989
to 2,835 in year 1996 (Blaško and Sinkey  2006). On the other hand, the total number of banks
has dropped from 12,702 to 9,529 in 1996.
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Real estate has been considered as a relatively high average return investment relative to its
risk. Institution investors have favoured to include real estate in their portfolio as a good
diversification instrument since 1980s. Real estate returns are predictable as the stock
returns, and perform well in an asset-liability framework. In addition, the chance of
experiencing a large loss on real estate in long term is very small (Chun et al 2004). The
changes in the real estate returns reflect in changes in the property values, and it can have
greater effects on bank risk and profitability (He et al. 1996). Therefore, real estate returns
should have an explanatory power on the risks and returns of the financial institution
stocks.
Although the importance of real estate has drawn many researchers’ attentions, there are not
many literatures on studying of the sensitivity of financial institution stocks to real estate
returns. An early study on the impact of real estate loans can be found in Eisenbeis and
Kwast (1991), in which they study the economic viability of the financial institution
concentrating on real estate loans for period 1978-1988. They classify the banks into two
groups: one group containing banks with 40% or more real estate loans, and the other group
with banks with 40% or more real estate loans for five or more years. This classification is
later adopted in Blaško and Sinkey (2006). The results show that banks with longer real
estate loan history have higher returns with less risk than more diversified banks over the
period 1978-1988, and those high return banks exhibit substantial flexibility in their ability to
adjust their real estate loan holdings.
Mei and Lee (1994) find the presence of a real estate factor, in addition to both stock and
bond factor in asset pricing, which addresses the importance to include real estate exposure
in asset portfolios. Allen et al (1995) first explicitly introduce the idea of the impact of real
estate market conditions on the banking industry. They argue that for bank stocks to be
significantly related to the real estate market they have to have significant exposure to the
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real estate, i.e. the amount of real estate holdings and the effectiveness of real estate market
impact on the holdings. They use the seemingly unrelated regression framework to estimate
a three-factor index model on bank stock returns to market, interest rate and real estate over
1979-1992. The findings show that, apart from market and interest rate, stock returns on
large and medium size bank portfolios are positively and significantly related to the level of
returns on real estate. And the sensitivity of bank returns to a real estate index has increased
over time, which reflects a shift to real estate investment over the period in 1980s. .
Similarly, He et al. (1996) use the same method, and he compares the results when different
proxies of return series are used. They use six proxies for the real estate returns: equally-
weighted indices of monthly and weekly returns on all tax qualified REITs, equity REITs
and mortgage REITs. They divide the bank holding company portfolios into 18 segments
according to the feature of the loans, e.g. construction, farmland or residential. Different
combinations of portfolio returns and proxies are analysed by the three-factor model. The
results show that mortgage and all value REITs returns have better performance. Among all
the combinations, the most appropriate proxies of market returns, interest rates and real
estate returns are equally weighted market index, the unexpected changes in yields on long-
term government bonds, and the mortgage REITs returns respectively. They also note that
banks with a large proportion of loan investments are more sensitive than those with a
smaller proportion. However, farm loans do not experience sensitivity on the bank stocks
returns.
In his later research, He et al. (1997) additional test how different types and qualities of real
estate loans affect the sensitivity of bank stock to real estate returns by using the most
appropriate proxies obtained in He et al. (1996). The quality of real estate loans is tested
according to the nature of loans. The results confirm the previous study on the bank real
estate sensitivity. Different from the results before, he shows that farmland loans have a
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negative impact on bank real estate return, of which could perform as diversification role in
terms of reducing bank real estate return sensitivity. As for the quality of real estate loans,
when using mortgage REITs returns, charge-off real estate loans have a negative impact on
the bank stock returns to real estate returns, however, the impact of recovery real estate
loans is positive.
Mei and Saunders (1995) use the GMM approach to test the multi-factor model restriction on
the returns of five portfolios, including general stock market, bond, real estate, and bank
stock portfolios. The bank stock returns are divided into a money centre bank group and a
nonmoney centre bank group, and two return series on equally-weighted bank stock
portfolio are used. The model allows flexibility of the influencing factors on the bank stock
return by not restricting particular factors. They find that the time variation in bank risk
premiums has been partly determined by interest rate and real estate market conditions.
Real estate return has been most important for large nonmoney centre banks. Mei and
Saunders (1997) extend the study by including real estate investment data of savings and
loan association and life insurance companies along with bank stock returns. When
estimating the real estate returns, they not only use equally-weighted equity REITs as in Mei
and Saunders (1995), but also include the equally-weighted returns on real estate company
stocks and mortgage REITs. They argue that mortgage REITs returns offer a particularly
good proxy to the underlying returns on financial institution’s real estate loan portfolios
since from an investment perspective, the “payoff” structure of the real estate loan portfolio
of financial institutions is similar to underlying the mortgage loan asset portfolios of
mortgage REITs. The study discovers a trend-chasing behaviour that the real estate
investment made by US commercial banks and saving and loans have been driven by ex-
post real estate returns as well as ex-post market returns.
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Ghosh et al (1997) examine the event study on financial institution stock price behaviour
from a different aspect. They analyse the stock price behaviour around the announcements
of declining real estate values during the crisis late 1980s and early 1990s. They show that
financial institutions have significant negative stock price reactions to announcements of
adverse real estate news. The study further support the indication of real estate impact on
the financial institution stock returns. In He (2002), monthly percentage changes in median
sale prices of new houses sold are used as a proxy for the real estate returns. The results
show that a common set of variables is useful in explaining the returns of commercial banks,
insurance companies and diversified financial institutions. He also shows that the inclusion
of real estate market factor in the model can significantly raise its explanatory power.
Therefore, it suggests that the real estate market factor indeed represents a systematic risk
and plays an important role in explaining the returns on financial institution stocks. He also
finds real estate market factor has very stable significant coefficients, except for two sub-
periods in the 10 year periods, 1978-1987, which reflects the dramatic bank deregulation and
unprecedented interest rate volatility. This supports real estate market experiences similar
but less pronounced cycle as stock and bond markets.
In the recent literature, more studies have been focusing on relaxing the time-constant
restrictions on the estimation process. He and Reichert (2003) use Flexible Least Square
method on a three-factor Fama-French model to estimate the return of financial institution
stocks for period 1972-1995. The study includes an index of overall financial institution, and
indices for bank stocks and insurance companies to examine any differences in the return
behaviour among sectors. The results find evidence that the real estate sensitivity of
financial institution stock returns us statistically significant during most of the period 1972-
1995. However, there are only two short sub-periods, 1972-73 and 1979-80 in which the real
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estate market factor does not play a significant role in explaining risk premiums for financial
institutions.
Since most of literature on financial institution stocks has been focusing on the United States
market, and Lu and So (2005) are the first of few that study the real estate market impact on
the bank return behaviours in Asia. They study the return relationships between listed
banks and real estate firms in seven Asian countries before and after the Asian financial
crisis in 1997, including Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea
and Thailand. They use a three-factor model to capture the impact of market, interest rate
and real estate returns on bank stock portfolios over 1995-1999. The Grange-Causality results
between real estate and bank stock returns show that the real estate returns do have an
explanatory power in the bank stock returns in the Asian market; however, the reverse
relationship is not established. In addition, Asian banks like those in United States are
exposed to the real estate risk both before and after the crisis, and risk increased in the post-
crisis period, which implies the underlying collateral on the bank real estate lending process
is recognized.
4.2.4 REAL ESTATE FACTOR SELECTIONS
From previous discussions, we have seen that many studies have found evidences that real
estate factor has a significant effect on the financial institution returns. However, there are
different proxies of real estate factors have been employed in the literature. Blaško and
Sinkey (2006) and Chun et al (2004) have used the size and proportion of real estate loans in
the bank asset portfolios to represent the real estate factor. In addition, the sale price of real
estate property has also been used in the research as shown in He (2002).  There  is  an
increasing trend of using Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) in the recent literature (as
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seen in Allen et al 1995, Mei and Saunders 1995, 1997, etc.).  The reasonableness of using
REITs to represent its underlying real estate has been examined in many studies, and mixed
results have obtained. In the following section, we will discuss the different findings of
using REITs to represent real estate factor from the literature.
REIT stocks can be viewed as a form of securitized real estate representing claims on real
properties or mortgages. However, when considering REITs as possible investment
opportunities, investor should understand to what extent REIT stocks reflect the returns of
their underlying real estate assets. If REITs returns do not reflect the returns to their
underlying assets, investors can not use them as a convenient way to add a real estate
component to their portfolio. In the literature, there is no consensus on the issue of whether
the REITs stock market and the real estate property market are integrated. Strictly speaking,
the two markets are said to be integrated if their risk premiums are the same or at least
similar.34
Some researchers find that the REIT pricing is very similar to that of other common stocks or
that there is no evidence of market segmentation, suggesting that the two markets are
integrated (Li and Wang 1995). Giliberto and Mengden (1996) find that return behaviours of
REITs stock and  private real estate are very similar after adjusting for differences in
valuation parameters used in the two markets. Ghosh et al (1996) show  that,  during  the
period 1985-1996, REITs stocks have become less comparable to average stocks in recent
period, and behave more like unsecuritized real estate. A positive contemporaneous
relationship exists between REITs returns and real estate stock returns supporting a
fundamental relationship between them (Myer and Webb 1994). After accounting for the lag
in returns relative to REITs return, the returns to REITs are similar to the returns to real
34 Su Han Chan, John Erickson, Ko Wang, Chapter 10 The Performance of REITs, Real Estate Investment Trust,
Oxford University Press, ISBN: 0-19-515534-3.
146
estate. These findings could suggest that the market for REITs stocks and unsecuritized real
estate shares similar fundamentals.
In some literature, they find evidences that a special real estate risk-factor premium affecting
REITs returns and there is a relationship between the capitalization rate and REITs returns
(Mei and Lee 1994, and Liu and Mei 1992, etc.). They argue that if the capitalization rate
used to value real property affects the return to REITs, then it provides strong evidence that
REITs stock returns can be partially affected by the movement of property values in the
property market. Lieblich et al (1998) find weak long-run statistical relationship between the
total returns of securitized and unsecuritized real estate, but no short-run relationship.
There are also evidences found by some researchers that the property market and the REITs
stock market are not correlated. Glascock et al (2000) find that over the period 1972-1996,
securitized and unsecuritized real estate markets are not cointegrated. Ambrose et al (1992)
show that REITs stock market is integrated with general stock market over the long run.
However, REITs may not be a good proxy for the returns of unsecuritzied real estate
because of their stock-like characteristics. Similar results are also seen in Scott (1990), in
which he reports REITs stock prices do not always track real estate market fundamentals,
therefore, REITs prices may not serve as reliable indicators of fundamental values for real
estate.
The evidences of use REITs as a proxy of real estate factor are mixed, however, it seems
there is an increasing number of recent studies have been used REITs represent the real
estate factor influence. They conclude that there is some basic relationship between the
markets for unsecuritzed and securitized real estate. The differences of mixed views of the
relationship between REITs and unsecuritized real estate are because of many reasons. One
reason is due to the different data periods employed in the papers. It has been found
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although the risk return characteristics of REITs stocks may have been more like non real
estate common stocks in the past, in recent years REITs stocks have behaved more like
unsecuritized real estate.35
4.2.5 REITS – REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
A traditional Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) is essentially a closed-end fund created
exclusively for holding real properties, mortgage-related assets, or both36. This investment
vehicle was created by the US Congress in 1960 for the express purpose of providing
investors with an opportunity to invest in real estate properties and, at the same time, to
enjoy the same benefits provided to shareholders in investment trusts. In order to make
REIT a more attractive investment, Congress waives the corporate-level income tax on
REITs, if they meet the requirements set by tax laws governing them. Among them, one of
the most core conditions is that REITs must be widely held and they must distribute most of
their taxable income as dividends to shareholders. With the creation of REITs, it is possible
for investors to trade properties in the stock market since they are now in a form of a
corporation or trust, and it also makes possible for small investors to invest in real estate.
The stockholders of a REIT also receive economic benefits from the production of income
through commercial real estate ownership. It can provide greater diversification by
investing in a portfolio of properties rather than a single property.
There are two major ways in which institutional investors can invest in real estate37: direct
(private) and indirect (public). Direct real estate is acquired by investing directly or through
35 Su Han Chan, John Erickson, Ko Wang, Chapter 10 The Performance of REITs, Real Estate Investment Trust,
Oxford University Press, ISBN: 0-19-515534-3.
36 Su Han Chan, John Erickson, Ko Wang, Real Estate Investment Trust, Oxford University Press, ISBN: 0-19-
515534-3.
37 Su Han Chan, John Erickson, Ko Wang, Real Estate Investment Trust, Oxford University Press, ISBN: 0-19-
515534-3.
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property pools, commingled real estate funds (CREFs), syndications or separate accounts
managed by real estate professionals. The second category, indirect real estate, involves the
purchase of securitized real estate, such as, REITs. The key difference between the traded
securities, such as property companies and REITs, and direct market and private funds real
estate investment is concerned with the basis of valuation.  The direct market and private
funds are valued according to valuation estimates, with expectations playing a limited role.
On the other hand, traded securities such as property companies and REITs are priced
primarily in relation to general equity markets, and the market expectation plays a key role.
REITs have become popular financial products since it was first introduced in United States
in 1960. REITs have changed the way of real estate investment from direct to indirect
investment. It has been found that many institutional investors prefer to take larger
positions in more liquid assets like REITs stocks than private real estate equities because
REITs can provide more flexibility in liquidity (Ciochetti et al. 2010).
The regulations on REITs are passed on country level, and REITs from different countries
may vary differently. However, in general, REITs are a tax efficient real estate investment
vehicle giving them perceived advantages over conventional corporate vehicles. Tax
efficiency means that the dividend payments of the firm are exempt from corporation tax. A
regular corporation pays taxes on the entire profit, and then the after-tax profits are
allocated between dividend and reinvestment. However, REITs can distribute all or almost
all of their profit as dividend and avoid corporate income tax (Peterson and Hsieh 1997). To
qualify as a REIT, a real estate company has to meet the following criteria38:
· Pay out a minimum of 90% of its taxable income to its shareholder every year.
· Be an investor in real estate rather than a broker.
38 Su Han Chan, John Erickson, Ko Wang, Chap. 2 The Origins and Evolution of Real Estate Investment Trusts,
Real Estate Investment Trust, Oxford University Press, ISBN: 0-19-515534-3.
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· Be a corporation, business trust or association managed by a board of trustees or
director.
· Have at least 100 shareholders with no more than 5 of these owning more than a
combined 50% of the trust’s outstanding shares.
· Derive at least 90% of its gross income from rent and interest income, gains on the
sale of property or shares of other trusts, and other real estate sources.
· Derive a minimum of 75% of its gross income from real property interest, gain on the
sale of property or shares of other trusts, and other real estate sources
· Have at least 75% of total assets in real estate properties or mortgages, cash and
government securities.
The success of the REIT structure in the US has led to the development internationally.
Australia has introduced REITs (LPTs) since 1985. In recent years, a number of Asian
markets have also pursued a REIT like structure, e.g. Japan, Singapore etc. European
markets were slightly later to join the REIT markets. By the end of December 2011, the total
number of companies listed under REITs is 616 worldwide39. The following Table.8 lists 22
major REITs countries, and information on the year in which the country joined the REIT
markets, the number of REITs by the end of year 2011, and its global market share:
39 Source from Bloomberg and EPRA European Public Real estate Association Annual Global REITs Survey
(http://www.epra.com/)
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In general, North America, which includes United States and Canada, plays a dominating
role in the global REITs market. It has the largest market share of global REITs market,
59.5%, with total market capital of €340bn. Asia Pacific region (Australia, Japan, Singapore,
Hong Kong, Malaysia, New Zealand, Taiwan, Thailand and South Korea) has the second
largest REITs market, with market capital €127.7bn, which takes 22.4% of global REITs
market. European region is relative new joiner of the REITs market, with France and United
Kingdom are the main players. The total market capital of European region is €97.4bn,
which takes up 17.1% of global REITs market.
If we look at the country individually, the United State REITs market has the largest number
of REITs, 179 companies. The US REITs dominated the global REITs market with market
capital €313.3bn and market share of 54.8%. Besides US, no other country has market share
more than 10%. Australia REITs is the second largest market in terms of number of REITs, 57
REITs, and market share of 9.9% (€56.4bn). In Europe, France has the largest number of
REITs, 43 companies with market capital €50.3bn and market share of 8.8%, and third largest
Country REITs Name Enacted Year No. of REITs Market Cap € billion % of Global REITs
USA US-REIT 1960 192 313.3 54.80%
Australia LPT 1985 57 56.4 9.90%
France SIIC 2003 43 50.3 8.80%
United Kingdom UK-REIT 2007 21 30.9 5.40%
Japan J-REIT 2001 34 29.5 5.20%
Canada MFT 1994 35 26.7 4.70%
Singapore S-REIT 1999 24 22.5 3.90%
Hong Kong HK-REIT 2003 8 11.8 2.10%
Netherlands FBI 1969 7 8.4 1.50%
Belgium SICAFI 1995 14 5.5 1.00%
South Africa PUT, PLS 2009 5 4.2 0.70%
Malaysia Unit Trust 2002 14 2.8 0.50%
New Zealand PIE 2007 8 2.4 0.40%
Turkey REIC 1995 19 2 0.40%
Taiwan Taiwan REIT 2003 8 1.7 0.30%
Germany G-REIT 2007 4 1.3 0.20%
Mexico FIBRAS 2004 1 0.6 0.10%
Greece REIC 1999 2 0.4 0.10%
Italy SIIQ 2007 1 0.4 0.10%
Thailand PFPO 1992 6 0.4 0.10%
Bulgaria SPIC 2004 19 0.2 0.00%
South Korea REIC 2001 4 0.2 0.00%
* Source: EPRA European Public Real estate Association Annual Global REITs Survey (http://www.epra.com/)
Table 8  Global REITs market share
This table reports the information regarding to the year of introduction, number of REITs products, market capitalization
and pertencentage share of global REITs.
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globally. UK REITs follows the France REITs, with market share of 5.4% (€30.9bn). However,
the total number of REITs companies in UK is 18, which is less than the number of REITs in
Japan, 34 companies, with market share of 5.2% (€29.5bn). This represents that the average
size of REITs in UK is larger than that in Japan. Canada REITs come to at the fifth place, with
a total number of REITs of 35 and market share of 4.7% (€26.7bn). Furthermore, Singapore
and Hong Kong REITs takes 3.9% (€22.5bn) and 2.1% (€11.8bn) of global REITs market. The
total REITs market capital share percentage for the rest of countries is 5.2%, with each
market share less than 1%.
REITs generally can be classified into three groups: equity REITs, mortgage REITs and
hybrid  REITs,  which  include  both  equity  and  mortgage  REITs.  Equity  REITs  focus  on  the
ownership of income-generating real estate properties and invest heavily in commercial
properties, such as retails, office buildings and industrial facilities. Mortgage REITs mainly
invest in long-term and short-term construction loans, and residential and commercial
mortgages, but they do not usually own or operate real estate. Therefore, it is expected that
mortgage REITs may be more sensitive to interest rate changes than others in general, since
they primarily held mortgages with long durations (Liang et al 1995). The  total  number  of
REITs companies is 616 by the end of 2011 worldwide as shown in Table.9. 90% of REITs
products currently are equity REITs, with fewer than 10% are mortgage REITs. Table.9 is a
classification of REITs products by their investment categories, and the information is
obtained from Bloomberg. It shows REITs specialize in Industrial and Office have the largest
number of REITs products of 179, followed by Retail REITs of 110, Diversified REITs of 99
and Residential REITs of 76. REITs specialize in mortgage lending has only 51 REITs, which
occupies 8.27% of total REITs worldwide. It also reconfirms that equity REITs play a much
larger role than mortgage REITs. There is a total of 192 US REITs, and 49 out of 192 US
REITs products are mortgage REITs. REITs specialize in Retail and Industrial and Office are
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33 respectively, followed by Specialty REITs (26) and Residential REITs (21). In UK, there are
a total of 21 REITs products in UK. The number of REITs specializing in Industrial and
Office and Retail is 9 and 7, followed by 3 in Diversified REITs and 2 in Specialty REITs. In
Japan, over 50% of REITs products are Industrial and Office REITs (16 out 34 REITs).
Residential REITs are the second largest REITs categories in Japan (8), followed by
Diversified and Retail REITs of 4 REITs respectively.
4.2.6 RISK AND RETURN CHARACTERISTICS OF REITS
From previous literature, there is a basic relationship between the markets for unsecuritized
and securitized real estate, especially in the long run. It is also suggested that including
REITs stocks in a portfolio possess certain advantages because of its unique characteristics,
e.g. liquidity.
REITs have been studied as portfolio diversifiers in a multi-asset portfolio (Glascock 2000
and Stevenson 2009). There is a significant positive correlation between REITs and equities,
especially small capitalization and value stocks (Niskanen and Falkenback 2010). It is also
found that the diversification benefits for equities decrease with increasing volatility. REITs
correlation to fixed income securities is found to be negative; therefore fixed income assets
Table 9  REITs Categories by Country
Worldwide US UK Japan
Diversified 99 14 3 4
Hotel and Lodging 35 16 0 2
Industrial and Office 179 33 9 16
Mortgage 51 49 0 0
Residential 76 21 0 8
Retail 110 33 7 4
Specialty 66 26 2 0
Total 616 192 21 34
* Source: The information, on the different REITs categories classification
and the number of REITs in each category and country, is from Bloomberg
database.
REITs Category
Number of REITs
This table reports the number of REITs by categories worldwide, and
particularly in US, UK and Japan.
153
provide an increased hedge. REITs have become more popular among institutional
investors, and more research studies have increasingly used REITs to represent the real
estate effect on the financial institution stocks (Mei and Saunders 1995, 1997; Elyasiani et al.
2010).
Similar with most common stocks, the returns on REIT securities have fluctuated
significantly over time. From literature, empirical results show that REITs perform
differently over different time periods against the stock market. Generally speaking, the
evidence indicates that over the long term, portfolios of REITs have not outperformed the
stock market. Sanders (1998) shows over 1978-1996, REITs perform slightly worse or no
better than stock market indices on a risk adjusted basis. However, this performance varies
over time. He also finds that REITs outperform long-term government and corporate bonds.
Chen and Peiser (1999) show the similar results over the period 1993-1997. In addition, they
find out REITs created after 1993 have the same performance with those created prior 1993.
There are some difference in the performance between equity and mortgage REITs, and
equity REITs tend to perform better than mortgage REITs (Han and Liang 1995). In general,
REITs have lower systematic risk, with equity REITs having the lowest systematic risk
(Glascock and Hughes 1995). However, REITs performance relative to stock market has
varied significantly for different subperiods. Sander (1998) finds that during the period
January 1978 to December 1986, equity REITs outperform the stock market indices, while for
the period January 1987 to October 1990, equity REITs earn risk adjusted excess return
below the stock market. In addition, for the most recent period from November 1990
through June 1996, REITs outperform the S&P 500 index but no better than the Wilshire
index. He argues that the reason for the different performance of REITs to S&P 500 and
Wilshire index is because REITs are small stocks and small stocks typically outperform large
stocks, such S&P 500 index. Han and Liang (1995) find similar results for the period 1970-
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1993, and they also find that the performance of larger REITs tend to be more stable than
that of smaller REITs. They explain the reason is because the portfolios of larger REITs tend
to be more diversified than those of smaller REITs in terms of the number of properties held.
The unstable REITs return performance is consistent with the strong cyclical behaviour of
property market, although the stock market cycles of REITs tend to precede cycles in
property market.
Since REITs is publicly traded on the market, the price movement of REITs stocks is
probably related to that of the general market, as evidenced by the fact that REIT stock
prices, just like those of all other stocks, change on a continuous basis. Therefore, factors
affecting the general stock market may have an impact on the REITs, such as stock and bond
market and changes in interest rates and unexpected inflation40. On the other hand, the
value of a REIT should be determined by the value of its underlying real estate properties.
Sander (1998) suggests that REIT return behaviour can be best described in terms of the
behaviour of a mixed-asset portfolio of stocks and bonds. He shows that REITs stock return
behaviour is more directly related to high-risk corporate bond and small stocks than to other
indices of portfolio returns. Since prior to the early 1990s, most of the REITs are relatively
small market capitalization, therefore, the small-firm factor exist, as shown in Chan et al
(1990), Han and Liang (1995) and Peterson and Hsieh (1997). However, the small market
capitalization effect does not exist in the late 1990s. Similar with the returns of publicly
traded non-REIT companies, REITs returns are shown to be negatively related to their
market-to-book values, such that when a company has low market-to-book value, it has a
higher return (Peterson and Hsieh 1997). Mei and Lee (1994) also find evidences that in
40 Su Han Chan, John Erickson, Ko Wang, Chapter 10 The Performance of REITs, Real Estate Investment Trust,
Oxford University Press, ISBN: 0-19-515534-3.
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addition to the traditional bond and stock market factors, real estate market factor can also
affect REITs returns.
There are plenty of evidences indicating REITs return is also sensitive to the changes in the
interest rate (Sander 1998, Chen and Tzeng 1988). Since REITs have high dividend payment
ratios, REITs traditionally offer relatively stable cash flow streams that resemble the cash
flows from fixed-rate bonds rather than those from stocks. Furthermore, it is expected that
both equity and mortgage REITs return may be more sensitive than those of the average
stock to changes in interest rates. Sander (1998) also shows that the level of sensitivity also
depends on the rate used as a proxy for the movement of the interest rate.  In addition,
equity REITs tend to be less sensitive to variations in interest rates than mortgage REITs
(Chen and Tzeng 1988).  This  is  because  the  cash  flows  to  equity  REITs  are  more  primarily
from property leases, which are renewed on a more frequent basis, the average duration of
cash flows from real property investment is shorter than that from mortgage securities.
Therefore, equity REITs are less sensitive than mortgage REITs to changes in interest rates. 41
Allen et al (2001) also show that the differences asset structure, financial leverage and
management strategy could also affect REITs sensitivity to interest rate and market risk.
Furthermore, interest rate sensitivity of REITs over time depends on the different interest
rate environment (Mueller and Pauley 1995). When the interest rate increases, REITs prices
usually tend to decline, while during periods of failing interest rate, REITs prices rise.
There are also classifications based on whether or not REITs can issue additional shares. If
REITs can only issue shares to the public once and can only issue additional shares once
approved by current shareholders, the REITs are closed-ended. On the other hand, open-
ended REITs can issue new shares and redeem shares at any time. The closed-end REITs
41 Su Han Chan, John Erickson, Ko Wang, Chapter 10 The Performance of REITs, Real Estate Investment Trust,
Oxford University Press, ISBN: 0-19-515534-3.
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companies raise money through IPO, much like corporations raise money selling stock to
the public. Money raised from the IPO is used to invest in various real estate projects. Share
prices for closed-ended REITs are based on the supply and demand on the market at any
given time, and the prices can change throughout the trading day. The open-ended REITs,
like most of  mutual funds,  do not have a fixed number of  shares.  When investing in open-
ended REITs, new shares are created and funds are added to the investment pool. When
selling share, the investment pool shrinks by the value of the share sold. The share price of
open-ended REITs is based on the REITs net assets value.
The close- and open-ended REITs may have different risk and return behaviours due to
different pricing characteristics, and close-ended REITs are more resemble to the common
stock behaviour than open-ended REITs. In the current market, close-ended REITs dominate
the REITs market. Myer and Webb (1993) study  the  time  series  properties  of  the  REITs
returns and intertemporal relationship between REITs and real estate returns, and the
results show mixed behavious. They show that in a distributional and time series sense,
equity REIT returns appear to be much more like those in common stocks and close-ended
funds than those on unsecuritized real estate. Intertemporally, REIT returns are much more
strongly related to unsecuritized real estate than stocks or close-ended funds.
157
4.3 LITERATURE REVIEWS ON METHODOLOGY
4.3.1 CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL – SHARPE (1964)
In the following section, we will discuss the estimation procedures that have been widely
used in the literature (He et al 1996, Ross and Zisler 1991, Chen and Tzang 1988 and Liang et
al. 1995). The first model has been adopted by the researchers in analysing the asset and
portfolio returns is the Capital Asset Pricing model. The CAPM is a model for pricing an
individual security or a portfolio first introduced by William Sharpe (1964) by building on
the earlier work of Harry Markowitz on the modern portfolio theory on diversification.
From Sharp’s study, it shows the expected return depends on the risk free rate of interest
and market premium or risk premium. The formula is as following:
ܧ(ܴ௜) = ௙ܴ + ߚ௜൫ܧ(ܴ௠) − ௙ܴ൯ + ߳௜
Where ܧ(ܴ௜) is the expected return on the capital asset; ௙ܴ is the risk-free rate of interest
such  as  interest  arising  from government  bonds; ߚ௜ is the sensitivity of the expected excess
asset returns on the expected excess market returns, ߚ௜ = ஼௢௩	(ோ೔,	ோ೘)௏௔௥(ோ೘) ; ܧ(ܴ௠) is the expected
return of the market; ܧ(ܴ௠) − ௙ܴ  is sometimes known as the market premium or risk
premium , which is the difference between the expected rate of return and the risk-free rate
of return.
Stone (1974) and Bae (1990) use the CAPM in estimating the interest rate sensitivity on the
bank stock returns. Stone (1974) argues that single-factor CAPM model produces noise and
instability on interest rate effects in estimating beta. He further studies the effects of bond
and equity market by using the two-factor model under the assumption investors hold well-
diversified portfolios with the aim to maximize a single-period mean variance expected
utility function. Allen et al (1995), Mei and Lee (1994) and He et al. (1996, 1997) use multi-
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variant CAPM model in studying the real estate sector influence on the bank stock return.
However, Sharpe’s one-factor CAPM model can explain only about 70% of the returns of the
stock market, but when two additional factors were considered; about 90% - 96% of the
variability of returns of a diversified portfolio can be explained.
In the early study of real estate risk and returns, CAPM and multi-index model have been
used as an estimating procedure for the assessing the relationship between REITs returns
and the market and interest rate indices. Ross and Zieler (1991) use two-index CAPM to find
that that real estate risk lies plausibly midway between that of stocks and bonds, in the 9
percent to 13 percent range. Chen and Tzang (1988) examine both the interest rate and
market effect on the REITs returns, and show that both equity and mortgage REITs are
sensitive to changes in the long-term interest rates and changes in expected inflation in 1973-
1979. In period 1980-1985, both REITs are sensitive to long-term as well as short-term
interest rates. The changes in the interest rate sensitivity are due to the change in the Federal
Reserve operating procedure in October 1979, shifting from interest-rate targeting toward
money-supply targeting. They also analyse the impact of expected inflation rate and
expected real rates of interest, and find that Equity REITs are sensitive to changes in the
expected inflation and Mortgage REITs are sensitive to both changes in expected inflation
and real rate of interest. Market factor is still an important factor in explaining the return
generating process of REITs, with mortgage REITs are marginally riskier with greater
estimated coefficient. In addition, the coefficients are larger in period 1973-1979 than period
1980-1985 for both REITs, which show REITs have lower market risk in 1980-1985. Liang et
al (1995) use the same method for similar period 1973-1989, and instead of examining the
expected interest rate and inflation, the study more focus on the impact of market risk and
long-term interest rate risk on different REITs portfolios. They construct four equally
weighted REIT portfolios: all-REIT portfolio, equity REIT portfolio, hybrid REIT portfolio,
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mortgage REIT portfolio. The results support the findings in Chen and Tzang (1988), and all-
REIT  and  hybrid  REIT  portfolio  show  similar  return-generating  process  as  shown  in
mortgage and equity REITs. It also shows that changes in policy can affect REITs
performance. All REITs portfolios experience a significant shift in the return-generating
process in 1976, 1980, 1983 and 1986, which are coinciding with important events, such as,
tax reform and monetary regime changes.
The effectiveness of interest rate proxies for equity and mortgage REITs are studied in He et
al (2003). The study examines REITs returns by two-factor index model, and FLS method is
used to allow the analysis of changes that affect each factor of the return-generating process.
FLS does not impose a time-constant restriction on coefficient estimates and analyse the
relative stability of the regression coefficient by showing the changes of coefficients over
time. It is suggested that mortgage REITs are sensitive to all proxies and equity REITs are
significantly affected by only changes in yields on long-term US government bonds and
high-yield corporate bonds. All interest rate sensitivities are time specific.
4.3.2 FAMA-FRENCH MODEL – FAMA AND FRENCH (1993)
Fama and French (1993) extended the Sharpe’s CAPM model by including another two
factors, size and price, to determine the factors describing the reason that there are
differences among the returns of stock asset classes over a long period. The findings suggest
that an investor’s investment performance in comparison to the stock market depends
almost entirely on the percentage of stocks (market factor) held in the portfolio, and more
specifically, the amount of small stocks (size factor) and high book-to-market ratio stocks
(value factor) held.
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The model is described as follows:
ݎ = ௙ܴ + ߚ௜൫ܭ௠ − ௙ܴ൯ + ܾ௦ × ܵܯܤ + ܾ௩ × ܪܯܮ + ߳௜
ܭ௠  is the return of the whole stock market, and ௙ܴ  is the risk-free rate of return. Term
ܭ௠ − ௙ܴ in the Fama-French three-factor model is the amount of exposure to the overall
stock market or the market risk factor. The level of exposure to this market factor is
determined by the amount of a portfolio invested in or exposed to stocks. The greater the
exposure is, the higher the return is in comparison to the US Treasury bills.
The second risk factor, ܵܯܤ, in the model is the level of exposure to small company stocks,
which denotes the size factor. The size risk factor is determined by the amount of a portfolio
that is invested in small company stocks. The greater the exposure, the higher the return in
comparison  to  large  company  stocks.  The  small  company  is  determined  by  the  size  of
market capitalization. The market capitalization is calculated by multiplying the total
number of shares times the market price per share. Stocks with small market capitalization
are generally considered as riskier than large company stocks because small companies have
fewer financial resources therefore more uncertainty than large companies. During the
period of economic downturns, small companies are less able to survive. Even small
companies have good track records, the records are not very long or stable, which makes
small company stocks riskier. Therefore, the investors investing small company stocks
expect higher returns. Over the last eighty years, the average returns of small cap company
stocks have significantly outperformed large company stocks by 3.13% perent. However, in
short term, small company returns do not always perform better than large companies.
The third factor, ܪܯܮ, in the model is the amount of exposure to stocks with low book-to-
market ratio value. Book-to-market value is the ratio of book value and market value, which
is used to identify undervalued or overvalued securities. Book value of a company is just an
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accounting term for its net value, its assets minus liabilities. The market value of a company
is its price per share multiple the numbers of shares outstanding on the market. Book-to-
market value is referred as value factor or price factor. Exposure to the price factor is
determined by the amount of a portfolio exposure level to the high book-to-market stocks. If
a stock’s book value is more than its market value, the ratio is greater than one, which gives
high book-to-market stock.  Stocks with high book-to-market value have low earnings and
experience other signs of financial distress. Due to their poor performance, the market drives
down their share prices in the market, this gives the market value less than its book value.
Therefore stocks with high book-to-market value are riskier to investors. Stocks with low
book-to-market value represent healthy growth and performance, therefore less risky to
investors.  Because the market perceives a value stock to be riskier, it drives down their price
so that the expected return is high enough to make it worthwhile for investors to hold. As
for investment, investors seeking for high returns are more favour to the stocks with high
book-to-market, and subsequently need to bare more risk. Investors earned higher return by
owning the stocks of companies that have poor performance.
The Fama-French three factor model can be extended by adding more deterministic factors.
Two common factors for fixed income products are usually considered as influential. One of
the factors is term risk factor. Term factor reflects the different rate of return by investing
different fixed income product with different maturities. If investors keep terms of
maturities short, they have more opportunity to capture much higher expected returns.
Therefore, products with short maturity give a higher return than products with long
maturity.  Another factor is the default risk factor. It measures the difference between long-
term corporate bonds and government bonds, since the long-term government bonds are
considered less likely to default than corporate bonds. Portfolios with a high proportion of
corporate bonds have higher returns than those with a lower proportion of corporate bonds,
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since it bears higher default risk and investors expect a higher return to compensate the risk
taken. After including these two factors, term risk factor and default risk factor, The Fama-
French three-factor model can be extended into five-factor model.
A number of studies examine the REITs return process under Fama-French procedures.
Peterson and Hsieh (1997) is the first to use Fama-French five-factor model on REITs returns.
They show that equity REITs returns are significantly related to three stock market factors:
market return, capitalization size HML and price factor book-to-market. Mortgage REITs
returns are related to these stock market factors as well as two bond market factors, default
risk and term risk factors. The inclusion of size factor and book-to-market factor in return
can significantly reduce the abnormal performance of equity REITs found in previous
studies. It is also noted that mortgage REITs on all five factors suggest that the mortgage
REITs underperform by 6.8 percent per year on average during the sample period 1976-1992.
In addition, He and Reichert (2003) use a three-factor Fama-French model to estimate the
return of financial institution stocks for period 1972-1995. He (2002) uses six-factor Fama-
French model after including the default risk and term risks. Chiang et al (2004) examine
REITs return-generating process by using the Fama-French three-factor model for period
1972-2001. It tests the robustness of the asymmetric beta under a variety of asset pricing
specifications and the findings show that the asymmetry in market beta in advancing and
declining markets disappears when adding capitalization size and book-to-market variables
in the estimation. To address the declining market beta of REITs found in some recent
studies, Chiang et al (2005) show that there is a weak evidence for a decline in equity REITs
beta based on a single factor model, and the declining trend disappears when Fama-French
three-factor model is used. The stability of equity REITs risk exposure to market beta has
implications for investor’s decision on asset allocation and portfolio diversification. The
Fama-French model is also used in the event study examining the performance of
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acquisitions in the REITs around the announcement and in the long-run in Sahin (2005). Lee
and Chiang (2008) examine the linkage between equity REITs and the underlying real estate
and show that REITs returns reflect the performance of underlying real estate. Therefore, it
supports the use of REITs as a proxy to capture the real estate exposure to the market. All
these studies find strong evidence that Fama-French model provides a better estimation
framework than the CAPM model.
4.3.3 GARCH FRAMEWORKS
Another model has been widely used in the literature is Autoregressive Conditonal
Heteroskedasticity model as shown in Song (1994). The ARCH models are used to
characterize and model observed time series. It assumes that the variance of current error
terms to be a function of the actual size of the error terms of prior periods.
For an estimation ݕ௧ = ܽ଴ + ܽଵݕ௧ିଵ +⋯+ ܽ௤ݕ௧ି௤ + ߳௧ = ܽ଴ + ∑ ܽ௜௤௜ୀଵ ݕ௧ିଵ + ߳௧
Let ߳௧  denote the error term or return residuals, i.e. the series terms. Let
߳௧ = ߪ௧ݖ௧
Where ݖ௧  is the stochastic term, ݖ௧ ௜௜ௗ~ ܰ(0,1), and ߪ௧ is the time-dependent standard deviation
characterizing the typical size of the terms. For and ARCH(q) model, the series ߪ௧ଶ  modeled
as
ߪ௧ଶ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵ߳௧ିଵଶ +⋯+ ߙ௤߳௧ି௤ଶ = ߙ଴ + ෍ߙ௜௤
௜ୀଵ
߳௧ି௜
ଶ
Where ߙ଴ > 0 and ߙ௜ ≥ 0, ݅ > 0.
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If an Autoregressive Moving Average model (ARMA model) is assumed for the error
variance, the model is a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH).
For a GARCH (p, q) model, the standard deviation is characterized as:
ߪ௧ଶ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵ߳௧ିଵଶ +⋯+ ߙ௤߳௧ି௤ଶ + ߚଵߪ௧ିଵଶ +⋯+ ߚ௣ߪ௧ି௣ଶ = ߙ଴ + ෍ߙ௜௤
௜ୀଵ
߳௧ି௜
ଶ + ෍ߚ௜௣
௜ୀଵ
ߪ௧ି௜
ଶ
The common feature of ARCH and GARCH is that they specify the conditional variance as a
function of the past shocks allowing the volatility to evolve over time and to permit
volatility shocks to persist. However, ARCH uses a limited number of lags in derivation of
the conditional variance, while GARCH allows all lags to include the past value of the
conditional variance itself and the past values of the squared error term.
There is a number of literatures using the GARCH based model to examine the volatility in
the financial institution stocks, as seen in Song (1994), Elyasiani and Mansur (1998, 2003,
2007) and Flannery et al (1997). Song (1994) is the first study to employ the ARCH-type
methodology in financial institution stocks. He finds that ARCH-type modelling is the
appropriate framework for analysis of bank stock returns. According to his results, market
and interest rate risk measures of banks do vary significantly over time. However, he shows
the volatility does not change significantly around October 1979 in response to the shift in
the monetary policy strategy; they increase around the end of 1982 when the Fed switch to
targeting borrowed reserve. Flannery et al (1997) also find similar results by using GARCH-
M, and except for the significant effect of stock market risk on financial institution stock
returns, the market factor’s volatility varies significantly through time, from 1973-1990. They
also show, interest rate risk is reflected in the pricing of financial institution stock, as well as
a broad class of securities. When sub-periods are considered, they show that the interest rate
volatility is relatively low, except for 1979-1984 sub-period. They also find evidence that
ARCH-M and GARCH-M model give better performance than the basic ARCH and
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GARCH, and they argue that the reason for the better performance is due to the inclusion of
the mean of return series as an explicit function of the conditional variance of the process.
Elyasiani and Mansur (1998) use the same GARCH-M method to investigate the effect of
interest rate and its volatility on the bank stock return generation process over 1979-1982
time periods. ARCH, GARCH and volatility are found to directly impact the first and
second moments of the bank stock returns distribution. The degree of persistence in shocks
is substantial for bank portfolios and sensitive to the nature of the bank portfolio and the
prevailing monetary policy regime.
Univariate-GARCH model can be generalized into the multivariate-GARCH model. For the
error term ߝ௧  of an n-dimensional time series model we assume that the conditional mean is
zero and the conditional covariance matrix is given by the positive definite (n×n) matriߪ௧ଶ.
߳௧ = ߪ௧ݖ௧
Where, ݖ௧ ௜௜ௗ~ ܰ(0, ܫ), ܫ is the identity matrix.
A number of studies have used the multivariate-GARCH model as in Elyasiani and Mansur
(2003, 2004, 2007). The advantage of using a multivariate framework is to provide an
analysis of volatility and interlinkage between the assets concerned, and to allow an
estimation of the time-varying covariance and correlations. Elyasiani and Mansur (2003) use
bivariate GARCH framework to examine the bank stock sensitivity to market, interest rate,
and exchange rate, and investigates the spillover effects of interest rate volatility and
unsystematic risk among the banking sectors of the United States, Japan and Germany. The
results show that the bivariate GARCH model is appropriate to represent the return
generating process of financial institutions. In addition, banks are sensitive to market and
exchange factor, but insignificant to interest rate factor. The volatilities in banks of the three
countries are found to be interdependent. Furthermore, most importantly, the spillover
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effects of interest rate uncertainty among three countries are found to be significant. When
interest rate volatility shocks originate in the United State, it spreads to Japan and Germany
market. In addition, Elyasiani et al (2007), they employ the multi-variate GARCH framework
to investigate the risk and return relationship across US commercial banks, securities firms,
and life insurance companies during 1991-2001period. They find evidences of significant
linkage between these financial institutions, and the relationship depends on the size of the
organizations. Larger organizations display stronger volatility transmission, while smaller
organizations show return-related linkage. Furthermore, Elyasiani et al (2010) also use the
bivariate GARCH model to examine the return and volatility spillover from real estate sector
to three financial institutions in US, commercial banks, savings and loans, and life insurance
companies. They show that the equity returns of the financial institutions considered follow
a GARCH process and should be modelled accordingly. There is also evidence that the real
estate factor has significant and positive influence on the financial institutions returns. The
results on the volatility indicate that the volatility in the real estate sector does get
transmitted into financial institutions. However, savings and loans institutions and life
insurance companies experience greater volatility spillover from real estate sector than
commercial banks.
Furthermore, in recent studies, there are a number of papers focusing on explaining the
volatility of REITs return under GARCH framework. Devaney (2001) uses  GARCH-M
estimating procedure used in Elyasiani and Mansur (1998) on the monthly equally weighted
returns on all individual publicly traded REITs from NAREIT from 1978 to 1998. He argues
that monthly data is used since it is more manageable than higher frequency data for long
horizons and monthly data avoids the settlement and clearing problems associated with
daily returns. It finds that both ARCH and GARCH effects in the volatility equation are
significant for mortgage REITs but not for equity REITs. The trade-off between the
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conditional variance and excess returns is only significant for mortgage REITs, but positive
for both REITs. It also shows that the impact of policy change is significant and negative for
mortgage REITs but is insignificant for equity REITs. Stevenson (2002) examines the linkages
of volatility and spillover between REITs and other capital market assets using both the
GARCH and EGARCH specifications. Various REITs portfolios and market equity portfolios
have been analysed in relation to US government bonds and T-bills. The adoption of various
equity indices is to capture any differences in the relationship between REITs and different
sectors of the broader capital markets. It is found that REITs are influenced more strongly by
volatility in small cap stocks and firms classified as value stocks. The overall S&P 500 has
inconsistent relationship with REITs. Comparing the GARCH and EGARCH specifications,
EGARCH gives more intuitively justifiable findings. Within the REITs sectors, it shows that
the equity REITs can influence the mortgage and hybrid REITs, and mortgage REITs behave
similarly with other REITs. In addition, in terms of volatility, the market does not
differentiate between the REITs sub-sectors and views the entire sector as a single market. In
the later study, Cotter and Stevenson (2006) extend the study to examine REITs volatility in
both method and data employed. Instead of univariate GARCH specification, a multivariate
GARCH model, BEKK, is used. The study also includes a high frequency daily data and
compares the results when different frequency data are used. The advantage of using a
multivariate framework is not only to provide an analysis of volatility and interlinkage
between the assets concerned, but also allow an estimation of the time-varying covariance
and correlations. The findings show that the use of high frequency data would weaken the
results when monthly data is used in relation to the links both within the REITs sector and
between REITs and the broader equity market. Under daily data, equity market plays a
stronger role and more influential when the linkage between REITs and related sector is less
obvious.
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4.4 METHODOLOGY
In this study, we adopt Bivariate GARCH framework on the financial institutions and REITs
return generating processes as used in Elyasiani et al (2010). The financial institution return
process is structured by the multifactor capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The REITs
return generating process is tested by both the Fama-French three-factor and multifactor
capital asset pricing model.
The frameworks used are as following:
Model.1:
ܴଵ,௧ = ߚଵ଴ + ߚଵଵܴܯ௧ + ߚଵଶܴଶ,௧ + ߚଵଷ∆I + ߝଵ,௧ (12)
ℎଵ,௧ = ܽଵ଴ + ܽଵଵߝଵ,௧ିଵଶ + ܾଵଵℎଵ,௧ିଵ + ߛଵଶℎଶ,௧ିଵ		 (13)
	ܴଶ,௧ = ߚଶ଴ + ߚଶଵܴܯ௧+ߚଶଶܵܯܤ௧ + ߚଶଷܪܯܮ௧ + +ߝଶ,௧ (14)
ℎଶ,௧ = ܽଶ଴ + ܽଶଶߝଶ,௧ିଵଶ + ܾଶଶℎଶ,௧ିଵ (15)
ℎଵଶ,௧ = ߩଵଶℎଵ,௧ℎଶ,௧(−1 < ߩଵଶ < 1) (16)
ߝ௜.௧|Ω௧ିଵ′ ~ܰ(0,ℎ௜.௧)										(݅ = 1, 2) (17)
REITs return is estimated by Fama-French three-factor model as in equation (14).
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Model.2:
ܴଵ,௧ = ߚଵ଴ + ߚଵଵܴܯ௧ + ߚଵଶܴଶ,௧ + ߚଵଷ∆I + ߝଵ,௧ (18)
ℎଵ,௧ = ܽଵ଴ + ܽଵଵߝଵ,௧ିଵଶ + ܾଵଵℎଵ,௧ିଵ + ߛଵଶℎଶ,௧ିଵ		 (19)
	ܴଶ,௧ = ߚଶ଴ + ߚଶଵܴܯ௧ + ߚଶସ∆ܫ	+	ߝଶ,௧ 		 (20)
ℎଶ,௧ = ܽଶ଴ + ܽଶଶߝଶ,௧ିଵଶ + ܾଶଶℎଶ,௧ିଵ (21)
ℎଵଶ,௧ = ߩଵଶℎଵ,௧ℎଶ,௧(−1 < ߩଵଶ < 1) (22)
ߝ௜.௧|Ω௧ିଵ′ ~ܰ(0,ℎ௜.௧)										(݅ = 1, 2) (23)
REITs return is estimated by multifactor CAPM model as in equation (20).
Where,
ܴଵ,௧ 	, is the return of banks portfolio; three different countries are examined separately;
	ܴଶ,௧, is the return of REITs index for each country;
ܴܯ௧ , is the market return;
∆ܫ, is the change of interest rate for each country;
ܵܯܤ௧ , Small minus Big, size of market capitalization, Fama-French factor;
ܪܯܮ௧ , High minus Low, value of book-to-market, Fama-French factor;
ߝଵ,௧ , error term of bank stock return generating process, following ܰ(0,ℎ௜.௧);
	ߝଶ,௧ , error term of REITs return generating process, following ܰ(0,ℎ௜.௧);
ℎଵ,௧, conditional variance of bank stock return;
ℎଶ,௧, conditional variance of REITs return;
ℎଵଶ,௧, conditional covariance of bank and REITs returns.
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In this framework, the error term ߝଵ,௧ 	ܽ݊݀	ߝଶ,௧  are structured by the bivariate GARCH
specification. Equation (12)-(13) and (18)-(19) are the same and represent the financial
institution mean return42 (ܴଵ,௧) and the conditional volatility (ℎଵ,௧). The difference between
the two models is the mean return of REITs (ܴଶ,௧). In Model.1, the REITs return (ܴଶ,௧) is
estimated by the Fama French three factor model (ܴܯ௧ , ܵܯܤ௧ ,ܪܯܮ௧) in equation (14) as used
in Chan et al (1990), Chiang et al (2004, 2005) and Peterson and Hsieh (1997). In Model.2,
REITs  return  (ܴଶ,௧) is estimated by CAPM multifactor model (ܴܯ௧ , ∆ܫ). Equation (15) and
(21) estimates the conditional volatility (ℎଶ,௧) of REITs return. The conditional covariance
between banks and REITs returns (ℎଵଶ,௧)  is  described  by  equation  (5)  and  (11).  The  mean
return spillover of REITs to bank return is estimated by the REITs return factor (ܴଶ,௧) in the
financial institution mean equation (12) and (18). The volatility spillover of REITs to bank
return is estimated by the conditional variance of REITs ൫ℎଶ,௧ିଵ൯ in the bank conditional
volatility (ℎଵ,௧) in equation (13) and (19). The market return is represented by ܴܯ௧  and the
interest rate return is represented by variable ∆ܫ.	
In equation (12) and (18), the mean equation of financial institution return is explained by
the market risk ܴܯ௧ , interest rate risk ∆ܫ, and most important to our interest, real estate
return factors ܴଶ,௧. ܴܯ௧  is  the  return  on  the  S&P  500  market  index  for  US,  FTSE  All  Share
Price index for UK and NIKKEI 225 for Japan. ∆ܫ is the change in long-term interest rate (10-
year treasury bills) for three countries. The real estate factors are represented by the REITs
returns,  which  are  the  return  of  NAREIT  All  REITs  index43 (US), EPRA UK REITs index44
(UK)  and  TSE  REITs  index45 (Japan). In the first model, REITs return is estimated by the
42 All return series used in the paper are excess returns. One month Treasury Bill rates in US, UK and Japan
market are used as risk free rates.
43 NAREIT: National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts; NAREIT All REITS index is the weighted
average index of all REITs companies (192 REITs) traded in the United State market.
44 EPRA UK REITs index is the UK REITs index produced by European Public Real estate Association for all UK
REITs (21 REITs) traded in the UK market.
45 TSE REITs index is the index of all REITs (34 REITs) traded in the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
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Fama-French three-factor model (equation 14). The model includes variables, the market risk
ܴܯ௧ , and two Fama-French factors, SMB, the difference between the returns on portfolios of
small and big stocks, and HML, the difference between the returns on portfolios of high and
low book-to-market ratio stocks. Chiang et al (2004) suggest that the growth style exposures
of REITs are the aggregation of small growth and big growth exposures. The value stock
exposure consistently represents a large component of equity exposure of REITs. Chiang et
al (2004) conclude that Fama-French three-factor model is a proper return generating process
of  REITs.  In  the  second  model,  REITs  return  is  estimated  by  the  CAPM. Chen and Tzang
(1988) examine both the interest rate and market effect on the REITs returns, and show that
both equity and mortgage REITs are sensitive to changes in the long-term interest rates and
changes in market returns. All return series used in the paper are excess returns. One month
Treasury bill rates in US, UK and Japan market are used as risk free rates.
The bivariate GARCH system model described above is estimated simultaneously for banks
and REITs returns. The advantage of GARCH model is that they can release some restrictive
assumptions in the conventional asset pricing models, such as, linearity, error independence,
and constant conditional variance, homoscedasticity. GARCH models specify the
conditional variance of return ℎ௜,௧ିଵ  as a function of past shocks (lagged squared errors
ߝ௜,௧ିଵଶ , ℎ௜,௧ିଵ,			௜ୀଵ,ଶ), allowing volatility to evolve over time and permitting volatility shocks to
persist (Elyasiani et al 2010). The squared error terms specify in GARCH estimation shows
that if the current shocks are larger in absolute value, future innovations are likely to be
large as well. The magnitudes of ARCH and GARCH coefficients (ܽ௜௜ ,ܾ௜௜) determine the
weights of lagged innovations. The sum of these parameters (ܽ௜௜ + ܾ௜௜)  determines the
degree of persistence in the shocks. To ensure a well defined process, the ARCH and
GARCH parameters must be non-negative and must satisfy the second order stationarity
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conditions (0 < ܽ௜௜ + ܾ௜௜ < 1).  If  the  sum of  parameters  is  unity,  the  model  is  integrated  of
order 1 in variance, and the persistence of shocks to the system will never end.
4.5 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
In this study, weekly data are analysed for period from January 1999 to December 2011 for
US market of total 673 observations. However, since UK and Japan introduced REITs in 2007
and 2001, that are much later than US REITs, which was introduced in 1960, the time periods
for UK and Japan market are from 2007 to 2011 of total 257 observations and from 2003 to
2011 of total 453 observations respectively. The reason to use weekly data is because of the
short period of data available for UK and Japan, especially in REITs, therefore, weekly data
can provide more information than monthly data. Also, when estimating REITs return,
compared to the monthly data, the weekly data always result in a higher level of significance
for both the coefficients of most variables as suggested by He et al (1996). For US market,
bank portfolios are constructed based on the standard industrial classification (SIC) code.
Standard Industrial Classification code is a United States government system for classifying
industries by a four-digit code. This classification is adopted in Elyasiani et al (2010).
According to the classification, three financial institution portfolios are formed. The
commercial banks portfolio consists of 323 banks which includes SIC 6021 (National
Commercial Banks) and SIC 6022 (State Commercial Banks). In UK market, 35 banks which
are actively traded in the UK stock market are selected according to the Bloomberg. In Japan
market, 95 banks are selected, and all of them are actively traded in the Japanese stock
market, and the historical prices are obtained from Bloomberg. The weekly returns are
calculated as log	( ௉೟
௉೟షభ
)  for each banks stock return, and the bank portfolio return is
constructed by the equally weighted average of the return of each individual bank. The
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measure of real estate impact of real estate on the performance of financial institution is
complex (He and Reichert 2003). Non-securitized measure of real estate return which using
the actual real estate prices is one option to represent the real estate factor as shown in He
(2002) and He and Reichert (2003). Blasko and Sinkey (2006) and Eisenbeis and Kwast (1991)
use the proportion of real estate loan in bank loan book as an indication of real estate factor.
In most of the literature, REITs are used to as proxies of the real estate factors, and they have
been shown as appropriate proxies to represent the influence of real estate on the financial
institution stocks. Furthermore, depository institutions such as commercial banks and
savings and loans have significant holdings on the residential and commercial real estate
mortgages, therefore, REITs, especially mortgage REITs may be considered as an
appropriate proxy to the real estate performance (Chen and Tzang 1988, Liang et al 1995 and
He et al 2003 etc.). In addition, other financial institutions, like insurance companies and
pension funds, own commercial real estate directly; therefore, equity REITs may be
considered as a good proxy (Peterson and Hsieh 1997, Lee and Chiang 2008 and Chiang et al
2004 etc.).  In  this  paper,  we  use  NAREIT  All  REITs  index46 as  a  proxy  for  the  US  REITs
returns,  EPRA  UK  REITs  index47 as  a  proxy  for  the  UK  REITs  returns,  and  TSE  JREITs
index48 as  a  proxy  for  the  Japanese  REITs  returns.  NAREIT  is  the  National  Association  of
Real Estate Investment Trusts, which is the worldwide representative for REITs and publicly
traded Real Estate companies with an interest in US Real Estate and capital markets.
NAREIT is one of the most popular indexes used to analyse real estate market influence (Lee
and Chiang 2008, Chiang et al. 2005, Cotter and Stevenson 2006, etc.). There are few
literatures in studying the UK and Japanese REITs market due to the limited data
46 NAREIT: National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts; NAREIT All REITS index is the weighted
average index of all REITs companies (192 REITs) traded in the United State market.
47 EPRA UK REITs index is the UK REITs index produced by European Public Real estate Association for all UK
REITs (21 REITs) traded in the UK market.
48 TSE REITs index is the index of all REITs (34 REITs) traded in the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
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availability, and our paper extends the literature range. All the REITs indices we adopted
here mainly included close-ended REITs as this is more resemble to the common stock
behaviours, and more close-ended than open-ended REITs in the market. Interest rate
variable is represented by change in the 10 year Treasury Bills interest rate (∆I) for all three
countries. The market risk variable is represented by the S&P 500 index, FTSE All Share
Price index and NIKKEI 225 index. S&P 500 index is one of the most used variables to
represent market risk for US market (Cotter and Stevenson 2006). FTSE All Share Price index
is used in many literatures to represent the UK stock market performance (Dinenis and
Staikouras 1998). NIKKEI 225 index is used to represent the Japanese stock market
performance as in Connolly and Wang (1998). All the above data are collected from
Bloomberg and Datastream database. The Fama-French factors variables SML and HML for
US and UK market are obtained from Kenneth R. French website49 and UK Fama-French Xfi
Centre source50. The Fama-French factors are created by using CRSP database. The weekly
returns are calculated as log	( ௉೟
௉೟షభ
), and the interest rate return is calculated by first difference.
We separate the entire period 1999-2011 into three sub-periods: from January 1999 to
December 2002; from January 2003 to December 2006; from January 2007 to December 2011.
The rationale behind the first division of December 2002 is to reflect the impact of the
collapse of the Dot-Com bubble in 2000, and especially after the 911 attack in September
2011, the overall decline in the financial market. In October 2000, Fannie Mae commits to
purchase and securitize $2 billion of Community Reinvestment Act eligible loans. Since
then, the early 2000s recession begins and spurs government action to recover the economy.
The second cutoff is January 2007 to reflect the recent subprime crisis. Since the first quarter
in 2007, the home sales continue to fall. The subprime mortgage industry collapses, and a
49 US Fama-French factors are collected from Kenneth R. French website:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
50 UK Fama-French factors are collected from Xfi Centre for Finance and Investment:
http://xfi.exeter.ac.uk/researchandpublications/portfoliosandfactors/index.php
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surge of foreclosure activity and rising interest rates threatens to depress prices further as
problems in the subprime markets spread to the near-prime and prime mortgage markets.
The two financial crises in 21th century are both originated in US and subsequently spread
into Europe and Asian market, and become a global economic recession. The two cutoffs in
the paper represent the two financial crisis and economic cycles for the last decade.
The following graphs show the annual average returns of bank portfolio, stock market and
REITs returns of US, UK and Japanese market. Figure.3 shows the percentage mean return
of US market. For bank stock portfolio, in 1999 the mean return of bank stock is negative, -
0.27%, and the return increases to -0.17% in 2000. In 2001, the return of bank stock becomes
positive in 2001, 0.42%, and after a small fluctuation in 2002, the return reaches its highest
point in 2003 to 0.63%. This return pattern represents the influence of Dot-Com bubble and
911 attack on the financial market in 2000, and the economic shows a sign of recovery in
2003. Since then, the return of banks decreases, however, the bank stock return is still
positive from 2004 to 2006. The graph shows in US there is a huge increase in the REITs
return reflects the influence of the government actions and booming economy, which peaks
between 2005 and 2006. However, in the beginning of 2007, the S&P/Case-Shiller house
price index records first year-over-year decline in nationwide house prices since 1991. The
subprime mortgage industry collapses, and several subprime lenders declare bankruptcy,
announcing significant losses, or putting themselves up for sale. The collapse of subprime
mortgage market spreads to the near-prime and prime mortgage markets, and further to the
whole financial market. The financial market has been experienced significant decline in all
aspects as a result of the subprime crisis. There is a sharp drop of bank stock return since
2006, and the return is -0.59% in 2007. The return is lowest in 2008, -0.84%, which shows the
recent subprime crisis has a significant impact in banks since 2007 and the situation is worst
in 2008. The bank return increases from 2009, and reaches positive 0.14% in 2010, which
176
shows the bank stocks is recovering from 2009. However, from 2011, the US economy has
experienced a fluctuation due to the debt crisis and unemployment rate, and the bank return
again drops to -0.43%. The REITs and market returns experience the same fluctuation
pattern as bank returns. However, in 1999 and 2000, REITs return experiences an increasing
trend from -0.29% to 0.28%, and market return decreases from 0.34% to -0.21%. From the
graph, we can also see that from 1999 to 2005, bank stocks experience highest returns,
followed by REITs and general market returns. However, since 2005, bank stocks become
the least profitable stocks with the lowest return, and REITs have the highest return.
Figure.4 shows the percentage of returns in UK market, and since REITs was first
introduced in 2007, our data adopted in our analysis is from 2007. From the graph, we can
see that bank, REITs and market returns all experience a significant drop from 2007, 0.36%, -
0.81% and 0.11% respectively, and only REITs return is negative. Similarly as in US market,
all the returns reach their lowest point in 2008. Bank stock return is down to -2.08%,
followed by REITs return of -1.70% and market return of -1.44%. Since 2008, all the returns
increase in 2009 to a new high point in 2009 as in US with bank stock return of 0.60%, REITs
Figure.3  US market annual returns
Figure.3 shows the annual mean returns of US market for bank, market and
REITs portfolios. Bank is the commercial banks portfolio is consist of 323 banks
which include SIC 6021 (National Commercial Banks) and SIC 6022 (State
Commercial Banks). Rm is the market stock returns which is proxied by S&P 500
index. REITs is the returns of US NAREITs Index (National Association of Real
Estate Investment Trusts, which is weighted average index of all 192 REITs
companies traded in the United State market.
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return of 0.12% and market return of 0.67%, which shows a recovery of the economy in 2009
since the subprime crisis. And after 2009, the returns continue to drop which reflects another
economic turbulence in UK market due to the European debt crisis since 2010. If we
compare the level of return for each portfolio, we can see in UK, general stock market has
the highest return from 2007 to 2011 in general. REITs return is higher than the return of
bank stock portfolio from 2007 to 2008 and from 2010 to 2011. In 2009, bank stock return
outperforms REITs.
Figure.5 shows the percentage return of Japanese market. In our sample, the Japanese data
starts from 2003. From the graph, we can see the highest return for all series is in 2003, with
bank return of 0.56%, REITs return of 0.65% and market return of 0.97%. Since 2003, all the
returns decrease, and reach the lowest return in 2008, which shares the same pattern with
US and UK market. The market experiences a recovery from 2008 to 2010 with a positive
return in 2010. Again, due to the European debt crisis and overall recession of the global
market since 2010, all the returns decrease with negative returns in 2011.
Figure.4  UK market annual returns
Figure.4 shows the annual mean returns of UK market for bank, market and
REITs portfolios. Bank is the UK banks portfolio, which is consist of 35 banks that
are actively traded in the UK stock market. Rm is the market stock returns which
is proxied by FTSE All Share Price index. REITs is the returns of UK REITs which
is the index produced by European Public Real Estate Association for all 21 UK
REITs.
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From the above analysis, we notice that US, UK and Japanese market share a similar pattern
in terms of bank, REITs and market returns. In general, there is an increasing trend of
returns from 2000 to 2003 which shows an increasing activity in the financial market since
the Dot-Com bubble and 911 attack. All the returns reach the lowest point in 2008 to reflect
the global financial subprime crisis since late 2007. The overall global market experiences a
recovery from 2009 to 2010. However, due to the collapse of the European debt market and
continuous defaults of European countries, the returns of financial market experiences
another downturn from 2010 to 2011. The similarity of the return pattern of three portfolios
in US, UK and Japanese market also confirms that there is a close relationship in the global
market  among  each  country.  The  financial  condition  in  one  country  or  region  can
significantly produce a spillover effect on another country or region. It supports the results
from Fraser and Oyefeso (2005), which  shows  real  stock  prices  of  US  and  UK  market  are
linked by a common stochastic trend and therefore they are perfectly correlated in the long-
term. Short-term diversification gains may occur, however, it tends to be short-lived.
Figure.5  Japanese market annual returns
Figure.5 shows the annual mean returns of Japanese market for bank, market
and REITs portfolios. Bank is the Japanese banks portfolio, which is consist of 95
banks that are actively traded in the Japanese stock market. Rm is the market
stock returns which is proxied by NIKKEI 225 index. REITs is the returns of
Japanese TSE JREITs index which include 34 REITs traded in the Tokyo Stock
Exchange.
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The descriptive statistics for each return series are described in Table.10. We include the
descriptive statistics for the full sample period of US, UK and Japan Market. The descriptive
results show that, for the full sample period, the average return of commercial banks is
negative and between -0.30% and -0.02%. UK market has the lowest average return of -0.3%,
followed by US banks of the average return of -0.1%. Japanese commercial banks have the
highest average return with -0.02%. We can see that the returns of commercial banks, REITs
and market fluctuate over the period. Commercial banks and REITs returns are all positive
for the period 1999-2006; however, the sharp drop since 2007 significantly influences the
overall average returns in the period from 1999 to 2007. The average returns of commercial
banks are still negative over longer sample period from 1999 to 2011. The average returns of
REITs range from -0.6% to 0.1%. Japanese REITs average return is the highest of 0.1%,
followed by  US REITs  return  of  0.05%.UK REITs  show the  lowest  return  of  -0.6%.  Results
show that REITs portfolios exhibit higher unconditional volatility compared with
commercial portfolios returns with a standard deviation of 3.5%, 6.0% and 3.5% for US, UK
and Japan respectively. The finding is different from those found in Elyasiani et al. (2010)
and Cotter and Stevenson (2006), in which REITs show lower unconditional volatility. The
reason of the difference may be due to the long sample period in our study. Elyasiani et al.
(2010) only  study  the  period  from  1972  to  2004,  and  our  sample  has  included  the  most
volatile period from 2007 to 2011, which may contribute to the difference. The overall market
average returns of the three market is around 0.0%, with UK market return of -0.1% and
Japan market of 0.1%. The unconditional volatility of general market is higher than
commercial bank and lower than REITs for all countries, which shows that commercial
banks are less volatile than the general market, and REITs is more volatile than the general
market. The average interest rates of US and UK market are 4.33% and 4.15% respectively,
which is higher than Japanese average interest rate of 1.40%. In addition, US interest rate is
the most volatile with unconditional volatility of 98%, with highest interest rate of 6.78% and
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lowest interest of 1.83%. The reason of the volatile interest rate is because, after the 911
attack, there is an overall decline in the financial market. The government takes a series of
actions to boost the economy. Between 2000 and 2011, US Federal Reserve lowers Federal
funds rate 11 times, from 6.5% (May 2000) to 1.75% (December 2001), creating an easy-credit
environment that fuels the growth of US subprime mortgages. Skewness and kurtosis are
significant for all series. The significant kurtosis values demonstrate leptokurtosis. The
unconditional distributions of returns are non-normal since the Jarque-Bera statistics are
significant. The Ljung-Box test statistics for the return series are significant for all series
except for commercial banks return for Japanese market, which shows the Japanese
commercial banks portfolios reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The findings
are to be expected because the time period covers certain rather extreme economic situations
of record high and low stock prices and interest rates (Elyasiani et al. 2010). The results of
skewness, kurtosis, non-normality and serial correlation suggest that a GARCH-type process
is appropriate for modelling financial institutions and REITs returns.
The correlation coefficients are presented in Table.11.
Table 10  Descriptive statistics of financial institutions and REITs returns
Variables Definition  Mean  Median  Maximum Minimum  Std. Dev. Skewness  Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Q(8) Q(16) Q(24)
US Market
BANK Commericial Banks -0.001 0.001 0.145 -0.149 0.024 -0.675 11.142*** 1910.514*** 15.752** 60.643*** 78.356***
REITS Real Estate Investment Trust 0.000 0.002 0.204 -0.192 0.035 -0.348*** 11.076*** 1842.699** 7.467 33.182*** 53.856***
RM Market (S&P 500) 0.000 0.001 0.114 -0.201 0.027 -0.769*** 8.877** 1035.159*** 19.174** 30.567** 35.502**
I Long-term Interest Rate 4.326 4.269 6.765 1.833 0.980 0.009*** 2.812*** 0.994** 4777.4*** 8565.4*** 1158.5***
SMB Small minus Big 0.098 0.090 6.270 -9.350 1.424 -0.455*** 7.912*** 699.928*** 23.097*** 41.886*** 44.461***
HML High minus Low 0.086 0.000 9.830 -6.950 1.545 0.480*** 8.689*** 933.595*** 25.705*** 47.822*** 67.131***
UK Market
BANK Commericial Banks -0.003 0.002 0.137 -0.260 0.049 -1.573*** 10.831*** 617.432*** 16.513*** 37.921*** 51.789***
REITS Real Estate Investment Trust -0.006 0.001 0.177 -0.233 0.060 -1.022*** 6.106*** 119.912*** 3.581 26.589** 42.992***
RM Market (FTSE All Share Price) -0.001 0.002 0.162 -0.269 0.043 -1.251** 10.781** 579.076*** 13.824** 38.580*** 43.237***
I Long-term Interest Rate 4.150 4.040 5.547 2.866 0.714 0.067*** 1.800*** 12.628*** 1679.1*** 2769.5*** 3336.1***
SMB Small minus Big -0.086 0.013 4.634 -2.957 1.106 0.926*** 8.274*** 270.903*** 249.650*** 253.390*** 259.120***
HML High minus Low -0.111 -0.143 2.839 -1.869 0.770 1.384*** 7.990*** 282.316** 265.400*** 309.500*** 407.080***
Japan Market
BANK Commericial Banks 0.000 0.000 0.106 -0.127 0.028 -0.044*** 4.506** 42.824*** 7.811 19.027 29.573
REITS Real Estate Investment Trust 0.001 0.001 0.189 -0.257 0.035 -0.779*** 12.972*** 1914.572*** 19.817** 44.053*** 56.616***
RM Market (NIKKEI 225) 0.001 0.002 0.085 -0.216 0.029 -1.039*** 9.273*** 820.868*** 4.037 21.484 34.789***
I Long-term Interest Rate 1.404 1.406 1.994 0.455 0.274 -0.450** 3.711*** 24.789*** 2592.7*** 3786.2*** 4396.2***
*** 1% significant level
** 5% significant level
* 10% significant level
Note: The US commercial banks portfolio is consist of 323 banks which includes SIC 6021 (National Commercial Banks) and SIC 6022 (State Commercial Banks). In UK market, 35 banks which are
actively traded in the UK stock market are selected according to the Bloomberg. In Japan market, 95 banks are selected and all of them are actively traded in the Japanese stock market, and the
historical prices are obtained from Bloomberg. The bank portfolio returns are constructed by the equally weighted average of the returns of each individual banks. US REITs index are obtained from
NAREIT: National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, which is weighted average index of all REITs companies (192 REITs) traded in the United State market. UK REITs index is the REITs
index produced by European Public Real estate Association for all UK REITs (21 REITs). Japan REITs index is the TSE JREITs index is the index of all Japanese REITs (34 REITs) traded in the Tokyo
Stock Exchange. Market stock used is here is the return of S&P 500 index, FTSE All Share Price index, and NIKKEI 225 index. The variables on the SML and HML Fama-French factors for US and
UK market are obtained from Kenneth R. French website  and UK Fama-French Xfi Centre source. Interest rate variable is represented by change in the 10 year Treasury Bills interest rate (∆I) for all
three countries. The weekly returns are calculated as log(Pt/P(t-1) ) for each return series, and the interest rate return is calculated by first difference.
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In US market, the correlation between commercial banks and general market (0.572) is
higher than the correlations of other portfolios. This is followed by the correlation of 0.563
between banks and REITs returns. The pattern of correlations in US market among banks,
REITs and market is the same with UK and Japanese market. The correlation between
general market and REITs is 0.534 in US market. However, in UK, the correlation between
general market and REITs (0.573) is higher than both the correlations between bank portfolio
and REITs (0.431), and between bank portfolio and general market (0.503). In Japanese
market, the correlation between REITs and general market is 0.524, which is lower than the
correlation between bank portfolio and general market (0.582), and is higher than the
correlation between bank portfolio and REITs (0.416). The correlations between interest rate
return and other portfolios are lower than others for the three countries, which shows
portfolios within the equity market are more correlated than with the bond market. These
results are consistent with findings in the majority of literature.
Table 11  Correlation coefficients of variables used in the empirical testing
US Market BANK REITS RM ∆I SMB HML
BANK 1.000
REITS 0.563 1.000
RM 0.572 0.534 1.000
∆I 0.233 0.218 0.292 1.000
SMB 0.208 0.225 0.081 0.141 1.000
HML 0.392 0.312 0.025 0.003 -0.234 1.000
UK Market BANK REITS RM ∆I SMB HML
BANK 1.000
REITS 0.431 1.000
RM 0.503 0.573 1.000
∆I 0.142 0.221 0.338 1.000
SMB 0.121 0.218 0.153 0.056 1.000
HML 0.198 0.202 0.175 -0.024 0.465 1.000
Japan Market BANK REITS RM ∆I
BANK 1.000
REITS 0.416 1.000
RM 0.582 0.524 1.000
∆I 0.158 0.013 0.277 1.000
Note: BANK: The US  commercial banks portfolio is consist of 323 banks which includes SIC
6021 (National Commercial Banks) and SIC 6022 (State Commercial Banks). In UK market, 35
banks which are actively traded in the UK stock market are selected according to the Bloomberg.
In Japan market, 95 banks are selected and all of them are actively traded in the Japanese stock
market, and the historical prices are obtained from Bloomberg. The bank portfolio returns are
constructed by the equally weighted average of the returns of each individual banks. REITS: US
REITs index are obtained from NAREIT: National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts,
which is weighted average index of all REITs companies (192 REITs) traded in the United State
market. UK REITs index is the REITs index produced by European Public Real estate Association
for all UK REITs (21 REITs). Japan REITs index is the TSE JREITs index is the index of all
Japanese REITs (34 REITs) traded in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. RM: Market stock used is here
is the return of S&P 500 index, FTSE All Share Price index, and NIKKEI 225 index. The variables
on the SML and HML Fama-French factors for US and UK market are obtained from Kenneth R.
French website  and UK Fama-French Xfi Centre source. ∆I Interest rate variable is represented by
change in the 10 year Treasury Bills interest rate (∆I) for all three countries. The weekly returns are
calculated as log(Pt/P(t-1) ) for each return series, and the interest rate return is calculated by first
difference.
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4.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The extended bivariate GARCH model of both Model.1 and Model.2 are presented by
equation (12)-(17) and equation (18)-(23) respectively described in the methodology section.
Each model framework is estimated simultaneously for commercial banks and REITs.
Equation (12)-(13) and (18)-(19) represent the mean return and conditional volatility process
for financial institution returns. Equation (14)-(15) and (20)-(21) represent the mean return
and conditional volatility process for REITs. Asymptotic t-values are in parentheses. The
estimation results for Model.1 are displayed in Table.12, and the estimation results for
Model.2 are displayed in Table.13.
4.6.1 FACTORS AFFECTING BANK STOCK RETURNS
4.6.1.1 MARKET FACTOR
As  shown  in Table.12 and Table.13, the magnitude of market betas (ߚଵଵ) for banks and
REITs portfolios for all periods in Model.1 and Model.2 are less than 1.0. He et al (1996) find
that the market beta for banks is less than unity in US market by using monthly and weekly,
value-weighted and equally-weighted indices. Our results support the findings in He et al
(1996), and the results also indicate that banks are less risky than the market portfolio in all
our testing periods of all three countries: US, UK and Japan.
 In Model.1, the market beta (ߚଵଵ) for US market in full period from year 1999 to 2011 is
0.313. Within in the full sample period, we divide the thirteen years into three sub-periods.
The market sensitivity to bank stock returns varies in different period. In the period 1999-
2002, the market beta is 0.164, which is less than the market beta of the full period. This
indicates that the bank stock return is less sensitive during 1999-2002 than during the longer
period from 1999-2011. This is because the longer period from 1999 to 2011 includes two
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extreme financial conditions, 2000 Dot-Com bubble and 2007 financial crisis; therefore, the
market beta may be significantly compromised by the ups and downs of the financial
market conditions.  During the year 2003 to 2006, the market beta is 0.521, and during the
year 2007 to 2011, the market beta is 0.353. The results show that the bank stock return is
more sensitive to the market return during the economic booming during 2003-2006 than
during the economic downturn in year 2007-2011, during which the world economy suffer
from subprime and European debt crisis. Elyasiani et al (2007) show that market beta for
financial institutions is to be size-dependent, with larger financial institutions displaying
greater market beta values. They explain that the difference in the market beta may be to the
fact that larger financial institutions tend to be highly leveraged, less liquid and more
orientated towards non-traditional banking activities such as exotic derivatives, which can
be highly risky. The argument is supported by our results of higher market beta (0.521) than
other periods, which shows during the economic booming period 2003-2006, banks are
highly involved in the exotic derivative in order to seek high profit, such as CDOs and
CMOs, and banks during the period are extremely highly leveraged with little liquidity.
Therefore, the banks return is highly sensitive to the general market performance. The high
leverage of banks is also the underlying reason for the sub-prime crisis beginning in late
2007. In UK, since we only test the period from year 2007 to 2011, we cannot compare the
market sensitive of different periods in UK. However, we notice that the market beta in UK
for period 2007-2011 is negative and insignificant, -0.047. The negative market beta shows
that banks are negatively related to the general market return during 2007-2011 in UK. In
addition, when the general market return increases, the bank stock returns decrease.
In Model.2, similarly within Model.1, the market betas for US market are all positive and
significant, and the magnitudes are slightly greater than the one in Model.1. The market
sensitivity is 0.383 for full period 1999-2011, which is similar with the magnitude in Model.1.
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The market beta for period 1999-2002 is 0.228, which is greater than the value in full period.
Bank stock return is more sensitive to the general market during period 2003-2006 than
during 1999-2002. The high sensitivity of banks to general market during the economic
booming in 2003-2006 is because banks tend to engage in the high risk financial activities in
order to pursue high profit, which has been discussed in the previous paragraph. However,
in the second model, the market beta of US market is highest during period 2007-2011 of
0.619. The second framework is different from the trend in the first framework, in which
market beta is greatest in period 2003-2006. This indicates when market is volatile during the
subprime and European debt crisis during 2007-2011, the bank stocks are sensitive to the
general market. As for UK market, the market beta is positive 0.659 and, again, insignificant.
The market beta is negative in the first framework, and in our second model, the coefficient
is positive. Japanese market is included in the second framework. The market betas in Japan
are positive and significant. The greatest market beta is 0.745 in period 2003-2006. Since the
market is globally connected, the prosperity of the economy in one country can be
transmitted to another country. Elyasiani and Mansur (2003) show that stock volatilities in
the banking sectors of US and Japan are found to be highly interdependent, so that the
performance of the stock market in US can spillover to Japanese market.  During 2003-2006,
the Japanese banks actively invest in the high-risk high-profit financial products as US
banks. Therefore, the bank stocks are highly sensitive to the general market performance. If
we compare like-by-like the Japanese market with the US market, we notice that for the
same period Japanese market beta is higher than the US market beta. This indicates that
Japanese banks are more sensitive to the equity market with greater impact.
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4.6.1.2 INTEREST RATE FACTOR
The interest rate betas (ߚଵଷ) for most of the portfolios are negative and small in magnitude
but not statistically significant, except for US full period 1999-2011 in Model.1 (-0.007) and
UK period 2007-2011 under both frameworks (-0.031). The findings on the interest rate
variable in the extant literature are mixed but in general the magnitude of the interest rate
effect is small and the direction of the effect is negative. According to Elyasiani and Mansur
(2004), the sensitivity of bank stock returns to the changes in the interest rate is an indicator
of the level of interest rate risk exposure of the banks. Banks curtail their interest rate risk
exposure by limiting the duration gap between their assets and liabilities and taking
positions in derivatives markets. These actions reduce the magnitude of the interest rate beta
coefficient in the model. Elyasiani and Mansur (2004) study three portfolios, money centre,
large and small banks by using daily data for period from January 1988 to December 2000 in
US  market  and  find  out bank stocks are clearly interest rate sensitive, with the long rate
demonstrating a bigger impact. In our results, when we use the US full period 1999-2011, the
interest rate is negative and significant to the bank stock returns. There are few literature
examining the interest rate sensitivity to bank stocks over the recent 10-year period. Our
results show that in the recent period 1999-2011, US banks still are sensitive to the interest
rate change as before (in period year 1988-2000 as in Elyasiani and Mansur 2004). On the
other hand, the interest rates for all three sub-periods in US and all periods in Japan are all
negative but insignificant in both frameworks. The negative coefficients indicate that
financial institutions are generally effective in hedging their interest rate exposures (Brewer
et al. 2007). Elyasiani et al. (2007) explain that banks tend to securitize much of their loans,
thereby shifting their interest rate risk to institutional investors purchasing the securitized
packages. While majority of literature, cited earlier in the literature review section (Stone
1974, Wetmore and Brick 1994, Bae 1990, etc.), find that the interest rate exposure of
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commercial banks is significant. The negative and insignificant of interest rate sensitivity to
bank stock returns in US and Japanese market is supported by a few literatures. Booth and
Officer (1985), Chance and Lane (1980) and He et al (1996) have found that interest rates
have little impact on U.S. bank stock returns. Elyasiani and Mansur (2003) study the bank
stock sensitivities to market, interest rate, exchange rate, and the spillover effects of interest
rate volatility and unsystematic risk among the banking sectors of the United States, Japan
and Germany for period of year 1986-1995. They found the interest rates are all negative and
insignificant for US, Japan and Germany. They discuss that there are several factors
contributing to the lack of significance of the interest rate. One reason is banks included in
the data set may have conflicting sensitivities to interest rates due to duration gaps between
assets and liabilities; the average interest rate sensitivity of the portfolio appears
insignificant.  Moreover, the hedging activity of the banks in the form of matching duration
gaps, securitization, and holding positions in financial derivative may results in the
insignificance of interest rate. Furthermore, banks in the sample are diversified
organizations, and they are more likely to engage in both banking and non-banking
activities whose banking business is focused on fee-based and off-balance sheet contracts,
rather than the intermediation. Finally, the results on interest rate may differ from some of
the existing literature because of the GARCH methodology adopted here. The interest rate
sensitivity of the Japanese banks is also insignificant under both frameworks. This result is
particularly interesting since it is expected that Japanese banks are sensitive to the interest
rate change because these banks hold a substantial amount of government bonds. The
reason is due to the low level and less volatile of interest rate which narrows the interest rate
changes and makes them ineffective (Elyasiani and Mansur 2003). Our sample period for
Japan is from year 2003 to 2011. From the descriptive statistics in Table.10, we notice that the
average interest rate is 1.404%, which only fluctuates slightly between 0.445% (minimum)
and 1.994% (maximum). Unlike US and Japanese market, the UK bank stocks show
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significant sensitivities to the interest rate changes, with coefficients of -0.031 under both
frameworks. Dinenis and Staikouras (1998) also use the weekly UK data and find that the
coefficients on the interest rate are significant and negative for UK financial institution
portfolios including banks for both one-month and three-month rate during period 1989-
1995. They also find that the use of longer term interest rate can increase the interest rate
sensitivity of the financial institution portfolios. Our results show that, following Dinenis
and Staikouras (1998)’s work, interest rate sensitivity to UK bank stocks is still significant
even over the most volatile subprime crisis 2007-2011. The long-term ten year Treasury bill
rate used in this paper provides stronger interest rate sensitivity of the portfolios.
4.6.1.3 REAL ESTATE FACTOR
The effect of real estate returns on the FI return distribution is the most interesting issue in
the study. Elyasiani et al. (2010) explain there are three channels through which the effect of
real estate can be transmitted to the financial institutions. Firstly, when the there is a boost in
real estate, the level of credit risk exposed by the financial institutions falls because the value
of mortgage loans and other real estate investment increases. Secondly, since financial
institutions directly hold real estate properties, such as industrial and office buildings, when
there is an increase in the value of the real estate, financial institutions gain greater profits.
The third channel is from the increase in the wealth of borrowers, such as an increase in their
revenue from rent.
The REITs Indices used in the paper (NAREITs, EPRA UK REITs and TSE REITs) measure
the total return on a value weighted investment in publicly traded REITs. There are many
discussions on the appropriate proxy to represent real estate market fundamentals.
Eisenbeis and Kwast (1991), Ghosh et al. (1997) and Blaško and Sinkey (2006) use mortgage
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loans and real estate properties holdings as percentage of total asset to examine effect of real
estate factor to financial institution stocks. He (2002) and He and Reichert (2003) adopt
median sale price index of commercial properties in the study to represent real estate
influence on the bank holding companies. Since the introduction of REITs, REITs have
become one of the most frequently used measures of real estate returns. Chun et al (2004)
and Mei and Saunders (1995, 1997) present evidences to support the use of REITs returns as
a real estate market proxy. Allen et al (1995) argue that the use of REIT returns is appealing
because they represent market transactions, even though REITs prices are a secondary
measure of real estate value.
The results show that most of REITs returns have positive and significant impact on all
financial institution returns (ߚଵଶ > 0) for all three countries. While each real estate coefficient
varied with the model used, the real estate coefficient is consistently positive and significant,
regardless of the model employed as shown in Allen et al (1995). The positive coefficients of
REITs represent that the fluctuation of bank stock returns is moving in the same direction
with the REITs returns. In terms of magnitude effect the coefficients of US REITs range from
0.556 to 1.469 for different time periods under Model.1. Over the full period 1999-2011, the
coefficient of REITs return is 0.746, less than unity, which shows the bank stock is less risky
than the REITs during 1999-2011 in general. When comparing among different sub-periods,
we notice that REITs return gives the strongest sensitivity to bank stock return during
period 2003-2006, with coefficient great than unity, 1.469. This is followed by the period
2007-2011 (0.985) and period 1999-2002 (0.556). During 2003-2006 there is a booming in the
real estate section and global economy. The price of real estate property is rising in
consecutive five years since 2002. The rising property prices have encouraged individual
and institutional investors investing in real estate properties and related products.
Individual investors take loans from banks and S&L institutions in order to invest in more
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properties. Institutional investors heavily invest in high risky real estate related financial
derivatives in order to gain greater profits. The booming real estate market has made
investor wealthy, however, at the same time properties and real estate related financial
products are significantly over-valued. This makes real estate products highly risky during
the period. The large magnitude of REITs coefficient, 1.469 reflects the unstable situation
during 2003-2011. Allen et al (1995) discuss  the  increase  in  bank  exposure  as  measured  by
the proportional holding of real estate over time increase the shift in the sensitivity of bank
portfolios to real estate. The coefficient is greater than unity, which shows REITs are more
risky than the bank stocks during this period. He et al (1996, 1997) examine real estate
sensitivity  by  using  all  REITs,  equity  REITs  and  mortgage  REITs.  They  conclude  that
irrespective of different REITs used, the results all show significant sensitivity to the bank
stock returns. However, they find out bank returns are most sensitive to mortgage REITs
given higher coefficient. They explain this is because banks make more real estate loans
during the period 1986-1991. This is consistent with Mei and Saunders (1995), in which they
show there is an increase in the sensitivity of bank stock to real estate as banks expanded
their loan portfolios in the real estate sector. Under Model.2, the coefficients of REITs are
also positive and significant; however the magnitudes are smaller than the coefficients under
Model.1. This shows Model.1 is stronger to represent the real estate REITs effect to bank
stock returns than Model.2. In UK market, the REITs return is significant in Model.1, with
magnitude of 0.738. The coefficient is smaller than that in US market from the same period,
which indicates UK REITs have weaker influence on bank stock returns than US REITs
during year 2007-2011. Under Model.2, REITs show insignificant influence to financial
institutions. Japanese REITs are tested in Model.2. All coefficients are significant, with
largest coefficient appearing during period 2003-2006. Since Elyasiani and Mansur (2003)
show that stock volatilities in the banking sectors of US and Japan are found to be highly
interdependent, so that the performances of stock market in US can spill over to Japanese
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market. Therefore, the reason of higher coefficient in period 2003-2006 is similar with the US
REITs as discussed before.
According to Elyasiani et al. (2010),  the  economic  significant  is  examined by  the  impact  of
changes in standard deviation change of explanatory variable, REITs returns, over the
explained variables, FI returns. In our paper, the magnitudes of economic significances are
obtained by multiplying the standard deviation of an explanatory variable by its coefficient.
From the Table.10, Table.12 and Table.13, a unit change in the standard deviation in REITs
return results in a change of 2.61% on US banks return over full period 1999-2011, and a
change of 4.43% on UK banks return during year 2007-2011 under Model.1. We find in
Model.2 the economic significance of REITs is lower than that in Model.1 due to smaller
magnitude of REITs coefficients. Under Model.2, a unit change in the standard deviation in
REITs return results in a change of 1.02% on US banks return over full period 1999-2011 and
a change of 0.50% on UK banks return during year 2007-2011. In Japan market, the economic
significance is the lowest, and a unit change in the standard deviation in REITs returns
results in a change of 0.40% on  banks return over full period 2003-2011.
If we compare the magnitude of coefficients of REITs under Model.1 and Model.2, the
coefficients of the first framework are generally greater than in the second framework for US
and UK market. Japanese market is only examined in Model.2 due to the lack of Fama-
French data. However, the coefficients of Japanese REITs are between 0.118 and 0.213, and
the coefficients are smaller than US REITs but larger than the UK REITs on average. This
shows Model.1 is stronger to represent the real estate REITs effect to bank stock returns than
Model.2. Furthermore, US banks are most sensitive and closest related to the REITs returns,
followed by the Japanese banks. UK shows the weakest link of bank stock to REITs returns
during 2007-2011. The highest level of sensitivity of US banks is as expected.  US banks, as a
leader, invest heavily in real estate properties and related products over the last decade with
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long established and matured REITs market. Japanese REITs market established in 2001, but
it is more matured than the UK REITs market. UK banks are less aggressive compared with
US banks, and the REITs history in UK is very recent, starting in 2007 with only 21 REITs
products.  The  short  history  and  less  REIT  products  of  Japan  and  UK  may  make  it  less
influential and representative on the bank stock, especially in UK.
The results in the paper provide evidences to researchers and investors. Although the
association between financial institutions and interest rate, general market and even foreign
exchange has received much more attention in the literature, the effect of real estate sector
on the financial institution has proven to be both statistically and economically significant.
This calls increasing attention of banks, insurance funds, regulators as well as investors to
carefully consider the real estate influence on the financial institution portfolios when
making investment and regulatory decisions.
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4.6.2 FACTORS AFFECTING REITS RETURNS
Under the two frameworks, Model.1 and Model.2, the REITs return is estimated
simultaneously with the financial institution returns. The differences between the two
frameworks are the ways in estimating the REITs return. Under Model.1, a Fama-French
three factor methodology, as used in Chiang et al. (2005),  is  used  to  estimate  the  REITs
returns; under Model.2, a two-index CAPM model is adopted as in Chen and Tzang (1988).
In the following sections, we discuss the empirical results obtained under both frameworks.
4.6.2.1 MARKET FACTOR
The systematic market coefficient for the REITs returns is estimated, and the results are
listed in Table.12 for  Model.1  and Table.13 for  Model.2.  From  the  results,  we  notice  the
market coefficients for all periods and countries under both models are positive and
significant under 1 percent significant level. This indicates a clear co-movement between
REITs returns and systematic market risk.  In US market, under Model.1, the magnitudes of
market betas are all less than unity for all periods, between 0.495 and 0.986, indicating the
average market risk of REITs is below market average during full period 1999-2003 as well
as each sub-periods. In Model.2, the coefficients are still all positive, but the range of
fluctuation is larger than in Model.1, between 0.223 and 1.227. It is noticed that the market
beta in period 2007-2011 is greater than 1.0, which shows that REITs are riskier than the
average market during the subprime crisis since 2007. The positive and significant
relationship between REITs and general market performance has been examined in previous
literature, and they all show evidences of a strong connection. Chen and Tzang (1988) and
Ross and Zisler (1991) show market beta is sensitive to both equity and mortgage REITs with
positive coefficients during year 1973-1985. Similarly, Liang et al. (1995) obtain a similar
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result by using the same data period with another two indices, all REITs and hybrid REITs.
Peterson and Hsieh (1997) use Fama-French model over period 1976-1992 and show that risk
premiums on equity and mortgage REITs are significantly related to the risk premium on a
market portfolio of stocks as well as to the returns on mimicking portfolios for size and
book-to-market equity factors in common stock returns. Chiang et al. (2004, 2005) provide
evidences of the positive relationship in return for a period covering year 1972-2002, and
they also find on average that mortgage REITs are generally riskier than equity REITs with
higher market beta.
In US market, over the three sub-periods, the magnitude of market beta (ߚଶଵ) under both
frameworks increases over the time with greatest value experienced in period 2007-2011.
One explanation of the increasing sensitivity of REITs to general market over time is that
REITs market is more matured and the proportion of equity REITs is increasing significantly
over time. In the current global REITs market, over 90% REITs are equity REITs. The equity
nature of equity REIT makes it more dependent on the general market. Another explanation
of the increasing sensitivity is based on the findings in Chiang et al. (2004, 2005). Chiang et
al. (2004, 2005) examine the market effect on REITs for period 1972 to 2002, with two sub-
periods.  They find that the market factor is generally larger in declining market than in
advancing market. In our results, the largest market beta is shown in period 2007-2011.
During this period all industries and market are in a serious recession, thus, declining and
low growth market, because of the subprime crisis in 2007 and recent European debt crisis.
The highest market beta experienced in this volatile period is supported by the conclusion in
Chiang et al. (2004, 2005).
During 2007-2011, UK REITs are also significantly sensitive to general market factor, with
positive coefficients of 1.091 and 1.129 under Model.1 and Model.2 respectively. By
comparing to the US REITs of same period 2007-2011, we see that the market impact to UK
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REITs under Fama-French framework is higher than to the US REITs with larger market
beta. On the other hand, when using CAPM two-index model, market beta is slightly
smaller for UK REITs than for US REITs. However, no matter which framework is used, the
market betas of UK REITs are both greater than unity. The results show that UK REITs is
riskier than the general market during period 2007-2011.
Similar results are shown in Japanese REITs. Market betas are all positive and significant for
Japanese REITs, ranging from 0.383 to 0.915 for period 2003-2011 and two sub-periods. The
magnitudes  are  less  than  unity,  which  shows  the  Japanese  REITs  are  less  risky  than  the
general market stocks. Market beta in sub-period 2007-2011 is significantly greater than the
sub-period 2003-2007, and the trend resembles the US market. As discussed in US REITs, the
greater impact of the market factor on Japanese REITs is due to the low growth during the
global financial downturn in period 2007-2011. If we compare with the US and UK market
under Model.2, during period 2003-2007, general market has a weaker influence on Japanese
REITs than on US REITs with smaller market beta. In addition, in period 2007-2011, Japanese
REITs are still the least affected by the market factor, followed by the US REITs. UK REITs
are the most influenced by the market returns since it has the greatest market beta in this
period.
4.6.2.2 FAMA-FRENCH FACTORS
The coefficients of Fama-French factors, SMB and HML, are positive and significant for most
of  REITs  returns  in  US  and  UK  markets  as  shown  in Table.12, and this is consistent with
many literatures. SMB is the difference between the return on small-cap stocks and the
return on large-cap stocks. HML is the difference between the return on high book-to-
market stocks and the return on low book-to-market stocks. Fama and French (1992) find
197
that size of capitalization and book-to-market equity (BE/ME) explains the cross-section of
average returns on US common stock, excluding ADRs, REITs and units of beneficial
interest. Fama and French (1992) use the time-series regression approach to show that a
market factor and mimicking portfolios for size and BE/ME factors in returns explain
returns on stocks. Peterson and Hsieh (1997) argue that although factors like size and
BM/ME have not direct connection to an asset pricing theory, it is possible these factors
which affect the return to common share also affect returns on REITs shares. In US market,
the coefficient of SMB ranges from 0.003 to 0.007 and the magnitude of SMB increases over
time for the three sub-periods. It shows the sensitivity of SMB to REITs increases over time.
The  coefficients  of  HML  of  are  also  positive  and  significant  for  all  periods,  ranging  from
0.006 to 0.009, however, the magnitude declines to zero in period 2003-2006. The HML is
more powerful in explaining the REITs return behaviour over the full time period 1999-2011
and sub-periods 1999-2001 and 2007-2011 for greater magnitude of HML coefficient.
However, during period 2003-2006, small size factor SMB has a stronger influence on the
REITs returns. In UK market, the coefficients of SMB and HML are also positive, however,
factor SMB is not significant. Similar with the US REITs in the same period, the coefficient of
HML is higher than the SMB, which shows during period 2007-2011 the factor HML is more
sensitive to the UK REIT returns.
There are many literatures have demonstrated SMB and HML influence on the REITs
returns. However, since UK REITs market is very recent, majority of REITs literatures are
focusing on the US REITs. Peterson and Hsieh (1997) studied the REITs return behaviour for
period from year 1976-1992, and find REITs return is sensitive to the small size factor SMB
and HML. They also discover that the small firm effect is less pronounced for equity REITs
and mortgage REITs. They explain that the significant correlation with SMB and HML are
consistent with the facts that many REITs are small firms and that many REITs have high
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BE/ME ratios. Therefore, it is likely that the factors which drive the size and BE/ME effects
in common stock returns also have the same effects in REITs returns. Chiang et al. (2005)
examine the REITs return over year 1972-2002. It shows the SMB factor is more useful than
the HML in equity REITs returns in period 1972-1983 and 1983-1991, and HML is more
useful during period 1991-2002. Lee and Chiang (2008) use similar period of information in
examining  the  sensitivity  of  SMB  and  HML  effect  on  REITs  returns.  The  findings  indicate
that the return sensitivities to SMB and HML increase substantially from 1992 to 2003, and
the sensitivity of REITs returns to small cap stock increase with a decline to the large cap
stocks. Therefore our results in Table.12, which show the increasing trend of SMB and HML
sensitivity during the period 2007-2011, extend the previous literature of Chiang et al. (2005)
and Lee and Chiang (2008) by indicating the REITs return is increasingly sensitive to the
capitalization size and BE/ME factors of the general stock market.
4.6.2.3 INTEREST RATE FACTOR
While the interest rate sensitivity on bank stock returns has been discussed in the previous
section, the interest rate effect on REITs returns is examined by the two-index CAPM
Model.2, and the empirical results are displayed in Table.13. As suggested by many
literatures (Chen and Tzang 1988, He et al 2003 etc.), REITs return is sensitive to the return
and change of interest rate.
Chen and Tzang (1988) investigate the effect of both the short-term (three-month 3MTB, six-
month 6MTB and one-year 1YTB) and long-term (20-year 20YTB) US Treasury bills to REITs,
especially equity and mortgage REITs returns over period 1973-1985. The results show that
both short-term and long-term interest rates seem to be an additional factor in explaining the
return generating process of REITs during period 1980-1985, with negative and statistically
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significant interest rate coefficients. However, only long-term interest rate is significant for
period 1973-1979. They argue that the difference of significance between two sub-periods
may be attributed to the fact that the Federal Reserve changed its policy orientation towards
reserves and the monetary aggregates in 1979. He et al (2003) extend previous studies by
including a longer period from year 1972 to1998 to test the effects of both the return and
change of long-term interest rate on REITs returns (equity and mortgage REITs). He et al
(2003) show that the equity REITs are insensitive to the monthly long-term interest rate, but
sensitive to the monthly change of interest rate. On the other hand, mortgage REITs are
sensitive to both return and change of interest rate, and more sensitive to the changes in
interest rate. The results also show that during 1972-1998, the coefficients of significant
interest rate changes are negative for both types of REITs. Furthermore, the results of Mei
and Lee (1994, 1995 and 1997) also provide evidences that REITs, especially equity REITs,
are sensitive to the changes in the interest rate, and the coefficients are negatively significant.
The negative sign of interest rate coefficients suggests perverse inflation behaviour of REITs,
and REITs generally perform well in hedging towards the changes in interest rate.
Our study contributes to the recent literature by including the most recent thirteen years
(1999-2011) in our sample since majority of previous literature focusing on period 1980s-
1990s. From the results shown in Table.13, similar behaviour of interest rate to REITs
returns is found for period 1999-2011. The change in interest rate returns is negative and
significant for UK REITs in period 2007-2011 and Japan REITs in period 2003-2011 as well as
its two sub-periods. This shows that the both UK and Japanese REITs are sensitive to interest
rate, and they are efficient in hedging toward the changes in the interest rate. The results of
UK and Japanese REITs follow the same findings in of US REITs He et al (2003) and Mei and
Lee (1994, 1995 and 1997), and we conclude that the UK and Japan REITs in 2003-2011
behave similarly with US REITs in 1980s-1990s. The magnitude of interest rate coefficient of
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Japan REITs increases over sub-period 2003-2006 (-0.039) and 2007-2011 (-0.101), which
shows Japan REITs are increasingly efficient in hedging the interest rate changes over time.
During the same period in 2007-2011, the magnitude of UK REITs (-0.019) is smaller than
Japan REITs (-0.101), and it indicates UK REITs are less volatile to the changes in interest
rate.
As for US REITs, the change in interest rate is only significant during period 2003-2006, with
negative coefficient -0.041. The magnitude is larger than that for Japan REITs, which shows
US REITs perform better than Japan REITs to interest rate impact during 2003-2006.
However, the interest rates for two sub-periods 1999-2002 and 2007-2011 are not significant
but with positive coefficients. The results show during 1999-2002 and 2007-2011, there is a
co-movement between US REITs return and interest rate. US REITs perform badly in
hedging the interest rate changes. The reason of the positive relationship may be because of
the volatile economy and market during 1999-2002 and 2007-2011. In 2000, the Dot-Com
bubble bursts, and it drags down the whole US economy, as well as the global market, into a
serious recession. In addition, the subprime crisis started in 2007 has damaged the global
economy in all aspects. Moreover, despite a mild recovery in the economy in 2009, the
collapse of European debt markets since 2010 gives the global economy another deadly
shock. Therefore, the most probable cause for the usual REITs performance during these two
sub-periods is for the increased volatility in all types of economic behaviour.
In He et al (2003), they separate the REITs into equity and mortgage REITs, and find
mortgage REITs are more sensitive to changes in interest rates with larger magnitude of
coefficients. They argue that the reason of the difference is that as fixed-income securities,
both mortgage and bonds share many similar fundamentals in the return generating
process. Chen and Tzang (1988) explain the phenomenon by using the effective duration of
real estate, which is a function of the lease structure for equity and maturities of mortgage
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for mortgage REITs. The difference is that for most of the equity REITs, lease terms are
updated every three to five years to reflect changes in the market. However, for mortgage
REITs, the mortgage maturities are usually fixed for more than ten years. Therefore,
mortgage REITs should be more sensitive to the changes in the interest rates. Both equity
and mortgage REITs use long-term liabilities as a source of financing, therefore, the duration
of long-term liabilities can explain the sensitivity of REITs to changes in interest rates since
interest rate on long-term government bonds do not have risk premium.  The longer
duration of long-term liabilities, the higher is the sensitivity to interest rate changes for
REITs (He et al (2003). However, in our study, we use NAREIT all REITs index, including all
kinds of REITs, to represent the real estate market. Since over 90% of REITs are equity REITs
worldwide, all REITs index are more likely to resemble the equity REITs behaviour. In
addition, this provides a future research direction to examine the equity and mortgage
REITs behaviour separately for period 1999-2011.
4.6.3 BIVARIATE GARCH VOLATILITY SPILLOVER
The results on the conditional volatility of financial institutions and REITs returns, described
by equation (13) and (15) in Model.1 and equaton (19) and (21) in Model.2, are also described
in Table.12 and Table.13 respectively. The conditional volatility variables ൫ℎ௜,௧,௜ୀଵ,ଶ൯ measure
the overall risk of banks and REITs returns. The conditional covariance between banks and
REITs return is represented by ℎଵଶ,௧ in equation (16) and (22) under each framework. In the
bivariate GARCH representation of banks and REITs return, the volatility ൫ℎ௜,௧,௜ୀଵ,ଶ൯  is
explained as a function of ARCH factor (ߝ௜,௧ିଵ,௜ୀଵ,ଶଶ ), representing a short-term shock to the
return from the last period, and GARCH factor ൫ℎ௜,௧ିଵ,௜ୀଵ,ଶ൯ , representing a long-term
memory effect of the shocks over all previous periods. Parameter ߛଵଶ captures the cross-
volatility spillover effect from the real estate sector to the banks.
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In US market, irrespective of which model used, the ARCH effect (short-term memory) to
bank returns is significant for full sample period 1999-2011, as well as sub-period 1991-2002
and 2007-2011, which shows during these periods bank stock returns show a strong
presence of ARCH effect.  On the other hand, the results of both models suggest that the
GARCH effect (long-term memory) to banks returns is significant for all periods except for
first sub-period 1999-2002. It indicates that banks stock returns show a strong presence of
GARCH effect except for period 1999-2002. The significance of ARCH and GARCH effect
questions the findings derived from the basic conventional models which assume the
linearity, independence and constant variances over time, which suggests a variable
variance methodology is more appropriate in bank return generating process (Elyasiani and
Mansur 1998). Furthermore, the study of Stevenson (2002) reveals that the volatility of REITs
has a significant influence on other sub-sectors of the market. It also shows that a number of
patterns emerge with regard to the influence of other asset classes. In all cases under both
frameworks, the second order stationary conditions (0 < ܽ௜௜ + ܾ௜௜ < 1) are  met.  The  sum of
ARCH and GARCH coefficients means the persistent shock for the banks. From the results,
the shock persistence varies from 0.686 to 0.985 under Model.1 and from 0.522 to 0.921 under
Model.2, with period 2002-2006 exhibiting the highest persistence for the banks, and period
1999-2002 with the lowest. In UK market, the shock persistence is 0.939 under the first
framework and 0.832 under the second framework.  The Japanese bank stock is analysed
under Model.2, with higher shock persistence in year 2007-2011, 0.882, and lower persistence
in year 2003-2006, 0.799. The longevity of shocks in period 2007-2011 is because of the long-
term duration of banks’ mortgage portfolios. This is consistent with the high interest rate
sensitivity of these banks in period 2007-2011 (Elyasiani et al. 2010). Interest rate and interest
rate volatility are especially found to directly impact the first and the second moments of
bank stock returns distribution respectively, as suggested in Elyasiani and Mansur (1998).
203
The ARCH and GARCH effect on REITs returns are generally significant but weaker than
the bank stock return (Devaney 2001). Same as in bank stocks effect, the second order
stationary conditions (0 < ܽ௜௜ + ܾ௜௜ < 1) are met for all portfolios. When REITs return is
estimated under Fama-French three-factor model, only long-term memory GARCH is
significant for period 2007-2011 for US REITs, with coefficient 0.558. On the other hand,
when two-index CAPM model is employed, short-term ARCH effect is significant for full
period 1999-2011 and sub-period 2007-2011. The long-term GARCH effect of US REITs is
significant for most of periods except for period 1999-2011. In addition, UK and Japan REITs
experience both ARCH and GARCH effects no matter which framework is used. The shock
persistence of US REITs is more volatile when using Fama-French framework, ranging from
0.147 to 0.906, than using CAPM framework, 0.352-0.979. The persistence of UK REITS
remains stable under both models. For Japan REITs, the persistence increases over time from
0.807 in 2003-2006 to 0.969 in 2007-2011.
The cross-volatility spillover (ߛଵଶ) is significant and positive over all periods and countries.
This indicates there is a co-movement in the same direction between banks and real estate
sector as represented by REITs in all periods and countries. The result here is inconsistent
with the findings in (Elyasiani et al. 2010) for US market, which finds that the commercial
banks are not responsive to the changes in volatility of REITs, but it shows the significant
spillover of volatility from REITs to other financial institutions, such as savings and loans
and life insurance companies. In US market, the coefficient of spillover effect increases from
0.545 to 0.710 continuously in Model.1 over three sub-periods. The magnitude of coefficient
represents the strength of volatility spillover. This indicates the banks are increasingly
influenced by the volatility from real estate sectors over time. However, under the CAPM
model, the effect of real estate volatility spillover increases from period 1999-2002 (0.385) to
2003-2006 (0.962), and decreases in 2007-2011 (0.540). The stronger volatility spillover from
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real estate to bank stocks in period 2003-2006 shows that during the booming economy the
volatility of real estate sector has stronger influence on banks than other periods. This result
is inconsistent with the finding in Elyasiani et al. (2010). Elyasiani et al. (2010) use real-estate
cycle dummy variable to represent the up- and down-turn in economy, and they notice the
real estate cycle does not exert a statistically significant influence on the risk of any of the
financial institutions considered. The reason of the difference in the significance of volatility
spillover is due to the different periods used in the study. In Elyasiani et al. (2010), they
examine the a longer 33-year period of 1972-2004, including some extreme periods of
economy, which may influence the sensitivity of volatility spillover from real estate sector to
bank stocks. Furthermore, Elyasiani et al. (2010) use monthly data in the study, and we use
more frequent weekly data. Cotter and Stevenson (2004 and 2006) suggest that the use of
different data frequency could lead to different empirical findings. It is possible that the use
of higher frequency data may mask more of these fundamental relationships with general
market sentiment. As for UK market, there is also strong influence from REITs to bank
stocks with positive significant influence. In addition, the magnitude of volatility spillover
effect does not change when different framework is used. Moreover, in Japan, real estate
volatility can be transmitted to banks in full period 2003-2011 and sub-period 2007-2011.
However, during the first period 2003-2006 it does not show significant volatility influence
from real estate to banks. The significant effect of volatility spillover from REITs to banks
stocks demonstrates that the UK and Japan markets follow the same mechanism as  US
market, and similar market trend has been observed.
The statistical significance and the magnitude of the cross-sectional spillover effects should
draw more attention to the financial regulators and investors to the developments in the real
estate market. The difference in the volatility parameter values for different sample periods
indicates real estate has a different level of risk impact on bank stock returns. In addition,
205
when considering the appropriate methodology of REITs return generating process, the
significance of both ARCH and GARCH effects for REITs returns suggest that the second
moment of REITs return distribution should be estimated accordingly.
4.7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper adopts bivariate GARCH methodology to examine the return behaviour of bank
stocks and REITs, and the volatility spillover from REITs to bank stocks between January
1999 and December 2011. Weekly data is used in order to include more data points and
increase the sensitivity of volatility. Three sub-periods, 1999-2002, 2003-2006 and 2007-2011
are used to examine the different return and volatility behaviours in different economic
environment. The results show that the market risk is positive and significant for both bank
stocks and REITs return, however, the interest rate effect is not always significant. In
addition, the bank stock return is more sensitive to the market return during the economic
booming in year 2003-2006 than during the economic downturn in year 2007-2011, in which
the world economy suffered from the subprime and European debt crisis. The effect of real
estate returns on the bank stock  return distribution is the most interesting issue in the study.
The results indicate real estate factor has a significant impact on the bank return generating
process for all three countries. The positive coefficients of REITs represent that the
fluctuation of bank stock returns is moving in the same direction with REITs returns.
Moreover, US banks are most sensitive and closest related to REITs returns, followed by the
Japanese banks. The highest level of sensitivity is shown in US banks as expected since US
banks, as a leader, invest heavily in real estate properties and related products over the last
few decades with long established and matured REITs market. Meanwhile, the bank stock
return is most sensitive to real estate sector during 2003-2006 when the global economy is
booming. As for REITs returns, the general common factors are also influential to the REITs
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returns. The result indicates a clear co-movement between REITs returns and systematic
market risk for all countries. Interest rate risk has only significant and negative impact to
REIT returns over period 2003-2006 for US market, and all periods for Japanese market. The
negative sign of interest rate coefficients suggests perverse inflation behaviour of REITs, and
REITs generally perform well in hedging towards the changes in interest rate. Furthermore,
the long-memory of GARCH and short-memory of ARCH effects to returns are significant
for all periods in all countries except for first period 1999-2002 of US market. The ARCH and
GARCH effects of REITs returns are usually significant but weaker than the bank stock
returns. The cross-volatility spillover (ߛଵଶ) is significant and positive over all periods and
countries. This indicates there is a volatility spillover from real estate sector to financial
institutions, and the co-movement is in the same direction between banks and real estate
sector in all periods and countries. However, the level of significance varies with different
magnitudes depending on the periods and countries.
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CHAPTER FIVE
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF TWO-SIDED MARKET CROSS-SECTIONAL
VOLATILITY BASED ON ZERO-BETA CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters empirically examine the relationship between major risk factors exposed
by the financial institutions, particularly capital risk and real estate risk respectively. This chapter
examines the influence of cross-sectional market volatility on the portfolio returns by using
zero-beta ZCAPM model. We apply rolling-window Fama-MacBeth two-step procedure to
examine the return estimation process under four frameworks, CAPM, zero-beta CAPM,
Fama-French three-factor and four-factor models over the period from January 1964 to
December 2012. We apply the procedure on eight sets of portfolios in total which include a
combine of common stocks and, particularly, financial institution stocks.
This chapter contributes to the current range of literature in four ways. Firstly, it provides
further empirical evidences on the impact of positive and negative volatility on asset returns
by taking two-sided market volatility into consideration. We achieve this by specifying a
signal variable ܦ௜௧ to denote positive and negative market volatility by taking value 1 and -1
respectively. Secondly, we apply the ZCAPM particularly on the financial institution stocks
which have not been examined before. The results suggest the cross-sectional zeta risk is
highly related to the financial institution portfolios similar as shown in common stock
portfolios. Therefore, we have shown that the high significance of cross-sectional market
volatility on asset returns in ZCAPM does not depend on the chosen test asset returns which
overcome the problem of portfolio formation that is common to other asset pricing models.
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Thirdly, we extend our data range from January 1964 to December 2012 comparing with
previous studies which have a shorter period. Despite different data range, we still find the
cross-sectional market volatility is consistently significant at high level. The results show
that  the  ZCAPM  does  not  depend  on  the  period  of  the  sample.  Furthermore,  we  find
evidences that ZCAPM provides better expected stock returns than the well-known three-
and four-factor models. We see this result as market risk is composed of two components,
average market returns and cross-sectional market volatility. Therefore, the fund manager
can use zero-beta CAPM framework to better predict expected stock returns. We also use the
Fama-MacBeth rolling window framework for the combined common stock portfolios using
one-month ahead excess returns. These fitted one-month returns are compared to each
portfolio’s one-month ahead average actual excess returns under both Fama-French three-
factor and ZCAPM models. The results show models can fit average realized excess returns
to some extent. However, the average fitted excess returns from three-factor model bunch
up into a smaller range of values than that of average realized excess returns, and it is
expected that the Fama-French model has difficulty explaining small and growth portfolios
from literature. On the other hand, average fitted excess returns for the ZCAPM spread out
and fall fairly closely to average realized excess returns. Therefore, the results show that
ZCAPM significantly improve the expected returns. Thus, in order to access the influence of
market risk, we need to include both components in the analysis. The result also explains the
unexplained return behaviour from previous studies when only average market returns are
included. Therefore, we conclude that the cross-sectional market volatility is indeed a
significant market factor in explaining the cross-section of expected stock returns and
ZCAPM model can provide better estimation as an asset pricing model.
The rest of the chapter is set as following. We begin the study from the literature reviews on
capital asset pricing for current findings and theories of zero-beta ZCAPM from literature.
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We  follow  on  with  discussions  of  methodology  used  to  examine  the  ZCAPM  in  the
methodology section. In addition, we provide descriptive results of the data sample in
section data and descriptive statistics. We present the results with discussions in the
empirical results section. Finally, we provide a summary of results in the conclusion section.
5.2 LITERATURE REVIEWS ON CAPITAL ASSET PRICING
The beginning of modern portfolio theory can be dated back to the paper Markowitz (1952).
In his paper, he introduces the theory of frontier of investment portfolios, such that each of
them had the greatest possible expected rate of return for their given risk. The primary
impact of MPT is on portfolio management because it provides a framework for the
systematic selection of portfolios based on expected return and risk principles. Most
portfolio managers today are aware of, and use to various degrees, the basic principles of
MPT. Major mutual fund families employ the implication of MPT in managing their funds.
Financial advisors use the principles of MPT in advising their individual investor clients.
Many financial commentators use MPT terms in discussing the current investing
environment and so forth.51 Prior to the dissemination of portfolio theory into the real world,
argument on how the pricing of securities would be affected by using portfolio theory to
invest in the portfolios on the frontier has been discussed in a wide range of literature. In
order to address the issue, the Capital Asset Pricing Model was developed by Sharp (1964),
Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) almost simultaneously. This model has become widely
used in the real world to measure portfolio performance, value securities, make capital
budgeting decision, and even regulate public utilities. However, the model is later
questioned in Roll (1980) because he argues the model is impossible empirically to verify its
51 Charles P. Jones (2010) Chapter 7 Investments Principles and Concepts , 11th Edition John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Publisher, ISBN: 9780470553077
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single economic prediction. On the other hand, the Arbitrage Pricing Theory is being
developed by Ross (1976). This theory argues that expected return must be related to risk in
such way that no single investor could create unlimited wealth through arbitrage
From Sharp (1964)’s study, it shows the expected return depends on the risk free rate of
interest and market premium or risk premium. The formula is as following:
ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௜൯ = ௙ܴ + ߚ௜൫ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௠൯ − ௙ܴ൯ + ߳௜ 	 (24)
Where ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௜൯ is the expected return on the capital asset; ௙ܴ is the risk-free rate of interest
such  as  interest  arising  from government  bonds; ߚ௜ is the sensitivity of the expected excess
asset returns on the expected excess market returns,
ߚ௜ = ܥ݋ݒ	( ෨ܴ௜ ෨ܴ௠)ܸܽݎ( ෨ܴ௠) 		 (25)
ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௠൯ is the expected return of the market;ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௠൯ − ௙ܴ  is known as the market premium or
risk premium , which is the difference between the expected rate of return and the risk-free
rate of return.
A  number  of  simplifying  assumptions  lead  to  the  basic  version  of  the  CAPM,  the
fundamental idea is that individuals are as alike as possible, with notable exceptions of
initial wealth and risk aversion. The list of assumptions is generally used in deriving
equation (24) that describes the necessary conformity of investors follows52:
1. Investors cannot affect prices by their individual trades. This means that there are many
investors, each with an endowment of wealth that is small compared with the total
endowment of all investors. This assumption is analogous to the perfect competition
assumption of microeconomics.
52 Zvi Bodie, Alex Kane and Alan J. Marcus, Essentials of Investments 6th Edition, McGraw-Hill Publication, ISBN-
10 007-125445-5
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2. Investor form portfolios from a universe of publicly traded financial assets, such as stocks
and bonds. Investors may take a long or short position of any size in any assets, including
the riskless asset. Any investor may borrow or lend at any amount he wants at the riskless
rate of interest.
3. All investors attempt to construct efficient frontier portfolios; that is, investors choose
portfolios that maximize their expected end-of-period utility of wealth, and all investors
are risk averse. Every investor’s utility function on end-of-period wealth increases at a
decreasing rate as his wealth increases.
4. All investors analyse securities in the same way and share the same economic view of the
world. They have the same opinions about the possibilities of various end-of-period values
for all assets. Therefore, they have a common joint probability distribution for the returns
on the available assets. They all end with identical estimates of the probability distribution
of future cash flows from investing in the available securities. This means that given a set
of security prices and the risk-free interest rate, all investors use the same expected returns,
standard deviations, and correlations to generate the efficient frontier and the unique
optimal risky portfolio.
5. The common probability distribution describing the possible returns on the available
assets is joint normal or joint stable with a single characteristic exponent.  And all investors
plan for one identical holding period.
6. Investors pay neither taxes on returns nor transaction costs, e.g. commissions and service
charges. In such a simple world, investors will not care about the difference between
returns from capital gains and those from dividends.
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There are several challenges of CAPM53: The model assumes that the variance of returns is
an adequate measurement of risk. This would be implied by the assumption that returns are
normally distributed, or indeed are distributed in any two-parameter way, but for general
return distributions other risk measures will reflect the active and potential shareholders’
preferences more adequately. The model assumes that the probability beliefs of active and
potential shareholders match the true distribution of returns. A different possibility is those
active and potential shareholders’ expectations are biased, causing market prices to be
informationally inefficient. This possibility leads to a new study field of behavioural finance.
The market portfolio consists of all assets in all markets, where each asset is weighted by its
market capitalization. This assumes no preference between markets and assets for
individual active and potential shareholders, and they choose assets solely as a function of
their risk-return profile. The length of the period for which the model applies is not
specified. The assumptions of the model are only held if the period is taken to be
infinitesimal. For any finite period, the distribution of possible returns on an asset is likely to
be closer to lognormal than normal. In particular, if the distribution of returns is normal,
then there will be a finite probability that the asset will have negative value at the end of the
period.  The  market  portfolio  should  in  theory  include  all  types  of  assets  that  are  held  by
anyone as an investment, such as real estate and human capital etc. In reality, such a market
portfolio is unobservable, and people usually substitute a stock index as a proxy for the true
market portfolio. However, Ross (1977) shows that this substitution is not innocuous and
can lead to false inferences as to the validity of the CAPM. It is also noted that due to the
difficulty in the observability of true market portfolio, the CAPM may not be empirically
tested. One of the most restricted assumptions is the second assumption, in which an
investor  may  take  a  long  or  short  position  of  any  size  in  any  asset,  including  the  riskless
53 Zvi Bodie, Alex Kane and Alan J. Marcus, Essentials of Investments 6th Edition, McGraw-Hill Publication, ISBN-
10 007-125445-5
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asset,  and  any  investor  any  borrow  or  lend  any  amount  he  wants  at  the  riskless  rate  of
interest. It fact, borrowing and investing in the capital market has restrictions, and the
riskless asset may not be available. Therefore, the model would be changed substantially if
this assumption is dropped.
This model has become widely used in the real world to measure portfolio performance,
value securities, make capital budgeting decision, and even regulate public utilities.
However, the model was later questioned by many researchers such as Black (1972) and
Ross (1977) because of the restricted assumptions.  Merton (1972 and 1973) show  a
multivariable intertemporal CAPM model outperforms over traditional CAPM. Fama and
French (1993, 1995, 1996a and 1996b) also suggest more than market betas are needed to
explain expected stock returns, and they show a three-factor model is more suitable which
captures size and value factors developed from stocks. The work from Carhart (1997) further
proposes a four-factor model including size and value factors with a momentum factor.
In addition, the model also does not appear to explain adequately the variation in stock
returns. Empirical studies show that low beta stocks may offer higher returns than the
model would predict (Carhart 1997). The model assumes that given a certain expected
return, active and potential shareholders will prefer lower risk (lower variance) to higher
risk and conversely given a certain level of risk will prefer higher returns to lower ones. It
does not allow for active and potential shareholders who will accept lower returns for high
risk. Several early studies have suggested that the returns on securities do not behave like
the simple capital asset pricing model as predicted. The work by Black, Jensen and Scholes
in Black et al (1972) analyse the returns on portfolios of stocks at different levels of ߚ௜, and
reject the traditional CAPM. Black et al (1972) find that the average returns on these
portfolios are not consistent with original CAPM. Their estimates of the expected returns on
portfolios of stocks at low levels of ߚ௜ are consistently higher than predicted by CAPM, and
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their estimates of the expected returns on portfolios of stocks at high levels of ߚ௜  are
consistently lower than predicted by CAPM. They suggest a possible explanation for these
empirical results is that the assumption of CAPM which can access unlimited riskless asset
does not hold.  They continue to give a suggestion on the possible behaviour of the portfolio
in form of
෨ܴ௜ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜ ෨ܴ௠ + (1 − ߚ௜) ෨ܴ௭ + ߝ௜̃ 		 (26)
Where ෨ܴ௭  is the return on another factor that is independent of the market ෨ܴ௠ . ߝ௜̃  is
approximately mutually independent residuals. This model indicates that in periods when
෨ܴ௭ is positive, the low ߚ௜ portfolios should perform better than predicted by the traditional
CAPM. The high ߚ௜ portfolios have worse performance than predicted by CAPM. When ෨ܴ௭
is negative, low ߚ௜ portfolios behave worse than expected, and high ߚ௜ portfolios give better
performance. The finding of equation (26) leads to establishing a new CAPM model – zero-
beta CAPM (Black 1972).  We provide the derivation of the above zero-beta CAPM in
Appendix A. In order to derive zero-beta CAPM, we start by assuming investors can take
long or short positions of any size in any risky asset, but there is no riskless asset and that no
borrowing or lending at the riskless rate of interest is allowed. However, in reality, this
assumption is not valid since there is a restriction on shorting selling just as the restriction
on riskless  borrowing.  We later  introduce  the  riskless  asset  in  our  derivation,  and we find
that the introduction of riskless borrowing opportunities only changes the market
equilibrium  in  terms  of  portfolio  composition.  In  the  presence  of  riskless  assets,  there  are
two kinds of efficient portfolios. The more risky efficient portfolios continue to be mixtures
of portfolio ݉ and ݖ as when there is no riskless asset available. The expected return on
portfolio ݖ must now be greater than the return on the riskless asset. Therefore, we show
that the empirical results are consistent with an equilibrium in which there is restricted
borrowing at the riskless interest.
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We find that if there is a riskless asset, the slope of the line relating the expected return on a
risky asset to its beta must be smaller than it without riskless borrowing restriction. The
risky portion of every portfolio is a weighted combination of market portfolio and
minimum-variance zero-beta portfolio. The zero-beta portfolio has covariance with risky
asset ݅ proportional to 1 − ߚ௜ .  If  there  is  a  riskless  asset,  then  the  efficient  portfolios  that
contain  the  riskless  asset  are  all  weighted  combinations  of  the  riskless  asset  and  a  single
risky portfolio. The line relating the expected return on an efficient portfolio to its beta is
composed of two straight line segments, where the segment for the lower-risk portfolios has
a greater slope than the segment for the higher-risk portfolios. The above derivation is
consistent with the arguments in Shanken (1985 and 1986), in which they find the true
market portfolio can be constructed from any two efficient portfolios on the efficient
frontier.
The quantitative derivation of zero-beta CAPM has been studied from the previous work as
in Appendix A. In addition, there are many literatures such as Roll (1980) and Kandel (1986)
have geometrically derived the properties of zero-beta CAPM in return-variance space.
However, a new geometric approach has been studied in Liu et al (2012).  The Liu et al
(2012)’s approach begins with choosing any portfolio expected return ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௑൯ on the y-axis to
tangent points on the superior and inferior curves of the symmetric mean-variance parabola.
Liu et al (2012) conclude that these two tangent points on the parabola are the zero-beta
CAPM portfolios ܫ and ܼܫ. This geometric approach is presented in Appendix B. Following
from Roll (1980), in the return-variance space, we set the y-axis as expected return, and x-
axis as variance. The minimum-variance portfolio is the one with the smallest variance on
the efficiency frontier, and let denote this portfolio as ܩ. For any given market index ܫ on the
efficient frontier, a line extending from and passing through minimum variance portfolio ܩ
to the y-axis gives the expected return on the zero-beta index ܧ(ܼܫ෪). Using this expected
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return as a reference point, the portfolio ܼܫ can be located on the inferior part of the frontier.
There are infinite pairs of these minimum variance portfolios ܫ  and ܼܫ  which can be
identified in this way. Roll (1980) shows that the market portfolio can be replaced by any
market index that is an efficient portfolio. The uniqueness is true only when the market
index is mean-variance efficient. When the index is not efficient, there are zero-beta
portfolios at all levels of expected return.
The traditional CAPM and Black (1972) zero-beta CAPM both assume that investors have
homogeneous expectations about end-of-period asset values, and returns on all assets are
jointly normal and investors are risk-averse with expectations to maximize their expected
end-of-period wealth. However, there are some fundamental differences between these two
models. Unlike the three-moment CAPM of Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) and Friend and
Westerfield (1980), the ZCAPM focuses on cross-sectional rather than time-series market
volatility and more importantly, posit two-sided as opposed to one-side directional market
volatility effects. Literature has provided support for the zero-beta CAPM, such as Black
(1972), Gibbons (1982) and Jobson and Korkie (1982). Black et al (1972) reject the traditional
CAPM by examining the US stock returns in the period 1931-1961. They find that time series
regression of excess returns reveals that high or low beta stocks have significant negative or
positive intercepts, which supports the zero-beta CAPM. Stambaugh (1982) provides further
evidences of significant zero-beta parameter for US stocks.  However, no previous studies
have conducted cross-sectional tests of the zero-beta CAPM due to the inability to estimate
factor.
One of the differences is that zero-beta CAPM finds that the identification of the market
portfolio ܯ defined in the CAPM as the tangent portfolio with respect to a ray from the
riskless rate to the efficient frontier is not a necessary condition for examining the CAPM.
This is because the identification of any orthogonal pair of minimum-variance index
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portfolios ܫ and ܼܫ on the mean-variance parabola is sufficient. The real market portfolio is
the one consist of the weighted average of all individual portfolios on the market.
Furthermore, different from traditional CAPM, zero-beta CAPM allows both long and short
positions in assets to construct portfolios ܫ and ܼܫ.
There is extensive range of literature studying on market volatility, but few authors address
two-sided risk effects. French et al (1987) examine the relationship between stock returns
and stock market volatility and find evidence that the expected market risk premium is
positively related to the predictable volatility of stock returns. They also find evidences that
unexpected stock market returns are negatively related to the unexpected change in the
volatility of stock returns. Campbell and Hentschel (1992) also support the volatility relation
to stock returns by using modified GARCH. The results show that volatility feedback is
more important when volatility is high for US stock market in period 1926-1988. Estimated
volatility discounts on the stock market range from 1% in normal time to 13% after the stock
market crashes in 1987. However, volatility feedback has little effect on the unconditional
variance of stock returns. Furthermore, Brown et al (1988) find  that  following  news  of  a
dramatic financial event, both the risk and expected return of the affected companies
increase systematically, and the price reacts more significantly to bad news than good.
Haugen et al (1991) exhibit similar result that changes of expected returns to volatility
appears to be an asymmetry in the market’s reaction to volatility increase as opposed to
volatility decrease. Ang et al (2006) extend the literature by exploring the pricing of
aggregate volatility risk in the cross-section of stock returns. They find that stocks with high
sensitivities to innovations in aggregate volatility, VIX – Chicago Board Options Exchange
Market volatility index, have low average returns. Ang et al (2009) use a similar approach
across 23 developed markets, and the difference in average returns between the extreme
quintile portfolios sorted on idiosyncratic volatility is -1.31% per month after controlling for
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geographical, size, and value factors.  They also show that low returns earned by stock with
high idiosyncratic volatility around the world have strong covariance with the idiosyncratic
volatility effect in the United States, which makes diversification difficult.  However, none of
these literatures incorporates the two-sided risk effects into research. Ang et al (2006b) is
one of the few paper investigating the two-sided risk effects. The findings show investors
who place greater weight on the downside risk demand additional premium for holding
stocks with high sensitivities to downside market risk.
5.3 METHODOLOGY
From the derivation of zero-beta CAPM in Appendix B,  we find that It is almost impossible
to calculate the real values of ܣ, ܤ and ܥ with so many stocks in real practice. One problem is
that the empirical estimation of the covariance matrix ∑ is not well justified because its
elements are time-dependent unobservation quantities. Another issue is that for large
samples gathering sufficient observations to invert the covariance matrix is very difficult.
Since the matrices have large dimension, we can use random matrix theory as in Liu et al
(2012) which extracts their statistical properties. There are a few literatures have found that
the empirical data for US common stocks is closely related to the correlation structure of
stock prices predicted by random matrix theory. Laloux et al (1999) and Rosenow et al (2000)
find that the statistics of most of the eigenvalues in the spectrum of the correlation matrix of
the largest 1000 US stocks during year 1994-1995 agree with the predictions of random
matrix theory. They also demonstrate that the correlation matrix shares universal properties
with the Gaussian orthogonal ensemble of random matrices. The relationship found
between empirical random matrices and Gaussian orthogonal provide sfurther supporting
evidence on the random walk hypothesis in Fama (1965) and Malkiel (1973), except that Lo
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and Mackinlay (1988) have found the random walk model is rejected for US stocks during
1962-1985.
According  to  the  work  in Liu et al (2012), we apply random matrix theory to study the
asymptotic behaviour of ܣ, ܤ and ܥ for large sample of assets as following,
ܣ ≈ ቆ
ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௔൯
ߪ௔௩௘തതതതതത
ଶ + ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௔൯ߪఙଶቇ2݊ଷଶߨ 					 (27)
ܤ ≈ ቀܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௔൯
ଶ + ߪ௔ଶቁቆ 1ߪ௔௩௘തതതതതതଶ + ߪఙଶቇ2݊ଷଶߨ 				 (28)
ܥ ≈ ቆ
1
ߪ௔௩௘തതതതതത
ଶ + ߪఙଶቇ2݊ଷଶߨ 						 (29)
Where ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௔൯ is the average return of portfolio ܽ with ݊ assets, and ߪ௔ଶ  is the variance of
portfolio	ܽ	returns. ଵ
ఙೌೡ೐തതതതതതത
మ  and ߪఙଶ are mathematical terms from the derivation. In the limit for
an infinite large sample ݊ of assets,
ܣ
ܥ
≈ ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௔൯																					ඨ
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
ܥଶ
≈ ߪ௔ 					
(30)
Thus,
ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ∗൯ ≈ ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௔൯ + ߪ௔
ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ∗൯ ≈ ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௔൯ − ߪ௔ (31)
Since ஺
஼
  is the expected return of global minimum-variance portfolio ܩ, ܧ൫ ෨ܴீ൯. Therefore,
ܧ൫ ෨ܴீ൯ ≈ ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௔൯, which shows that  portfolio ܽ lies in the return-variance space with the axis
of symmetry at ܧ൫ ෨ܴீ൯ that splits the parabola into halves. The portfolio ܽ can also be market
portfolio ܯ, and the equal-weighted market return is not reasonable proxy as it represents
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an estimate of ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௔൯ or ܧ	൫ ෨ܴீ൯. The same problem arises if we use a value-weighted return
to construct portfolios as the standard deviations are both greater than ߪீ . The above
equations also show that the market volatility has two-sided, opposite effects in increasing
ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ∗൯ and decreasing ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ∗൯ from the average market return ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௔൯. It also simplifies the
computation in estimating ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ∗൯  and ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ∗൯  by only using the average return and
standard deviation of returns for the ݊ population assets in the market instead of covariance
matrix. Many researchers have studied in extending traditional CAPM. Kraus and
Litzenberger (1976) extend the capital asset pricing model to incorporate the effect of
skewness on in return distributions. In the later study, Friend and Westerfield (1980)
implement the same theory in Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) and incorporate bonds as well
as stocks into the analysis. They find that investors may pay a premium for positive
skewness in their portfolios.
When riskless assets exist in the market, there are three orthogonal assets ܫ∗,ܼܫ∗ and ݂. The
zero-beta CAPM from Appendix B derivation can be written as
ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௜൯ = ߱ூ∗ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ∗൯ + ߱௓ூ∗ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ∗൯ + ߱௜,௙ ௙ܴ
																																				= (߱ூ∗ + ߱௓ூ∗)ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௔൯ + (߱ூ∗ − ߱௓ூ∗)ߪ௔ + ߱௜,௙ ௙ܴ
Thus,
ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௜൯ − ௙ܴ = (߱ூ∗ + ߱௓ூ∗)ൣܧ൫ ෨ܴ௔൯ − ௙ܴ൧ + (߱ூ∗ − ߱௓ூ∗)ߪ௔
ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௜൯ − ௙ܴ = ߚ௜,௔ൣܧ൫ ෨ܴ௔൯ − ௙ܴ൧ + ܼ௜,௔ߪ௔ (32)
Investors can both long and short positions in these assets, but the sum of weights equals to
unity, ߱ூ∗ + ߱௓ூ∗ + ߱௜,௙ = 1. ߚ௜,௔ is beta risk measuring the sensitivity of the ݅ݐℎ asset excess
returns to average market excess returns, and the zeta risk coefficient ܼ௜,௔  measures the
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sensitivity of asset returns to market volatility. ߚ௜,௔ is used instead of ߚ௜,ெ  because it does not
measure the market beta associated with the market portfolio, but instead it is related to the
average return on the portfolio of ݊ assets in the market. The approach is consistent with the
study in Shanken (1985 and 1986) and Shanken and Weinstein (2006), in which they show
that the true market portfolio can be constructed from any two portfolios on the parabola.
The intuition of the two-factor zero-beta CAPM model is that the factors are multivariate
proxies for the unobservable equilibrium market portfolio.
5.3.1 PRELIMINARY TESTS OF TWO-SIDED MARKET VOLATILITY HYPOTHESIS
In order to test the existence of two-sided market volatility, we carry out the following
procedure based on equation (32):
Firstly, we run an OLS time-series regression of the market model using a value-weighted
stock market index to proxy the average return of assets in the market in month ݐ:
෨ܴ௜௧ − ௙ܴ௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜,௔൫ ෨ܴ௔௧ − ௙ܴ௧൯ + ߝ௜̃௧ (33)
Where error term ߝ௜̃௧ is i.i.d. normal and uncorrelated with the average market premium.
We then using the residual terms, we estimate the following OLS zeta risk model,
|ߝ௜̃௧| = ܾ௜ + ܼ௜,௔ߪ෤௔௧ + ߤ෤௜௧ (34)
Where the zeta risk parameter ܼ௜,௔ measures the sensitivity of the absolute value of asset ݅
market model residuals to market volatility over time, and error term ߤ෤௜௧ shares the same
properties as in equation (33). The absolute value of market model residual is used to
capture two-sided market volatility effects. Therefore, if the estimated zeta risk coefficient is
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significant, ZCAPM theory is supported. The term ߪ෤௔௧  represents a measure of market
volatility and the zeta risk coefficient ܼ௜,௔ captures its two-sided effect on excess returns.
5.3.2 TESTS FOR ZCAPM CROSS-SECTIONAL MARKET VOLATILITY
The ZCAPM equation (32) implies that there are two-sided market volatility effects on asset
returns. This means the expected returns on portfolios ܫ∗ and ܼܫ∗ are
ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ∗൯ − ௙ܴ௧ = ߚூ∗,௔ൣܧ൫ ෨ܴ௔൯ − ௙ܴ௧൧ + ܼூ∗,௔ߪ௔
ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ∗൯ − ௙ܴ௧ = ߚ௓ூ∗,௔ൣܧ൫ ෨ܴ௔൯ − ௙ܴ௧൧ − ܼூ∗,௔ߪ௔ (35)
Therefore, if ߪ௔ increases, the expected return on ܫ∗ will increase but the expected return on
ܼܫ∗ will decrease. In the ZCAPM, each period generates a different cross-sectional standard
deviation of asset returns and asset excess returns can be differently affected by changes in
the cross-sectional measure of market volatility. Liu et al (2012) propose an empirical
methodology that takes into account for the first time two-sided market volatility on asset
returns from period to period. For ݅ݐℎ asset, the general empirical ZCAPM model is,
෨ܴ௜௧ − ௙ܴ௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜,௔൫ ෨ܴ௔௧ − ௙ܴ௧൯ + ܼ௜,௔ܦ௜௧ߪ෤௔௧ + ݑ෤௜௧ (36)
Where ܦ௜௧ is unobserved indicator variable, taking value 1 with probability ݌௜ for positive
market volatility effect, and -1 with probability 1 − ݌௜ for negative market volatility effect.
The probability of unobserved ܦ௜௧ is calculated by Bayes’ rule.
 Let
݌̂௜௧ = ܲ൫ܦ௜௧ = 1ห ෨ܴ௜௧ ,ߠ௜ᇱ൯ (37)
Therefore, the expected ܦ௜௧ is
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ܦ෩௜௧ = ܧ൫ܦ௜௧ห ෨ܴ௜௧ ,ߠ௜ᇱ൯ = ܲ൫ܦ௜௧ = 1ห ෨ܴ௜௧ ,ߠ௜ᇱ൯ − ܲ൫ܦ௜௧ = −1ห ෨ܴ௜௧ ,ߠ௜ᇱ൯
= ݌̂௜௧ − (1 − ݌̂௜௧)										
= 2݌̂௜௧ − 1																					 (38)
The parameters in the empirical ZCAPM model in equation (36) can be denoted as ߠ௜ =(ߙ௜ ,ߚ௜,௔ ,ܼ௜,௔ ,ߪ௜ଶ,݌௜). If the signal variable ܦ௜௧ is observable, the first four parameters can be
estimated by running a least squares regression, and ݌௜ can be estimated by computing the
sample frequency ofܦ௜௧ taking value 1. However, since the signal variable ܦ௜௧ is the latent
variable that is unable to be observed, we can not use the least square regression for
empirical ZCAPM as normal. In order to make a valid inference, the latent variable
distribution should be integrated out from the complete data likelihood. Therefore, we need
to find other estimation methods which can take the unobserved latent variable into
account. One way to estimate the parameters including latent signal variable ܦ௜௧ is to use
expectation-maximization algorithm to compute the maximum likelihood estimate. EM
iterates between an expectation-step and maximization-step until the iteration reaches the
convergent point. The first step of EM algorithm is to calculate the conditional expectation of
the complete data log-likelihood given the observed data and the estimates of the parameter.
Then we maximize the conditional expectation obtained from the previous step until the
estimates converge to the maximum likelihood estimate. We outline the general procedure
of expectation-maximization algorithm in Appendix C.
Although we have achieved nice convergence properties of the estimation, it requires
extensive computation iterations. Therefore, we implement an alternative procedure that
requires less computational efforts to estimate the signal variable ܦ௜௧ with expected value2݌̂௜ − 1.
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(1) The first step is to estimate the CAPM model for sample period ݐ = 1, … ,ܶ. Initialize
the value of ܦ௜௧
(଴) as:
ܦ௜௧
(଴) = ቊ1; 										when	( ෨ܴ௜௧ − ௙ܴ௧) − ߚ௜,௔൫ ෨ܴ௔௧ − ௙ܴ௧൯ ≥ 0	
−1; 						when	( ෨ܴ௜௧ − ௙ܴ௧) − ߚ௜,௔൫ ෨ܴ௔௧ − ௙ܴ௧൯ ≤ 0 (39)
In this step, we firstly initiate the initial value of signal variable ܦ௜௧
(଴) based on the
sign of residual terms under CAPM model.
(2) We then used the estimated initial signal variable ܦ௜௧
(଴)  obtained from step (1) to
estimate the empirical ZCAPM:
෨ܴ௜௧ − ௙ܴ௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜,௔൫ ෨ܴ௔௧ − ௙ܴ௧൯ + ܼ௜,௔ܦ௜௧ߪ෤௔௧ + ݑ෤௜௧ (40)
In this step, we obtained an estimated coefficients ߚመ௜,௔ and መܼ௜,௔.
(3) We use the estimated coefficient ߚመ௜,௔ from step (2) to calculate the updated signal
variable ܦ௜௧. Let ݇ denotes the ݇’s iteration, and the signal variable ܦ௜௧
(௞) is defined as:
ܦ௜௧
(௞) = ቊ1; 										when	( ෨ܴ௜௧ − ௙ܴ௧) − ߚ௜,௔൫ ෨ܴ௔௧ − ௙ܴ௧൯ ≥ 0	
−1; 						when	( ෨ܴ௜௧ − ௙ܴ௧) − ߚ௜,௔൫ ෨ܴ௔௧ − ௙ܴ௧൯ ≤ 0 (41)
(4) We continue to repeat the step (2) and (3) until model converges to ܦ௜௧ value that will
not change. We conclude the convergence of the iteration is achieved at this stage.
This step minimizes the sum of the |ߙ௜ + ݑ෤௜௧ 	| conditional on the estimates of ߚ௜,௔ and
ܼ௜,௔. When convergence achieves, the corresponding estimated coefficients ߚመ௜,௔ and
መܼ௜,௔ are the final estimates we obtain. Liu et al (2012) find this alternative iteration
method gives almost identical average ܦ௜௧ to 2݌̂௜ − 1 obtained from EM algorithm,
with similar estimates of both ߚ௜,௔ and ܼ௜,௔.
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5.3.3 FAMA-MACBETH ROLLING WINDOW FRAMEWORK
In order to compare the effectiveness of ZCAPM estimation with other standard methods,
we compare the estimation results across four frameworks for each portfolio: CAPM market
model, zero-beta CAPM model, Fama and French three-factor model and four-factor model.
The Fama-MacBeth (1973) two-step procedure is used in all the estimations. This includes
two separate steps:
(1) The first step is carrying out time-series regressions of the respective factor model are
fitted using daily returns in a 6- and 12-month period rolling window to estimate
factor loadings. By rolling this process forward one month at a time, a set of
estimated factor loadings is obtained for subsequent out-of-sample period from
January 1964 to December 2012.
(2) Then in the second step, in the subsequent out-of-sample month, a cross-sectional
regression uses monthly excess returns in the out-of-sample month January 1964 to
December 2012 as the dependent variable and factor loadings from the first pass
regressions in the previous 6- and 12- month estimation period as independent
variables for the entire sample period. By rolling this process forward one month at a
time, a set of estimated factor prices of risk ߣመ௞ for the ݇ݐℎ factor are generated.
The procedures are rolled forward one month at a time to enable cross-sectional regressions
in each month from July 1964 to December 2012. We analyse the above four frameworks
across eight different sets of portfolios: (A) 25 size B/M sorted portfolios; (B) 49 industry
portfolios; (C) 25 beta-zeta sorted portfolios on all CRSP common stocks; (D) 25 size B/M
sorted and 49 industry portfolios; (E) 25 size B/M sorted plus 49 industry and 25 beta-zeta
sorted portfolios on all CRSP common stocks; (F) 4 financial institution industry sectors
portfolios; (G) 25 beta-zeta sorted portfolios on all CRSP financial Institution stocks; (H) 4
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financial institution industry sectors and 25 beta-zeta sorted portfolios on all CRSP financial
Institution stocks.
5.4 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We first provide an overlook of the descriptive feature of the data employed in the analysis.
We then provide preliminary evidences in favour of the ZCAPM hypothesized two-sided
market volatility effect. We later develop an empirical ZCAPM that takes into account two-
sided market volatility and comparing ZCAPM to market CAPM, three- and four-factor
asset pricing model.
We use S&P 500 index to proxy the general market return and use one-month Treasury bill
as the risk-free rate. Both data are obtained from the Centre for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP). We also obtained Fama-French size, value and momentum factors from Kenneth R.
French data library54. The size factor SMB is referred by small minus large firms' stock
returns; the value factor HML is referred by high B/M minus low B/M firms' stock returns;
the four-factor model is based on the three-factor model augmented with a momentum
factor MOM that is proxied by high past return minus low past return firms' stock returns.
Five different sets of US stock portfolios are employed from period January 1964 to
December 2012. For common stock portfolios, we use Fama and French 25 size and book-
equity/market-equity (B/M) sorted portfolios; and 49 industry portfolios. The monthly and
daily weighted average returns of both of the portfolios are obtained from Kenneth R.
French data library55. Another set of 25 common stock portfolios is created by sorting on all
CRSP stock’s estimated values of ߚ௜,௔ and ܼ௜,௔∗  in the empirical ZCAPM equation ( ෨ܴ௜௧ − ௙ܴ௧ =
54 Kenneth R. French data library: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
55 Kenneth R. French data library: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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ߚ௜,௔൫ ෨ܴ௔௧ − ௙ܴ௧൯ + ܼ௜,௔∗ ߪ෤௔௧ + ݑ෤௜௧). This is constructed by using daily data series common stocks
and financial institution stocks, and estimating the empirical ZCAPM for the six-month
period from July 1963 to December 1963. We include 1000 common stocks and 951 financial
institution stocks in our study, which have coverage of almost 75% to 78% of the total
market capitalisation. The stock returns are obtained from the Centre for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP). Estimated ߚ௜,௔ and ܼ௜,௔∗  parameters are used to sort the stocks into
portfolios, within each quintile rank of ߚ௜,௔ ,  quintile  ranks  of ܼ௜,௔∗  are formed. The value
weighted average returns on these portfolios are computed in the next month in January
1964. The process is repeated by rolling forward one month at a time to generate a series of
ߚ௜,௔-ܼ௜,௔∗  sorted portfolio returns from January 1964 to December 2012. For each individual
stock, we requires at least 50 months of return observations in each sample period, as well as
stock  price  more  than  $1.  To  proxy  for  the  market  return  and  risk  free  rate,  we  use  CRSP
value weighted return of all stocks and one-month Treasury bill. To proxy the market
volatility, we use cross-sectional standard deviation of assets return
ߪ෤௔௧ = ට ௡௡ିଵ∑ ܽ௜௧ିଵ( ෨ܴ௜௧ − ෨ܴ௔௧)ଶ௡௜ୀଵ , where ෨ܴ௔௧  is the value weighted market return for all
CRSP stocks; ܽ௜௧ିଵ is the weighted market value for asset ݅ in month ݐ − 1; and ෨ܴ௜௧ is the
return of asset ݅ in month ݐ. Liu et al (2012) show that although the cross-sectional standard
deviation of all assets return ߪ෤௔௧ is biased and consistent estimator of ߪ௔௧,  the magnitude of
the bias is a constant proportion of ߪ௔௧. Therefore we can use ߪ෤௔௧ as a reasonable proxy to the
market volatility. Alternatively, another option to represent the market volatility is using
implied volatility VIX index produced by Chicago Board Options Exchange Market as in
Ang et al. (2006). They find that VIX provides a good proxy of market volatility. However,
the VIX index only starts from year 1992, therefore, due to shorter data period compared
with ours, we will not use this VIX index to represent market volatility in our paper.
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In addition to the common stock portfolios, another two financial institution portfolios are
also included in our analysis. The financial institution stocks are chosen and obtained from
CRSP according to the SIC industry classification. The first set of financial institution
portfolios includes four portfolios: the first asset class is the banking institutions with SIC
code ranging from 6000 to 6199, including banks, saving institutions and credit unions etc;
The second asset class is insurance companies with SIC code ranging from 6300 to 6411; The
third portfolio is real estate financial companies with SIC code ranging from 6500 to 6611,
including real estate developers, agents and operators etc; The last asset category is financial
trading firm with SIC code ranging from 6200 to 6799, including security and commodity
traders and brokers, Investment trusts and investment holding companies etc. The second
set of financial institution portfolios is constructed in a similar way as in common stock ߚ௜,௔-
ܼ௜,௔∗  sorted portfolios. Instead of using all CRSP stocks returns, we use only financial
institutional stocks according to SIC classification of financial institutions from CRSP.
The descriptive data analysis is shown in the Table.14.  In the sample period, the average
monthly return on CRSP market stock return is 0.88 percent with standard deviation 4.49.
The average monthly risk free rate is 0.42 percent with a standard deviation of 0.24.  The
mean SMB and HML are 0.25 and 0.38 percent respectively. All of the above variables are
downloaded from Kenneth French website. The market volatility ߪ௔ is computed from all
CRSP stocks cross-sectional standard deviation of asset return
ߪ෤௔௧ = ට ௡௡ିଵ∑ ܽ௜௧ିଵ( ෨ܴ௜௧ − ෨ܴ௔௧)ଶ௡௜ୀଵ  as discussed before. The average market volatility is 6.65
percent per month. The mean we computed here is similar with those computed in the
literature.
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5.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.5.1 PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF TWO-SIDED MARKET VOLATILITY HYPOTHESIS
In order to test the presence of two-sided market volatility, we first run an OLS time-series
regression of the CAPM market model using a value-weighted stock market index to proxy
the average return of assets in the market in the month as shown in equation (33). We then
estimate OLS zeta risk model by using the residual terms from equation (33) as dependent
variable and market volatility as independent variable as in equation (34). The zeta risk
parameter ܼ௜,௔  measures the sensitivity of the absolute value of asset ݅  market model
residuals to market volatility over time, and error term ߤ෤௜௧ share the same properties as in
equation (33). The absolute value of market model residuals is used to capture two-sided
market volatility effects. Therefore, if the estimated zeta risk coefficient is significant,
ZCAPM theory is supported. The term ߪ෤௔௧ represents a measure of market volatility and the
zeta risk coefficient ܼ௜,௔ captures its two-sided effect on excess returns. We carried out a
preliminary test on the existence of two-sided market volatility by using monthly data on
five sets of portfolios from January 1964 to December 2012. The five portfolios are, Fama and
Table.14 Descriptive statistics for the period January 1964 to December 2012
R a R f SMB HML σ a
 Mean 0.88 0.42 0.25 0.38 6.65
 Median 1.21 0.41 0.07 0.38 6.18
 Maximum 16.61 1.35 22.00 13.84 23.42
 Minimum -22.64 0.00 -16.39 -12.60 3.23
 Std. Dev. 4.49 0.24 3.12 2.89 2.29
 Skewness -0.49 0.66 0.54 -0.00 2.53
 Kurtosis 4.88 4.17 8.51 5.48 13.38
 Jarque-Bera 113.23 78.62 783.36 152.72 3,311.16
The variables presentated in this table is monthly data in percentage terms. The variables are
defined as following: Ra  is the average market return which is value-weighted return of CRSP
market index;Rf is riskless rate which is one-month US Treasury bill return; σa is the market
volatility which is cross-sectional standard deviation of monthly value-weighted returns for all
CRSP common stocks; SMB is the size factor which is Fama-French small minus big firms'
stock returns; HML  is the value factor which is high B/M minus low B/M firms stock returns.
MOM  is momumtum factor which is Fama-French high past return stocks mnus low past
return stocks.
230
French’s 25 B/M sorted all industry portfolios, 49 industry portfolios, 25 ߚ௜,௔ and ܼ௜,௔∗  sorted
portfolios on all common stocks, and another two financial institutional specific portfolios.
One financial institutional portfolio includes four stock categories, banking, insurance, real
estate and trading and investment holding portfolios sorted by SIC classification, the other is
25 ߚ௜,௔ and ܼ௜,௔∗  sorted portfolios based on all financial institution stocks. We present the
result in the following Table.15. From the results, we can see all the estimated ߚ௜,௔ and ܼ௜,௔
are highly significant in all five portfolios at 1 percent level or less. The magnitude of the ܼ௜,௔
coefficient ranges between 0.1 and 1.0 across all five portfolios as shown in the previous
literature. This suggests that the sensitivity to market volatility differs considerably across
industries and that most portfolios are significantly exposed to zeta market volatility risk.
The average ܼ௜,௔ coefficient is 0.44, which shows the zeta risk accounts for residual stock
returns of approximately an average of 2.3 percent per month. The adjusted ܴଶ  values  for
the first CAPM model range from 0.38 to 0.71 and the adjusted ܴଶ  values for the second zeta
risk model are much smaller than those under CAPM model, which is between 0.06 and
0.16. This shows that the market volatility explains some portion of the absolute value of
market model residuals in all sets of portfolios.  We interpret this preliminary results as
evidences to support the ZCAPM’s proposition that market volatility has two-sided and
opposite effects on stock returns.
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5.5.2 RESULTS FOR ZCAPM CROSS-SECTIONAL MARKET VOLATILITY
In order to carry out cross-sectional tests of the empirical ZCAPM, we employ the Fama-
MacBeth (1973) two-step approach. From the literature, the General Method of Moments
(GMM) procedure is not adapted to a latent variable required in the iterative time-series
regression model. The Fama-MacBeth two-step approach has been used in many literatures.
The first pass time-series regressions are used to estimate the factor loadings, such as, ߚመ௜,௔
and መܼ௜,௔∗  by using daily returns in the 6- and 12- month period from July 1963 to December
1963 for the first factor loading. By rolling this process forward one month at a time, a set of
estimated factor loadings are obtained for subsequent out-of-sample period from January
1964 to December 2012. The second pass cross-sectional OLS regression uses monthly excess
returns in the out-of-sample month January 1964 to December 2012 as the dependent
variable and factor loadings from the first pass regressions in the previous 6- and 12- month
estimation period as independent variables for the period from July 1963 to June 2012. By
Rit – Rft = a i + βi.a (Rat – Rft) + εit                    (33)
|εit|= bi + Zi.a σat +μit                                      (34)
a i βi.a Adj. R2 (1) bi Zi,a Adj. R2 (2)
Portfolio I -0.01 1.07 0.71 -0.46 0.38 0.16
(-0.50) (193.72)*** (-9.32)*** (54.83)***
Portfolio II 0.09 1.05 0.49 0.14 0.48 0.10
(3.40)*** (168.46)*** (0.14)** (57.36)***
Portfolio III 0.70 0.97 0.53 -0.26 0.46 0.13
(20.93)*** (130.67)*** (-3.89)*** (48.25)***
Portfolio IV -0.01 1.12 0.59 -0.54 0.51 0.16
(-0.20) (59.41)*** (-3.20)*** (21.27)***
Portfolio V 0.25 0.85 0.38 0.80 0.38 0.06
(5.43)*** (86.99)*** (8.17)*** (28.87)***
*** 1% significant level
** 5% significant level
* 10% significant level
Portolio I is French’s 25 B/M sorted all industry portfolios; Portfolio II  is 49 industry portfolios; Portfolio III is 25
beta-zeta sorted all common stocks portfolios; Portfolio IV is the 4 sectors financial institution portfolios; Portfolio
V is 25 beta-zeta sorted financial institutional stocks portfolios.
We first run an OLS time-series regression of the CAPM market model shown in equation (33); we then estimate
OLS zeta risk model of the residual terms and market volatility shown in equation (34):
This table reports the preliminary test on the existence of two-sided market volatility. The Ra - Rf is the monthly
value-weighted market excess return, where Ra  is the monthly value-weighted market return and Rf  is the risk-
free rate presented as one-month Treasury bill. σa  is the market volatility which is the cross-sectional standard
deviation of monthly value-weighted returns for all CRSP common stocks.
Table.15 Preliminary ZCAPM existence results  for the period January 1964 to December 2012
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repeating this process forward one month at a time, a set of estimated factor prices of risk ߣመ௞
for the ݇ݐℎ factor are generated for 589 months from January 1964 to December 2012. In
order to evaluate the performance of the empirical ZCAPM with the CRSP value-weighted
index as the market factor, we conduct the same Fama-MacBeth (1973) two-step approach
procedure for CAPM market model, Fama and French three-factor model, and a four-factor
model with additional momentum factor. The factor series for SMB, HML and MOM are all
obtained from Kenneth French website.
5.5.2.1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS UNDER 6-MONTH ROLLING WINDOW
We first conduct the cross-sectional empirical Fama-MacBeth (1973) two-step approach
under the 6-month rolling windows in the first pass regressions. The results are shown in
the Table.16 below. The market factor ܯ is proxied with the CRSP value-weighted index;
the volatility ܸ factor is proxied by the cross-sectional standard deviation of CRSP stocks'
returns; the size factor SMB is referred by small minus large firms' stock returns; the value
factor  HML  is  referred  by  high  B/M  minus  low  B/M  firms'  stock  returns;  the  four-factor
model is based on the three-factor model augmented with a momentum factor MOM which
is proxied by high past return minus low past firm stock return. The riskless rate is proxied
with one-month Treasury bill yield. We analyse the above frameworks across eight different
sets of portfolios: (Panel A) 25 size B/M sorted portfolios; (Panel B) 49 industry portfolios;
(Panel C) 25 beta-zeta sorted portfolios on all CRSP common stocks; (Panel D) 25 size B/M
sorted and 49 industry portfolios; (Panel E) 25 size B/M sorted plus 49 industry and 25 beta-
zeta sorted portfolios on all CRSP common stocks; (Panel F) 4 financial institution industry
sectors portfolios; (Panel G) 25 beta-zeta sorted portfolios on all CRSP financial Institution
stocks; (Panel H)  4 financial institution industry sectors and 25 beta-zeta sorted portfolios
on all CRSP financial Institution stocks.
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From the Table.16 results, we notice that all the estimated market volatility ߣመ௏  are
significant, and particularly, most of them are consistently priced at 1 percent level. No other
factor is consistently priced in these test assets. Under Panel A using the 25 size B/M sorted
portfolios, the cross-sectional market volatility coefficient is 5.04 and significant at 1 percent
level. Among all four frameworks in Panel A, excess market return is not significant.
Although the rest of the excess markets return coefficients are not significantly priced, the
estimated coefficients are a mix of positive and negative. The coefficients of size factor SMB
under Fama-French three- and four-factor are both positive and significant at 1 percent level.
The coefficients of value and momentum factor HML and MOM are not significant in either
of the models under Panel A. The results in Panel B with 49 industry portfolios share similar
behaviour as those under 25 size B/M sorted portfolios. The cross-sectional market volatility
coefficient is still significant at 1 percent level, although the magnitude of the coefficient
(1.51) is smaller than 25 size B/M sorted portfolios. Similar as in Panel A, the excess market
return coefficient is not significant in under any of the frameworks. However, different from
in Panel A, all the excess market return coefficients are positive in Panel B. This shows the 49
industry portfolio sets are more positively related to the general market movement. The size
factor SMB is not significant in either three- or four-factor model, with negative coefficient -
0.06 in three-factor model and positive coefficient 0.07 in four-factor model. Similar
behaviour is shown for value HML factor, which is not significant in either of Fama-French
three- and four- factor model. However, unlike in Panel A where momentum factors are is
significant, MOM is significant in four-factor model at 10 percent level only. The momentum
coefficient MOM is positive 0.17. We then move to look at the results by using the
constructed 25 ߚ௜,௔-ܼ௜,௔∗  sorted portfolios on all common CSRP stocks. All coefficients under
Panel C show more significant results than in previous portfolios. Excess market return
coefficients in Panel C are all positively significant at 1 percent significant level. The
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magnitudes of the excess market return coefficient range from 0.37 to 0.46, which are higher
than the market coefficients in Panel B in general. This shows the 25 ߚ௜,௔ -ܼ௜,௔∗  sorted
portfolios on all common CSRP stocks are more influenced by the market movement than
the market influence on 49 industry sorted portfolios. Market cross-sectional volatility
coefficient is positive 0.08, which is lower than that in Panel A and B. This observation
shows that the 25 ߚ௜,௔-ܼ௜,௔∗  sorted portfolios on all common CSRP stocks are less exposed to
the market volatility. All the Fama-French size, value and momentum factors are significant
at 1 percent level, except for MOM that is not significant. Size factor SMB is positive and
both value and momentum factors HML and MOM are negatively related to the Panel C
portfolio returns. The size factor SMB shares similar positive significant impact on the
portfolio returns in Panel C as in Panel A. The negative significance of value factor is
consistent with the Panel B 49 industry portfolio returns. On the other hand, the momentum
factor MOM has a positive impact on the Panel C portfolio return, similar with the result
shown in Panel B. In the next two Panel D and Panel E portfolios, we combine the portfolios
sets of previous Panel A to Panel C portfolios together and we expect the combined portfolio
sets have combined mixed behaviour. In Panel D, we examine the portfolio returns
combining 25 size B/M sorted portfolios with 49 industry portfolios, resulting in a 74
portfolio  sets  of  returns  in  Panel  D.  The  results  of  Panel  D  shown  in Table.16 show our
expected behaviour, in which the coefficients show a mixed of behaviours when testing
Panel A and Panel B individually. As in Panel A and B, the excess market return coefficient
is not significant in any model, and the magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than that in
Panel B and larger than in Pane A. The market cross-sectional volatility factor is still
positively significant, and the magnitude (1.71) is in between of 5.04 from Panel A and 1.51
from Panel B. We can explain this as after combining the portfolio sets, the cross-sectional
market volatility still has influence on the combined portfolio returns. The size, value and
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momentum factors are only significant in the four-factor model. The coefficient of SMB and
MOM are positive 0.12 and 0.16 respectively as shown in Panel B, whereas the value factor
HML is negative -0.06 similar with that in Panel B as well. We noticed that the results of the
combined portfolios Panel D share more similar behaviour with Panel B rather than with
Panel A. We interpret this as that 49 out of 74 portfolio sets in Panel D are industry
portfolios in Panel B, which takes 66% of the total Panel D portfolio returns. Therefore, the
results in Panel D are more influenced by the behaviours of 49 industry portfolios presented
in Panel B. We propose the question on how the results will behave if the size of portfolio
sets difference is diluted by introducing another portfolio. We combine all the portfolios sets
from Panel A, B and C together to form a portfolio of 94 return sets. The results of the pooled
portfolios set are shown in Panel E. The coefficients of the excess market returns are all
positively significant, which shows the movement of returns of pooled portfolios is in the
same direction with the general market returns. The result is in line with our expectation as
when the number of return sets increases, we include a greater proportion of market stocks
into our portfolio; therefore, the behaviour of larger sample of stocks represents more
resemble the general market behaviour. The cross-sectional market volatility in Panel E is
still highly significant with coefficient 0.93, which is lower than individual result from either
of the Panel A to Panel C. The size coefficient SMB is not significant in four-factor model as
in Panel D, with much lower coefficient of 0.02. The value factor HML is significant for four-
factor model and the coefficient is negative as shown in Panel D. Similarly, the momentum
factor MOM is still significant in pooled portfolio Panel E, and the coefficient is positive.
From the results of Panel E, the weighting influence of 49 industry portfolios is significantly
diluted, and the results show a mixture of behaviours.
Apart from common stock portfolios, we also study the zero-beta CAPM behaviour when
we use financial institution stocks and portfolios to see whether the cross-sectional market
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volatility has a similar effect on the financial institution portfolios as in general common
stock portfolios. The first portfolio (Panel F) we use in our test is the 4 return sets which are
categorized according to the Standard Industry Code. The four financial institutional
categories employed in this paper are banking, insurance, real estate and trading related
sectors. Similar with the common stock portfolios, the cross-sectional volatility is still
positively significant at 1 percent level related to financial institution portfolio return in
Panel F. However, the magnitude of the coefficient is 2.59, which is higher than the cross-
sectional market volatility in Panel B. The result suggests that financial institution portfolios
returns are more extensively exposed to the cross-sectional market volatility than the overall
general market. The Fama-French size factor SMB is not significant in either model. The
value factor HML and momentum MOM factor are significant in four-factor model, with
coefficient 0.61 and 1.23 respectively. However, despite the insignificance, all Fama-French
factors are positive.  In order to compare the behaviour of financial institutions results more
closely with the general common stocks, we also construct a 25 ߚ௜,௔-ܼ௜,௔∗  sorted portfolios on
financial institution stocks only in Panel G and try to compare the like-to-like with results in
Panel C which is 25 ߚ௜,௔-ܼ௜,௔∗  sorted portfolios on common stocks. Almost all explanatory
factors show  significance in Panel G compared with other financial institution portfolios
Panel F to H. This observation is consistent with all common stock portfolios in Panel A to E
where the Panel C 25 ߚ௜,௔-ܼ௜,௔∗  sorted portfolios on all common stocks show the strongest
significance among all the other portfolios sets. Excess market returns in Panel G are all
significant and positive. If we revisit the market coefficient in Panel C, we can notice that the
market return is more significant for beta-zeta sorted portfolios in ZCAPM model, although
some of them are only significant at 5 percent level while others are significant at 1
significant level. This shows that the beta-zeta sorted portfolios are more closely related to
the general market movement. The cross-sectional market return volatility in ZCAPM is
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positively significant as usual, however, the magnitude of the coefficient is 0.26 which is less
than that in Panel C on all common stock beta-zeta portfolios at only 5 percent significant
level. This suggests that the financial institution portfolios are less influenced by the market
volatility than the general common stock portfolios. The Fama-French factors SMB and HML
are also seen as non-significant in both three- and four-factor models. However, the
momentum factor MOM is highly significant at 1 percent level with positive coefficient 0.67.
We then pool the two financial institution portfolios together to obtain a pooled portfolio set
with 29 asset returns in Panel H. The pooled portfolio results are weakened by the portfolio
including four sectors financial institution returns compared with the results in Panel G. The
excess market return is significant in all models with positive coefficients. As expected the
cross sectional market volatility is significant at 5 percent significant level with positive
coefficient 0.21. The results of Fama-French factors under Panel H show the similar
behaviour as in Panel G. Both SMB and HML Fama-French factors are not significant, but
momentum factor MOM is highly significant at 1 percent level with positive coefficient 0.75.
The magnitudes of coefficients are larger than Panel G results but less than those in Panel F.
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Panel A: 25 Fama-French Size B/M Sorted Portfolios
Model α λM λV λSMB λHML  λMOM Adj. R2
CAPM 0.44 0.03 0.71
(2.65)*** (0.18)
ZCAPM 0.33 0.14 5.04 0.80
(1.96)** (0.80) (4.42)***
Three-factor 0.65 -0.40 0.33 0.17 0.73
(2.06)** (-1.27) (3.30)*** (1.45)
Four-Factor 0.62 -0.37 0.34 0.17 0.03 0.65
(1.90)* (-1.14) (3.39)*** (1.46) (0.11)
Panel B: 49 Industry Portfolios
CAPM 0.43 0.14 0.10
(3.76)*** (1.34)
ZCAPM 0.53 0.06 1.51 0.25
(4.84)*** (0.67) (3.61)***
Three-factor 0.46 0.12 -0.06 0.07 0.08
(3.39)*** (0.91) (-0.71) (1.18)
Four-Factor 0.47 0.08 0.07 -0.09 0.17 0.00
(3.34)*** (0.58) (0.84) (-1.29) (1.87)*
Panel C: 25 Beta-Zeta Sorted All Common Stocks Portfolios
CAPM 0.61 0.43 0.25
(5.51)*** (4.19)***
ZCAPM 0.66 0.37 0.08 0.28
(6.09)*** (3.80)*** (3.18)***
Three-factor 0.65 0.41 0.47 -0.38 0.31
(4.77)*** (3.14)*** (3.57)*** (-3.62)***
Four-Factor 0.60 0.46 0.55 -0.43 0.21 0.56
(4.10)*** (3.19)*** (4.05)*** (-3.93)*** (1.56)
Panel D: 25 Size B/M Sorted Plus 49 Industry Portfolios
CAPM 0.41 0.13 0.30
(4.42)*** (1.47)
ZCAPM 0.46 0.10 1.71 0.28
(5.13)*** (1.15) (4.56)***
Three-factor 0.46 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.10
(3.88) (0.44) (0.61) (1.11)
Four-Factor 0.47 0.02 0.12 -0.06 0.16 0.15
(3.79)*** (0.23) (1.92)* (-1.13) (1.88)*
Table.16 Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression results for factors in pricing common stocks in the
period January 1964 to December 2012 for 6-month rolling windows
This table reports the price of risk estimates under four frameworks: CAPM market model, the empirical ZCAPM
model, Fama and French three-factor model and four-factor model. The market factor M  is proxied with the
CRSP value-weighted index; the volatility V  factor is proxied by the cross=sectional standard deviation of CRSP
stocks' returns; the size factor SMB is referred by small minus large firms' stock returns; the value factor HML
is referred by high B/M minus low B/M firms' stock returns; the four-factor model based on the three-factor model
augmented with a momentum factor MOM  which is proxied by high past return minus low past return firms'
stock returns. The riskless rate is proxied with one-month Treasury bill yield. The Fama-MacBeth (1973) two-
step procedure is used in all the estimations. The first step is carrying out time-series regressions of the
respective factor model are fitted using daily returns in a 6-month period rolling window to estimate factor
loadings; Then in the second step, in the subsequent out-of-sample month, a cross-sectional regression is run to
estimate the out-of-sample factor prices of risk λ  for each factor. The procedures are rolled forward one month at
a time to enable cross-sectional regressions in each month from January 1964 to December 2012. We analyse
the above four frameworks across eight different sets of portfolios: (A) 25 size B/M sorted portfolios; (B) 49
industry portfolios; (C) 25 beta-zeta sorted portfolios on all CRSP common stocks; (D) 25 size B/M sorted and
49 industry portfolios; (E) 25 size B/M sorted plus 49 industry and 25 beta-zeta sorted portfolios on all CRSP
common stocks; (F) 4 financial institution industry sectors portfolios; (G) 25 beta-zeta sorted portfolios on all
CRSP financial Institution stocks; (H) 4 financial institution industry sectors and 25 beta-zeta sorted portfolios on
all CRSP financial Institution stocks.
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Table.16 Continue
Panel E: 25 Size B/M Sorted , 49 Industry Plus 25 Beta-Zeta Sorted All Stocks Portfolios
CAPM 0.42 0.24 0.22
(5.81)*** (3.55)***
ZCAPM 0.47 0.20 0.93 0.29
(6.70)*** (3.05)*** (3.23)***
Three-factor 0.45 0.22 -0.05 -0.03 0.12
(4.99)*** (2.49)** (-1.04) (-0.61)
Four-Factor 0.48 0.18 0.02 -0.14 0.17 0.26
(4.94)*** (1.98)** (0.35) (-2.83)*** (2.35)**
Panel F: 4 Financial Institution Industry Portfolios
CAPM 0.16 0.33 0.27
(0.41) (0.84)
ZCAPM 0.19 0.34 2.59 0.40
(0.48) (0.87) (3.03)***
Three-factor -0.12 0.54 0.02 0.10 0.11
(-0.24) (1.10) (0.06) (0.32)
Four-Factor -0.47 0.65 0.41 0.61 1.23 0.06
(-0.82) (1.25) (1.20) (1.77)* (2.86)***
Panel G: 25 Beta-Zeta Sorted Financial Institution Stocks Portfolios
CAPM 0.41 0.27 0.27
(3.98)*** (2.32)**
ZCAPM 0.40 0.25 0.26 0.51
(3.94)*** (2.33)** (2.64)**
Three-factor 0.27 0.38 0.07 -0.06 0.32
(2.17)** (2.91)*** (0.52) (-0.48)
Four-Factor 0.24 0.36 0.14 0.08 0.67 0.43
(1.91)* (2.70)*** (1.01) (0.65) (4.09)***
Panel H: 4 Financial Industry Plus 25 Beta-Zeta Sorted Financial Institution Stocks Portfolios
CAPM 0.39 0.25 0.22
(3.94)*** (2.27)**
ZCAPM 0.39 0.23 0.21 0.31
(3.90)*** (2.29)** (2.52)**
Three-factor 0.25 0.36 0.05 -0.02 0.17
(2.08)** (2.85)*** (0.44) (-0.22)
Four-Factor 0.20 0.33 0.17 0.16 0.75 0.18
(1.62) (2.65)*** (1.31) (1.34) (4.86)***
*** 1% significant level
** 5% significant level
* 10% significant level
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5.5.2.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS UNDER 12-MONTH ROLLING WINDOW
In order to compare whether the size of the rolling window has effect on the cross-sectional
regression results, we conduct the same Fama and MacBeth two-step approach with one-
month ahead returns by using 12-month rolling windows in the first pass regression, and
the results are shown in Table.17. We first notice that the cross-sectional market volatility is
still consistently priced at 1 percent significant level in all portfolios panels, and the results
appear to be stronger than the 6-month regression results with higher factor prices and
significance level. In Panel A, the excess market return is significant under all models except
for  ZCAPM.  If  we  compare  with  the  6-month  rolling  windows  results,  the  excess  market
return has more significant t statistics under 12-month rolling windows than the 6-month
rolling windows. However, all significant results show negative estimated market return
coefficients under 12-month rolling window, while, in 6-month rolling window, only Fama-
French three- and four-factor models give negative coefficients. The cross-sectional market
volatility factor is also significant at 5 percent level with positive coefficient 2.60. The results
of  Fama-French  factors,  when using  12-month  rolling  windows,  show similar  results  as  in
Table.16, in which only size factor SMB is significant under both three- and four-factor
models.  We  then  look  at  the  results  under  Panel  B  for  49  industry  portfolios.  The  excess
market return is not significant under any model. The cross-sectional market volatility is still
highly significant with coefficient 2.27. The magnitude of cross-sectional volatility is lower
than  that  in  Panel  A,  and  this  has  the  same  trend  as  the  results  in  the  6-month  rolling
windows. We noticed that, in Panel B, none of the Fama-French factor is significant, whereas
the momentum factor MOM is significant in the four-factor model under 6-month rolling
windows. The results of using 49 industry portfolios are generally weaker under all models
in Table.17 as  in Table.16. We also test the constructed ߚ௜,௔-ܼ௜,௔∗  sorted portfolios on all
common stocks by using 12-month rolling windows. The results of 12-month rolling
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window share similar behaviour as in 6-month rolling windows, and the Panel C results
shows the strongest result in terms of significance of coefficients. The excess market returns
of ߚ௜,௔-ܼ௜,௔∗  sorted portfolios are all positively significant at 1 percent significant level with
coefficient between 0.34 and 0.46. The cross-sectional market volatility is 1.45 and significant
at 5 percent level. The magnitude of the coefficient is lower than that in size B/M sorted
portfolio but larger than that when using 49 industry portfolios. Both size factor SMB and
value factor HML are highly significant under three- and four-factor models. The size factor
SMB coefficients are positive 0.47 and 0.55, and value factor HML coefficients are negative -
0.38 and -0.43 respectively. Similar as in 6-month rolling windows, the momentum factor
MOM is positive and significant at 1 percent level and the coefficient is positive 0.21. As
before, the Panel D consists of portfolios sets of 25 size B/M sorted portfolios and 49
industry portfolios. From the results from 6-month rolling window, we expect the results in
Panel D is a mixed behaviour of Panel A and Panel B, with a stronger influence from the
results  of  Panel  B  as  two  thirds  of  the  portfolio  sets  within  Panel  D  is  from  Panel  B
portfolios.  As  we  expected,  the  results  shown  in  Panel  D  in Table.17 experience similar
trends as in Panel B. Excess market return coefficient is not significant under any
framework, however, the coefficients are all negative.  The cross-sectional volatility factor is
highly significant under ZCAPM at 1 percent level with magnitude of 2.11. No other factors
are significant in any other frameworks. The coefficient of the cross-sectional volatility is
lower than 2.60 in Panel A and 2.27 in Panel B. The pooled 99 portfolios set is also analysed
in Panel E. We notice that except for the cross-sectional market volatility factor, all other
factors show slightly weaker results in 12-month rolling windows than those in 6-month
rolling windows framework. In 12-month rolling windows, the excess market return factor
is significant in CAPM and ZCAPM models, with coefficient 0.14 and 0.13 at 10 percent
significant level in CAPM and ZCAPM. The estimated cross-sectional volatility coefficient is
0.92 at 5 percent significant level. Fama-French size factor SMB does not show significant
242
feature in either three- or four-factor model as in Panel A or Panel C. Furthermore, the value
factor HML is negatively significant in Fama-French four-factor models with coefficient -0.12
and this result is same with Panel C under 12-month rolling window and Panel E results
under 6-month rolling windows. The momentum factor MOM is significant at 10 percent
level with coefficient 0.15
Moreover, we continue to examine on whether the change in the rolling window periods has
impact on the cross-sectional market volatility on the financial institution portfolios as in
general common stock portfolios. In Panel F, we still use the 4 financial industry portfolios
returns. Similarly as under 6-month rolling window, the excess market return factor is not
significant in any model. The cross-sectional market volatility factor is significant with a
positive coefficient of 7.49 at 1 percent significant level. This shows, as usual, the financial
institution portfolio is also influenced by the overall market volatility. The Fama-French
factors are only significant in four-factor model, with estimated value factor coefficient 0.79
and estimated momentum coefficient 1.16 at 5 percent significant level. We also construct
the 25 ߚ௜,௔-ܼ௜,௔∗  sorted portfolios on financial institutional stocks as in Panel G. The results in
Panel G show stronger behaviour than in Panel F, and they are also similar with those using
previous 6-month rolling windows. Excess market returns coefficients are positively
significant in all models. The market cross-sectional return has a positive coefficient of 2.24
at 1 percent significant level. Size factor SMB is significant under both three- and four-factor
models, and the momentum factor MOM is also positively significant (0.66) at 1 percent
significant level in four-factor model. Both coefficients are positive. The value factor HML is
still not significant in either model; however, the coefficient is positive 0.01 in three-factor
model, and 0.11 in four-factor model. We also combine the four financial industry asset
returns and the 25 ߚ௜,௔-ܼ௜,௔∗  sorted asset returns on financial institutional stocks to create a
pooled financial institution 29 returns sets portfolio in Panel H. The results experience
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similar behaviour as in Panel G, with significant positive excess market return in Fama-
French three- and four-factor models. It shows positive market volatility factor of 0.83 at 10
percent significant level, and positive significant coefficients on size factor SMB and
momentum factor MOM. The resemble results of Panel H with Panel G are not surprising as
the trend is the same when we using 6-month rolling window since 25 out of 29 asset returns
in Panel H is the 25 ߚ௜,௔-ܼ௜,௔∗  sorted portfolios on financial institutional stocks. In conclusion,
the results of coefficients in any panel are consistent no matter which rolling window is
used. However, we can see the results of cross-sectional market volatility show stronger
behaviour when using 12-month rolling windows, while other factors do not have a
significant difference under 6- and 12-month rolling window.
The obtained estimated coefficients under both 6-month and 12-month can be used to
compare predicted realized excess returns versus actual excess returns of test assets. Liu et
al (2012) review  the  results  for  the  common  stock  combined  portfolio  including  25  B/M
sorted and 49 industrial portfolios. As discussed before in Fama-MacBeth rolling window
framework, using 6-month and 12-month first pass time-series regression with daily returns
to estimate factor loadings, cross-sectional three-factor and ZCAPM models are estimated
for the combined common stock portfolios using one-month ahead excess returns. Similarly
this process is rolling forward one month at a time to generate cross-sectional regressions,
the average of the estimated factor price of risk and the average estimated loading factors
are used to compute average fitted expected excess returns in the next month for each
portfolio. These fitted one-month returns are compared to each portfolio’s one-month ahead
average actual excess returns under both Fama-French three-factor and ZCAPM models. We
compare the predicted realized excess returns versus actual excess returns for the 74
combined common stock portfolios, which are exogenous portfolios not constructed from
the ZCAPM. The results show models can fit average realized excess returns to some extent.
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However, the average fitted excess returns from three-factor model bunch up into a smaller
range of values than that of average realized excess returns.  From previous literature, it is
well-known that the Fama-French model has difficulty explaining small and growth
portfolios (Fama and French 1996). On the other hand, average fitted excess returns for the
ZCAPM spread out and fall fairly closely to average realized excess returns. Therefore, the
results show that ZCAPM significantly improve the expected returns, represented as
average predicted returns in the month ahead. It is also noted that Fama-French three-factor
model can not predicted exogenous industry portfolio returns (Daniel and Titman 2012).
Therefore, the major advantages of zero-beta CAPM in this chapter is that it can provide
better prediction on portfolio expected returns than other traditional asset pricing model.
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Panel A: 25 Fama-French Size B/M Sorted Portfolios
Model α λM λV λSMB λHML  λMOM Adj. R2
CAPM 0.78 -0.34 0.80
(2.65)*** (-1.86)*
ZCAPM 0.68 -0.24 2.60 0.82
(3.74)*** (-1.28) (2.25)**
Three-factor 1.03 -0.76 0.29 0.18 0.69
(2.94)*** (-2.19)** (2.88)** (1.56)
Four-Factor 0.90 -0.64 0.30 0.16 0.06 0.68
(2.49)** (-1.76)* (2.95)*** (1.37) (0.15)
Panel B: 49 Industry Portfolios
CAPM 0.56 0.01 0.19
(4.63)*** (0.13)
ZCAPM 0.61 0.01 2.27 0.21
(5.11)*** (0.13) (4.27)***
Three-factor 0.64 -0.05 -0.09 0.11 0.06
(4.32)*** (-0.35) (-0.95) (1.56)
Four-Factor 0.68 -0.11 0.02 -0.05 0.15 0.01
(4.26)*** (-0.71) (0.27) (-0.64) (1.36)*
Panel C: 25 Beta-Zeta Sorted All Common Stocks Portfolios
CAPM 0.57 0.44 0.33
(4.93)*** (4.06)***
ZCAPM 0.63 0.34 1.45 0.26
(6.09)*** (3.27)*** (2.17)**
Three-factor 0.67 0.42 0.43 -0.33 0.35
(4.33)*** (3.12)*** (3.42)*** (-3.52)***
Four-Factor 0.62 0.45 0.55 -0.44 0.23 0.62
(4.12)*** (3.09)*** (4.02)*** (-3.63)*** (1.57)
Panel D: 25 Size B/M Sorted Plus 49 Industry Portfolios
CAPM 0.58 -0.04 0.27
(5.93)*** (-0.46)
ZCAPM 0.57 -0.01 2.11 0.35
(5.92)*** (-0.11) (4.54)***
Three-factor 0.67 -0.14 0.01 0.09 0.13
(5.09)*** (-1.13) (0.22) (1.48)
Four-Factor 0.69 -0.17 0.08 -0.03 0.14 0.16
(4.87)*** (-1.24) (1.22) (-0.56) (1.36)
Table.17 Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression results for factors in pricing common stocks in the
period July 1964 to December 2012 for 12-month rolling windows
This table reports the price of risk estimates under four frameworks: CAPM market model, the empirical ZCAPM
model, Fama and French three-factor model and four-factor model. The market factor M  is proxied with the
CRSP value-weighted index; the volatility V  factor is proxied by the cross=sectional standard deviation of CRSP
stocks' returns; the size factor SMB is referred by small minus large firms' stock returns; the value factor HML
is referred by high B/M minus low B/M firms' stock returns; the four-factor model based on the three-factor model
augmented with a momentum factor MOM  which is proxied by high past return minus low past return firms'
stock returns. The riskless rate is proxied with one-month Treasury bill yield. The Fama-MacBeth (1973) two-
step procedure is used in all the estimations. The first step is carrying out time-series regressions of the
respective factor model are fitted using daily returns in a 12-month period rolling window to estimate factor
loadings; Then in the second step, in the subsequent out-of-sample month, a cross-sectional regression is run to
estimate the out-of-sample factor prices of risk λ  for each factor. The procedures are rolled forward one month at
a time to enable cross-sectional regressions in each month from July 1964 to December 2012. We analyse the
above four frameworks across eight different sets of portfolios: (A) 25 size B/M sorted portfolios; (B) 49 industry
portfolios; (C) 25 beta-zeta sorted portfolios on all CRSP common stocks; (D) 25 size B/M sorted and 49
industry portfolios; (E) 25 size B/M sorted plus 49 industry and 25 beta-zeta sorted portfolios on all CRSP
common stocks; (F) 4 financial institution industry sectors portfolios; (G) 25 beta-zeta sorted portfolios on all
CRSP financial Institution stocks; (H) 4 financial institution industry sectors and 25 beta-zeta sorted portfolios on
all CRSP financial Institution stocks.
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Table.17 Continue
Panel E: 25 Size B/M Sorted , 49 Industry Plus 25 Beta-Zeta Sorted All Stocks Portfolios
CAPM 0.51 0.14 0.28
(6.71)*** (1.89)*
ZCAPM 0.53 0.13 0.92 0.32
(7.03)*** (1.85)* (2.39)***
Three-factor 0.54 0.12 -0.09 -0.01 0.16
(5.49)*** (1.28) (-1.59) (-0.04)
Four-Factor 0.60 0.06 -0.03 -0.12 0.15 0.29
(5.56)*** (0.62) (-0.58) (-2.16)*** (1.67)*
Panel F: 4 Financial Institution Industry Portfolios
CAPM 0.39 0.10 0.22
(0.92) (0.25)
ZCAPM 0.60 0.03 7.49 0.45
(1.39) (0.07) (2.41)**
Three-factor 0.29 0.10 0.01 0.22 0.12
(0.52) (0.20) (0.04) (0.64)
Four-Factor -0.23 0.35 0.52 0.79 1.16 0.03
(-0.36) (0.61) (1.42) (2.01)** (2.25)**
Panel G: 25 Beta-Zeta Sorted Financial Institution Stocks Portfolios
CAPM 0.52 0.21 0.25
(4.81)*** (1.74)**
ZCAPM 0.44 0.21 2.24 0.56
(3.85)*** (1.80)** (4.57)***
Three-factor 0.26 0.37 0.35 0.01 0.29
(1.80)** (2.60)*** (2.00)** (0.06)
Four-Factor 0.08 0.48 0.59 0.11 0.66 0.45
(0.58) (3.32)*** (3.31)*** (0.65) (2.90)***
Panel H: 4 Financial Industry Plus 25 Beta-Zeta Sorted Financial Institution Stocks Portfolios
CAPM 0.51 0.16 0.23
(4.87)*** (1.44)
ZCAPM 0.48 0.16 0.83 0.34
(4.54)*** (1.45) (1.77)*
Three-factor 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.06 0.16
(2.09)*** (2.15)** (1.63) (0.42)
Four-Factor 0.07 0.40 0.54 0.24 0.76 0.23
(0.53) (2.92)*** (3.40)*** (1.56) (3.64)***
*** 1% significant level
** 5% significant level
* 10% significant level
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5.6 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter adopts rolling-window Fama-MacBeth (1973) two-step procedure to examine
the return generating process under four frameworks, CAPM, zero-beta CAPM, Fama-
French three-factor and four-factor models. Particularly, the result of zero-beta CAPM is of
our great interest since ZCAPM examines the impact of cross-sectional market volatility on
the portfolio returns. The ZCAPM model specifies asset returns as a function of the average
return on all assets in the market and their cross-sectional standard deviation – volatility ߪ௔.
According to ZCAPM, the market volatility can have two-sided and opposite effects on asset
returns. Some asset returns are positively affected by an increase in market volatility, and on
the other hand, some asset returns may be negatively affected by an increase in market
volatility. Therefore, our study takes into account two-sided market volatility by specifying
a signal variable ܦ௜௧ to denote positive and negative market volatility by taking value 1 and
-1 respectively. Since the direction of market volatility effect on an asset is unknown at any
given specific time, we use iterative regression method on a binary latent variable that
iteratively estimates the probabilities of positive versus negative market volatility effect.
In the first step of Fama-Macbeth procedure, we carry out time-series regressions of the
respective factor model are fitted using daily returns in a 6- and 12-month period rolling
window to estimate factor loadings. Then in the second step, in the subsequent out-of-
sample month, a cross-sectional regression is run to estimate the out-of-sample factor prices
of risk λ for each factor. The procedures are rolled forward one month at a time to enable
cross-sectional regressions in each month from January 1964 to December 2012. We apply
the method on eight portfolios in total which include a combination of common stocks and,
particularly, financial institution stocks. We find that cross-sectional market volatility
premium is consistently significant at high level in all sets of portfolios. The results of cross-
sectional market volatility are also robust to different estimation periods when applying to
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6-  and  12-month  rolling  windows  in  the  first  pass  regressions  and  different  out-of-sample
period  in  the  second pass  regression.  Another  finding  of  our  interest  is  that  we  also  apply
the ZCAPM specification on the financial institution portfolios. The results also suggest the
cross-sectional zeta risk is highly related to the financial institution portfolios as shown in
common stock portfolios. Therefore, we have shown that the high significance of cross-
sectional market volatility on asset returns in ZCAPM does not depend on the chosen test
asset returns which overcome the problem of portfolio formation that is common to other
asset pricing models.
We find evidence that the cross-sectional market volatility is indeed a significant market
factor in explaining the cross-section of expected stock returns and ZCAPM model can
provide better estimation as an asset pricing model. We can explain this result as, in the
ZCAPM, market risk is composed of two components, average market returns and cross-
sectional market volatility. The previous studies on asset returns only focus on beta risk and
exclude the unobserved risk from cross-sectional market volatility. We also find that the
Fama-French size and B/M sorted portfolios are also closely related to zeta-risk and one-
month-ahead average excess returns. The highly significance of cross-sectional market
volatility on B/M sorted portfolios indicates that the size and value portfolios are explained
by two-sided market volatility associated with zeta risk which is an unobserved component
of market risk. Therefore, we conclude that the cross-sectional market volatility is indeed a
significant market factor in explaining the cross-section of expected stock returns and
ZCAPM model can provide better estimation as an asset pricing model.
The important application of the ZCAPM study is that the fund manager can use zero-beta
CAPM framework to better predict expected stock returns. The Fama-MacBeth rolling
window framework is used for the combined common stock portfolios using one-month
ahead excess returns. This process is rolling forward one month at a time to generate cross-
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sectional regressions, the average of the estimated factor price of risk and the average
estimated loading factors are used to compute average fitted expected excess returns in the
next month for each portfolio. These fitted one-month returns are compared to each
portfolio’s one-month ahead average actual excess returns under both Fama-French three-
factor and ZCAPM models. We compare the predicted realized excess returns versus actual
excess returns for the 74 combined common stock portfolios, which are exogenous portfolios
not constructed from the ZCAPM. The results show models can fit average realized excess
returns to some extent. However, the average fitted excess returns from three-factor model
bunch up into a smaller range of values than that of average realized excess returns, and it is
expected that the Fama-French model has difficulty explaining small and growth portfolios
from literature. On the other hand, average fitted excess returns for the ZCAPM spread out
and fall fairly closely to average realized excess returns. Therefore, the results show that
ZCAPM significantly improve the expected returns, represented as average predicted
returns in the month ahead. Therefore, the major advantages of zero-beta CAPM in this
chapter is that it can provide better prediction on portfolio expected returns than other
traditional asset pricing model.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The thesis investigates the risk-related behaviours of financial institutions across the global
financial markets and provides reasonable explanations for the empirical results. The thesis
has a few findings and contributions to the existing literature. It investigates various risks to
which financial institutions are exposed, particularly capital risk, real estate risk and
valuation risk. The importance of capital adequacy had drawn public and regulators
attention in the recent financial turmoil, especially when financial institutions face
unexpected credit and liquidity shocks in the financial markets. The thesis shows that
banking organizations show little pecking order behaviour in capital structure. Banks are
different in terms of leverage relative to non-banks, as taxpayers deposit subsidized debt
relative to equity in banking. Therefore, the debt structure in banking is different from non-
financial firms. For the same level of financial deficit, a bank may have higher debt level
than non-financial firms. However, this is not due to pecking order but because the
taxpayers funds deposit in the bank. The thesis also finds that despite of the regulatory
minimum capital requirement, the banking organizations target capital level is linearly and
collectively influenced by bank-specific, macroeconomic and country-specific variables.
Thesis also finds significant evidences that with the development of mortgage loans issuance
and related derivatives, financial institutions are increasingly exposed to real estate markets,
and there is a significant and positive cross-volatility spillover from real estate sector to
banks, and the co-movement is in the same direction. It is also crucial that financial
institutions and fund managers can predict the expected portfolio returns more accurately.
The thesis finds that zero-beta CAPM significantly improve the expected returns,
252
represented as average predicted returns in the month ahead when comparing with three-
factor model, which has difficulty explaining small and growth portfolios returns .
The findings of the thesis not only contribute and extend the existing literature, but also
have important implication for regulators, risk and asset managers as well as investors at
both company and public policy levels. The regulators and financial institution managers
can monitor banks targeted capital structure more closely based on the bank-specific,
macroeconomic and country-specific variables discussed in the thesis. When there is any
changes in these determinant variables, institution managers should make relevant
adjustments in the targeted capital structure. In addition, regulators should be aware the
influence of real estate market over financial institutions, especially any significant volatility
changes in real estate as it can spillover into financial institutions. As financial institutions
are increasingly exposed to real estate market, any significant changes in real estate market
can also have influential impact on the capital adequacy in bank organisations. Therefore, it
is suggested institutional managers need to control the real estate exposure in their financial
assets and include real estate factor in the stress testing. Furthermore, it is also important
that financial institution and fund managers can estimate the expected returns more
accurately, so that they can make correct collection of assets for required risk and return. In
the thesis we find that the zero-beta CAPM outperforms the traditional asset pricing model,
particularly three-factor model, by providing better prediction on portfolio expected returns.
Therefore, the fund managers can adopt the zero-beta ZCAPM framework along with other
asset pricing framework when predicting portfolio returns. As high returns often come with
high risk, predicting returns more accurately means we can predict and monitor risk more
precisely. The financial institution managers can also apply zero-beta CAPM on their
institutional asset holdings to monitor whether the institutions are exposed to higher risk
assets. The regulators can use the framework to control the financial intermediaries risk and
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return behaviour to maintain the financial market stability. By identifying and quantifying
the risk and return behaviours of financial intermediaries, stakeholders can assess and
improve their management and investment performances. The empirical findings also help
the regulatory bodies to make effective and suitable policies for financial sectors to ensure a
stable, prosperity and sustainable growth of financial market.
The thesis starts with reviewing the current literature on financial institutions from risk and
regulatory aspects. We discuss types of risks faced by financial institutions and relevant
literature on each of the risks, such as interest rate risk, market risk, credit risk and foreign
exchange risk. Financial institutions have observed a trend of increasing exposure of real
estate sector worldwide since 1980s. From the literature research, we find that there are two
ways real estate have been included in the financial institution investment portfolios. One
way for financial institutions investing in real estate is through the traditional real estate
loan. The other way of investing in real estate is through indirect investments, such as real
estate stocks, derivative instruments and Real Estate Investment Trusts. There is an
increasing trend of investing in Real Estate Investment Trusts in recent years. Furthermore,
financial institutions need to protect against the risk of insolvency and shield it from the risk
sufficiently large to cause the institution to fail. One of the most important protections of the
financial institution is their capitals. We review the current literation on the initiation,
implementation, limitation and development of Basel I, II and III regulation. Particularly,
Basel III is designed to improve the safety and healthiness of financial institutions; however,
the possible influence of the implementation on economy is uncertain. Several studies have
shown  there  is  a  potential  of  increase  in  cost  of  funding  and  decline  in  state  output  and
welfare consumption. Therefore, implementing Basel III requires policy maker to take
careful consideration in terms of the extent and time frame so that financial market and
economy can have a buffer period to gradually adjust themselves to the changes.
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We then empirically investigate the risk factors that financial institutions are exposed to,
including particularly capital risk, real estate risk and valuation risk. In chapter three, the
thesis shows that financial institutions, especially banking institutions, are significantly
exposed to capital risks. The recent financial turmoil has revealed the capital inadequacy of
the financial institution when facing unexpected credit and liquidity shocks in the financial
markets. Therefore, it is important to understand the factors that impact bank capital
structures so that risk managers can efficiently monitor banks capital level and regulatory
bodies can design suitable policies. The thesis examines the extent of pecking order
behaviour in the banking organizations and finds that banks show little pecking order
behaviour. One concern of testing the pecking order theory on banks is that banks are
different in terms of leverage relative to non-banks, as taxpayers deposit subsidized debt
relative to equity in banking. The term deposit is used by the banking industry in financial
statements to describe the liability owned by the bank to its depositor, and not the funds that
bank holds as a result of the deposit, which are shown as assets of the bank. When taxpayers
put funds into the bank, it is recognized as an asset by the bank. On the other hand, the bank
credits a liability account for the same amount to show as a liability owed by the bank to its
customer. Therefore, the debt structure in banking is different from non-financial firms. For
the same level of financial deficit, a bank may have higher debt level than non-financial
firms. However, this is not due to pecking order but because the taxpayers funds deposit in
the bank.
The results also show that all bank-specific, macroeconomic and country-specific variables
collectively make a linear significant contribution in explaining banking organizations target
capital level. The thesis finds that if the larger proportion of a country financial system is
bank-based, banks within this country tend to maintain less capital since banks have a large
impact on the financial industry, and it would be easier and cheaper for banks to finance
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within short time period. The moral hazard index variable is positive but not statistically
significant. The indicator of government ownership of banks variable is negatively related
with the change of leverage ratio, which shows the higher degree of government ownership
of banking organizations, the slower the change of leverage ratio. We have also noticed that
the introduction of non-linear interactive variables tends to dramatically reduce both the
statistical and economic significance of the macroeconomic and standalone public policy and
regulatory variables estimated in the previous models. This indicates that the nonlinear
specification may not provide helpful and meaningful contribution to the estimation of
capital ratios.
In addition to the study on capital adequacy, we further empirically examine other risk
factors that impact the financial institution returns.  The results give similar results as in the
existing literature that the market risk is positive and significant for financial institution
equity returns, while the interest rate effect is not significant. With the development of
mortgage loans issuance and related derivatives, financial institutions are increasingly
exposed to real estate markets. We adopt bivariate GARCH framework to examine the
return and volatility spillover of real estate market into financial intermediaries across three
international markets, United States, United Kingdom and Japan over a period of thirteen
years between 1999 and 2011. Comparing with previous studies, the thesis extends the
period of the sample to most recent years and allows comparison across three international
markets. The positive coefficients of REITs represent that the fluctuation of bank stock
returns is moving in the same direction with REITs returns. Our findings indicate real estate
factor has significant influence on the bank return generating process in all three countries.
Moreover, US banks are most sensitive and closest related to REITs returns, followed by the
Japanese banks. The highest level of sensitivity is shown in US banks as expected since US
banks, as a leader, invest heavily in real estate properties and related products over the last
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few decades with long established and matured REITs market. Furthermore, the bank stock
return is most sensitive to real estate sector during 2003-2006, which indicates that bank
stock returns are more sensitive to real estate sector when the economy is booming. The
results of significant and positive cross-volatility spillover show that there is a volatility
spillover from real estate sector to banks, and the co-movement is in the same direction.
When comparing between different countries and sub-periods, we notice the level of
sensitivity of all factors varies, which indicates the bank return and volatility behaviours are
influenced by the country and economic cycle factors.
Furthermore, the last empirical chapter thesis investigates the influences of the cross-
sectional market volatility on the portfolio returns, especially financial institution portfolio
returns, based on zero-beta CAPM. The zero-beta CAPM framework provides further
empirical evidences on the impact of positive and negative volatility on asset returns by
taking two-sided market volatility into consideration. We especially apply the model to the
financial institution equity returns, and results suggest the cross-sectional zeta risk is highly
related to the financial institution portfolios as shown in common stock portfolios. We also
extend the existing research by employing more recent periods, and find that the cross-
sectional market volatility is consistently significant at high level. By comparing the zero-
beta CAPM with other traditional asset pricing model, the results show that the zero-beta
CAPM provides a better approximation of expected stock returns. We explain this result as
that market risk is composed of two components, average market returns and cross-sectional
market volatility. The implication of the findings is that in order to access the impact of
market risk, we need to include both components in the analysis. The result also explains the
unexplained return behaviour from the previous study when only average market returns
are included. Therefore, we conclude that the cross-sectional market volatility is indeed a
significant market factor in explaining the expected financial institutional stock returns.
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The important application of the ZCAPM study is that the fund manager can use zero-beta
CAPM framework to better predict expected stock returns. The Fama-MacBeth rolling
window framework is used for the combined common stock portfolios using one-month
ahead excess returns. This process is rolling forward one month at a time to generate cross-
sectional regressions, the average of the estimated factor price of risk and the average
estimated loading factors are used to compute average fitted expected excess returns in the
next month for each portfolio. These fitted one-month returns are compared to each
portfolio’s one-month ahead average actual excess returns under both Fama-French three-
factor and ZCAPM models. We compare the predicted realized excess returns versus actual
excess returns for the 74 combined common stock portfolios, which are exogenous portfolios
not constructed from the ZCAPM. The results show models can fit average realized excess
returns to some extent. However, the average fitted excess returns from three-factor model
bunch up into a smaller range of values than that of average realized excess returns, and it is
expected that the Fama-French model has difficulty explaining small and growth portfolios
from literature. On the other hand, average fitted excess returns for the ZCAPM spread out
and fall fairly closely to average realized excess returns. Therefore, the results show that
ZCAPM significantly improve the expected returns, represented as average predicted
returns in the month ahead. Therefore, the major advantages of zero-beta CAPM in this
chapter is that it can provide better prediction on portfolio expected returns than other
traditional asset pricing model.
The  findings  of  the  thesis  pave  ways  for  future  research  as  following.  The  thesis  examines
the bank capital structure determinants. Current literature has shown that despite for the
specialness of financial institutions, banks that use equity capital to fund its operations
should be determined by the same set of factors that influence other non-financial firms
together with combined impact of any government safety net policies and capital regulation.
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We find that target capital structure is influenced by all bank-specific, macroeconomic and
country-specific factors. However, in the thesis, due to data limitation, the changes in capital
structure behaviour during the financial crisis and later sovereign credit issues of European
countries were not specifically revealed. Studies on the impact of unexpected financial and
credit shock on bank capital structure is important in maintaining the stability of financial
market for the financial institution and regulatory bodies. The financial institution can use
the knowledge to predict and control of risk of capital failure, and regulatory bodies can
design efficient and sustainable policies to maintain the stable capital and credit
environment during the turmoil. In the future, we can extend the thesis results by examining
capital structure changes before and after the financial crisis by using the event studies.
In addition, the thesis shows that there is a significant volatility spillover from real estate
sector to banks, and the co-movement is in the same direction. In the study, we use REITs to
illustrate the real estate risk factor, and it is based on the assumptions from result of existing
literature that REITs return and unsecuritized real estate share similar fundamentals and
behaviours.  However, some researches show that REITs do not always reflect real estate
market fundamentals which indicate REITs may not be a good proxy for the returns to
unsecuritized real estate. Therefore, the future study can reassess the volatility spillover
effect by using unsecuritized real estate returns. The only limitation of using unsecuritized
real estate data is that it may not have adequate periods or frequencies required. There are
also classifications based on whether or not REITs can issue additional shares. If REITs can
only issue shares to the public once and can only issue additional shares once approved by
current shareholders, the REITs are closed-ended. On the other hand, open-ended REITs can
issue new shares and redeem shares at any time. The close- and open-ended REITs may
have different risk and return behaviours due to different pricing characteristics. Although
REITs traded in the market are mainly close-ended REITs, however, there are also open-
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ended REITs available. The future research can focus on separating the close-ended REITs
and open-ended REITs to see the difference of impacts on the results, and which type of
REITs can represent the unsecuritized real estate market more closely.
Furthermore, the thesis also examines the superiority of zero-beta CAPM model over
traditional asset pricing models by using a rolling window Fama-MacBeth two-step
procedure. We find evidence that zero-beta CAPM provides better expected portfolio
returns than the well-known three- and four-factor models, and market risk is composed of
two components, average market returns and cross-sectional market volatility. The thesis
uses monthly data for the Fama-MacBeth rolling window regression. In the future research,
we can apply bootstrapping and stochastic asset models, such as, Monte Carlo simulation, to
extend and simulate the sample over the period in order to review the superiority of the
zero-beta CAPM approach.
In conclusion, the thesis investigates the risk-related behaviours of financial institutions
across the global financial markets. It provides reasonable explanations for the empirical
results. We investigate various risks to which financial institutions are exposed, particularly
capital risk, real estate risk and valuation risk. The findings of the thesis not only contribute
and extend the existing literature, but also have important implication for regulators, risk
and asset managers as well as investors at both company and public policy levels. The
regulators and financial institution managers can monitor banks targeted capital structure
more closely based on the bank-specific, macroeconomic and country-specific variables
discussed in the thesis. In addition,  regulators should be aware the influence of real estate
market over financial institutions, especially any significant volatility changes in real estate
as it can spillover into financial institutions. It is suggested institutional managers need to
control the real estate exposure in their financial assets and include real estate factor in the
stress testing. Furthermore, the fund managers can adopt the zero-beta ZCAPM framework
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along with other asset pricing framework when predicting portfolio returns. The regulators
and financial institution managers can also apply zero-beta CAPM on their institutional
asset holdings to monitor whether the institutions are exposed to higher risk assets to
maintain the financial market stability. Overall, the financial intermediary stakeholders can
benefit from the results in the thesis to improve their management and investment
performances. The empirical findings also help the regulatory bodies to make effective and
suitable policies for financial sectors to ensure a stable, prosperity and sustainable growth of
financial market.
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APPENDIX A
ZERO-BETA CAPM WITH NO RISKLESS ASSETS
In order to derive zero-beta CAPM, we assume investors can take long or short positions of
any size in any risky asset, but there is not riskless asset and that no borrowing or lending at
the riskless rate of interest is allowed. However, in reality, this assumption is not valid since
there is restriction on shorting selling just as the restriction on riskless borrowing. Followed
by the original CAPM, the efficient sets of portfolios can be written as value-weighted
combination of two basic portfolios, with different weights being used to generate the
different portfolios in the efficient set. Let ܺ௜ be the proportion of asset ݅ in the efficient
portfolio corresponding to the parameter ߣ  satisfies: ܺ௜ = ܭ௜ + ߣ݇௜ , where ܭ௜  and ݇௜  are
constant, which are the weights on the stocks in the two basic portfolios. ܭ௜ and ݇௜ satisfy,
෍ܭ௜
ே
௜ୀଵ
= 1; 	෍݇௜ே
௜ୀଵ
= 0 (42)
 Thus,
෍ܺ௜
ே
௜ୀଵ
= ෍ܭ௜ே
௜ୀଵ
+ ߣ෍݇௜ே
௜ୀଵ
= 1 (43)
Therefore, the sum of weights ܺ௜ is always equal to 1.
The beginning of modern portfolio theory can be dated back to the paper Markowitz (1952).
In his paper, he introduces the theory of frontier of investment portfolios, such that each of
them had the greatest possible expected rate of return for their given risk. The primary
impact of MPT is on portfolio management because it provides a framework for the
systematic selection of portfolios based on expected return and risk principles. Most
portfolio managers today are aware of, and use to varying degrees, the basic principles of
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MPT. Major mutual fund families employ the implication of MPT in managing their funds,
financial advisors use the principles of MPT in advising their individual investor clients,
many financial commentators use MPT terms in discussing the current investing
environment and so forth.56 Prior to the dissemination of portfolio theory into the real world,
argument on how the pricing of securities would be affected by using portfolio theory to
invest in the portfolios on the frontier was discussed in wide range of literature. In order to
address the issue, the Capital Asset Pricing Model is developed by Sharp (1964), Lintner
(1965) and Mossin (1966) almost simultaneously. This model has become widely used in the
real world to measure portfolio performance, value securities, make capital budgeting
decision, and even regulate public utilities. However, the model is later questioned in Roll
(1978) because he argues the model is impossible to empirically verify its single economic
prediction. On the other hand, the Arbitrage Pricing Theory is being developed by Ross
(1976). This theory argues that expected return must be related to risk in such a way that no
single investor could create unlimited wealth through arbitrage.
From the standard mean-variance portfolio, given the expected returns and matrix of
covariances of returns for n assets, we need to find the set of optimal asset weights that
minimizes the return variance for a given expected return.  Followed from previous studies,
an efficient portfolio is one that has maximum expected return for given variance, or
minimum variance for given expected return. We want to show that every efficient portfolio
consists of a weighted combination of two basic portfolios as follows. Using the notation
similar to that used in Black (1972), the efficient portfolio held by individual ݇ is obtained by
choosing proportions ܺ௞௜ , ݅ = 1,2, … ,ܰ, invested in the shares of each of the N available
assets. Following Markowitz (1952), we minimize the portfolio’s variance subject to the
constraints of expected return, and constituent asset weights sum to one:
56 Charles P. Jones (2010) Chapter 7 Investments Principles and Concepts , 11th Edition John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Publisher, ISBN: 9780470553077
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Minimize:
ݒܽݎ൫ ෨ܴ௞൯ = ෍෍ݔ௞௜ݔ௞௝ܿ݋ݒ( ෨ܴ௜ ,ே
௝ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
෨ܴ௝); (44)
Subject to:
ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௞൯ = ෍ݔ௞௝ܧ(ே
௝ୀଵ
෨ܴ௝); (45)
෍ݔ௞௝ = 1;ே
௝ୀଵ
(46)
In order to minimize equation (44), we use Lagrange multiplier ܵ௞  and ௞ܶ ,  this  can  be
expressed as minimizing,
෍෍ݔ௞௜ݔ௞௝ܿ݋ݒ( ෨ܴ௜ ,ே
௝ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
෨ܴ௝) − 2ܵ௞ ቎෍ݔ௞௝ܧ(ே
௝ୀଵ
෨ܴ௝) − ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௞൯቏ − ௞ܶ ቎෍ݔ௞௝ே
௝ୀଵ
− 1቏ (47)
Differentiate equation (47) with respect to ݔ௞௜ resulting,
෍ݔ௞௝ܿ݋ݒ(ே
௝ୀଵ
෨ܴ௜ , ෨ܴ௝) − ܵ௞ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௜൯ − ௞ܶ = 0	 (48)
This  set  of  equations  for ݅ determines the value of ݔ௞௜. If we take the inverse of covariance
matrix as ܦ௜௝, then the equation (48) can be written as:
ݔ௞௜ = ܵ௞෍ܦ௜௝ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௝൯ே
௝ୀଵ
+ ௞ܶ෍ܦ௜௝ே
௝ୀଵ
(49)
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Since k denotes the individual investor and it only appears in ܵ௞ and ௞ܶ on the right hand
side of the equation, it shows every investor holds a linear combination of two basic
portfolios, and every efficient portfolio is a linear combination of these two basic portfolios.
In order to have sum of weighted equals to unity, we normalize these weights, and the
equation (49) becomes,
ݔ௞௜ = ݓ௞௣ݔ௣௜ + ݓ௞௤ݔ௤௜ (50)
Where,
ݓ௞௣ = ܵ௞෍෍ܦ௜௝ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௝൯ே
௝ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
; (51)
ݓ௞௤ = ௞ܶ෍෍ܦ௜௝ே
௝ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
; (52)
ݔ௣௜ = ∑ ܦ௜௝ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௝൯ே௝ୀଵ∑ ∑ ܦ௜௝ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௝൯ே௝ୀଵே௜ୀଵ ; (53)
ݔ௤௜ = ෍ܦ௜௝ே
௝ୀଵ
/෍෍ܦ௜௝ே
௝ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
(54)
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Therefore, if we sum ݔ௣௜ and ݔ௤௜ according to I, we get
෍ݔ௣௜
ே
௜ୀଵ
= 1; (54)
෍ݔ௤௜
ே
௜ୀଵ
= 1; (55)
ݓ௞௣ + ݓ௞௤ = ܵ௞෍෍ܦ௜௝ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௝൯ே
௝ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
+ ௞ܶ෍෍ܦ௜௝ே
௝ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
= ෍቎ܵ௞෍ܦ௜௝ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௝൯ே
௝ୀଵ
+ ௞ܶ ෍ܦ௜௝ே
௝ୀଵ
቏
ே
௜ୀଵ
(56)
From equation (49), equation (56) equals,
ݓ௞௣ + ݓ௞௤ = ෍ݔ௞௜ே
௜ୀଵ
; (57)
Since ݔ௞௜ is the normalized weighting of individual assets, according to equation (46), the
sum ∑ ݔ௞௜ே௜ୀଵ = 1, therefore,
ݓ௞௣ + ݓ௞௤ = ܵ௞෍෍ܦ௜௝ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௝൯ே
௝ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
+ ௞ܶ෍෍ܦ௜௝ே
௝ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
= 1; (58)
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Equation (50) shows that the efficient portfolio held by any investor ݇ consists of a weighted
combination of the basic portfolios ݌ and ݍ. However, these two basic portfolios are not
unique, therefore, we can transform the basic portfolios ݌ and ݍ into two different portfolios,
for example, ݑ and ݒ. Let ݓ௨௣ ,ݓ௨௤ ,ݓ௩௣	and ݓ௩௤ be the weights,
ݔ௨௜ = ݓ௨௣ݔ௣௜ + ݓ௨௤ݔ௤௜;
ݔ௩௜ = ݓ௩௣ݔ௣௜ + ݓ௩௤ݔ௤௜; (59)
We solve the simultaneous equation (59) for ݔ௣௜  and ݔ௤௜ , and set the coefficients to be
ݓ௣௨,ݓ௣௩ ,ݓ௤௨	and ݓ௤௩. Therefore, we get
ݔ௣௜ = ݓ௣௨ݔ௨௜ + ݓ௣௩ݔ௩௜;
ݔ௤௜ = ݓ௤௨ݔ௨௜ + ݓ௤௩ݔ௩௜; (60)
If we substitute equation (60), we can obtain a linear combination of portfolio k, with basic
portfolio ݑ and ݒ, with coefficients 	ݓ௞௨  and ݓ௞௩ , and the sum of these weights equal to
unity.
ݔ௞௜ = ݓ௞௨ݔ௨௜ + ݓ௞௩ݔ௩௜;
ݓ௞௨ + ݓ௞௩ = 1; (61)
Therefore, according to Black (1972), the basic portfolios ݑ and ݒ can be any pair of different
portfolios that can be formed as weighted combinations of the original pair of basic portfolio
݌ and ݍ. Every efficient portfolio can be expressed as a weighted combination of portfolios ݑ
and ݒ, but they do not have to be efficient themselves. However, portfolio ݌ and ݍ must have
different betas, otherwise it will not be possible to generate every possible efficient portfolio
as a weighted combination of these two portfolios. In addition, if portfolio ݌ and ݍ have
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different betas, it will be possible to generate new basic portfolios ݑ and ݒ with different
betas by choosing appropriate weights. In extreme case, we can choose,
ߚ௨ = 1	ܽ݊݀	ߚ௩ = 0; (62)
If we multiply equation (9) by factor ݔ௠௞ of total wealth held by investor k, and summing
over all the investors, with ݇ = 1,2, … , ܮ. We obtain the weights ݔ௠௜ 	of  each  asset  in  the
market portfolio,
෍ݔ௠௞ݔ௞௜
௅
௞ୀଵ
= ൭෍ݔ௠௞ݓ௞௣௅
௞ୀଵ
൱ ݔ௣௜ + ൭෍ݔ௠௞ݓ௞௤௅
௞ୀଵ
൱ݔ௤௜
⟹				 ݔ௠௜ = ൭෍ݔ௠௞ݓ௞௣௅
௞ୀଵ
൱ݔ௣௜ + ൭෍ݔ௠௞ݓ௞௤௅
௞ୀଵ
൱ ݔ௤௜
(63)
Since the market portfolio is a weighted combination of portfolios ݌ and ݍ,  and  the  beta  of
market portfolio is unity, the portfolio ݑ  must be the market portfolio because ߚ௨ = 1 .
Therefore, we can set portfolio ݑ	as portfolio ݉, and portfolio ݒ  as portfolioݖ , with beta
ߚ௠ = 1 and ߚ௭ = 0, which are market portfolio and the zero-beta basic portfolio.  The return
on an efficient portfolio ݇ as a weighted combination of the returns on portfolio ݉ and ݖ, the
coefficient of the return on portfolio ݉ must be ߚ௞. Therefore, the return of portfolio ݇ is:
෨ܴ௞ = ߚ௞ ෨ܴ௠ + (1 − ߚ௞) ෨ܴ௭ (64)
If we take the expected value of both side of equation (20), we get
ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௞൯ = ߚ௞ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௠൯ + (1 − ߚ௞)ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௭൯
⟹ 		ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௞൯ = ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௭൯ + ߚ௞ൣܧ൫ ෨ܴ௠൯ − ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௭൯൧ (65)
306
Therefore, the equation (65) shows that the expected return on an efficient portfolio ݇ is a
linear function of its ߚ௞.  If  we  compare  equation  (65)  with Sharp (1984), the corresponding
relationship when there is a riskless asset, and riskless borrowing and lending are allowed,
we discover that the relation between the expected return on an efficient portfolio ݇ and its
ߚ௞ is the same no matter whether there is a riskless asset. If there is a riskless asset, the
interception of the relationship is the return of riskless asset, ௙ܴ. If there is no riskless asset,
the interception is expected return of zero-beta portfolio, ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௭൯. Therefore the equation (65)
applies to individual securities, and the equation also applies to efficient portfolios.  We
show this conclusion as follows;
From equation (48), we let index ݅ and ݆ be to ݅ and ݇, and ݆ and ݇,
෍ݔ௞௞ܿ݋ݒ(ே
௞ୀଵ
෨ܴ௜ , ෨ܴ௞) − ܵ௞ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௜൯ − ௞ܶ = 0 (66)
෍ݔ௞௞ܿ݋ݒ(ே
௞ୀଵ
෨ܴ௝, ෨ܴ௞) − ܵ௞ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௝൯ − ௞ܶ = 0 (67)
Subtract equation (67) from equation (66), we get
ܿ݋ݒ൫ ෨ܴ௜ , ෨ܴ௞൯ − ܿ݋ݒ൫ ෨ܴ௝, ෨ܴ௞൯ = ܵ௞ൣܧ൫ ෨ܴ௜൯ − ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௝൯൧ (68)
We substitute portfolio ݇  by efficient market portfolio ݉ , and portfolio ݆  by zero-beta
portfolio ݖ. Given ܿ݋ݒ൫ ෨ܴ௭, ෨ܴ௠൯ = 0,	the above equation (24) becomes
ܿ݋ݒ൫ ෨ܴ௜ , ෨ܴ௠൯ = ܵ௠ൣܧ൫ ෨ܴ௜൯ − ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௭൯൧ (69)
Since ߚ௜ = ஼௢௩	(ோ෨೔ோ෨೘)௏௔௥(ோ෨೘) , equation (25) becomes,
ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௜൯ = ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௭൯ + ߚ௜[ݒܽݎ( ෨ܴ௠)/ܵ௠] (70)
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Substituting ݉ for ݅ and ߚ௠ = 1 , we get
ݒܽݎ൫ ෨ܴ௠൯
ܵ௠
= ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௠൯ − ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௭൯ (71)
Putting equation (71) into equation (70), we obtain
ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௜൯ = ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௭൯ + ߚ௜ൣܧ൫ ෨ܴ௠൯ − ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௭൯൧ (72)
Therefore, the expected return on every asset where there is no riskless asset or borrowing. If
let ߚ௜ = 0, each portfolio with beta equals to zero must have the same expected return as
portfolio ݖ. It has been noted that the return on portfolio ݖ is  independent  of  the  return  on
portfolio ݉, and the weighted combinations of portfolios ݉ and ݖ must be efficient, portfolio
ݖ must be the minimum-variance zero-beta portfolio.
Many researchers have tested and demonstrated the existence of zero-beta CAPM. Black et
al (1972) reject the traditional CAPM by examining the US stock returns for the period 1931-
1961. They find that time series regression of excess returns reveal that high or low beta
stocks have significant negative or positive intercepts, which supports the zero-beta CAPM.
Stambaugh (1982) provides further evidence of significant zero-beta parameter for US
stocks.  However, no previous studies have conducted cross-sectional tests of the zero-beta
CAPM due to the inability to estimate factor. The above derivation of zero-beta CAPM is
from analytical point of view. After the first introduction of zero-beta CAPM, studies such as
Roll (1980) and Kandel (1986) have geometrically derive the properties of zero-beta CAPM
in return-variance space.
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ZERO-BETA CAPM WITH RISKLESS ASSETS
When there is riskless asset available, but investors are not allowed to take short positions in
the riskless asset, the zero-beta ZCAPM share similar behaviour as when there is no
risklessasset available. In the case of riskless asset, it is expected that the expected return on
any asset ݅ continues  to  be  a  linear  function  of  its ߚ. The efficient set of portfolios now has
two parts. One part is consist of weighted combinations of portfolios ݉ and ݖ, and the other
part includes weighted combinations of riskless asset with a single portfolio of risky assets.
Since the restriction on short position is only on riskless asset, there is two kinds of efficient
portfolios. One contains the riskless assets and the other one does not. For efficient portfolios
that do not contain riskless asset, we can apply equation (47)-(62) from the previous section.
Each efficient portfolio can be expressed as a weighted combination of portfolios ݑ and ݒ,
where ߚ௨is unity and ߚ௨ is zero. For those efficient portfolios that do contain the riskless
asset, we extend equation (48) to N+1 aasets. The covariance term for ݆ = ܰ + 1 equals to
zero. Therefore, we have the following equation for i=1,2,…,N:
෍ݔ௞௝ܿ݋ݒ(ே
௝ୀଵ
෨ܴ௜ , ෨ܴ௝) − ܵ௞ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௜൯ − ௞ܶ = 0 (73)
Therefore, the risky portions of these investors’ portfolios are weighted combinations of
portfolios ݑ and ݒ as before. For the riskless portion of the portfolio ݅ = ܰ + 1, equation (73)
becomes
−ܵ௞ ௙ܴ − ௞ܶ = 0 (74)
Since the risky part of every investor’s portfolio, whether he holds riskless asset or not,
consists of a weighted combination of portfolios ݑ and ݒ.  The  sum  of  all  investors’  risky
holdings, which is the market portfolio, must be a weighted combination of portfolios ݑ and
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ݒ. As discussed in the previous section, the portfolio ݑ must  be  the  market  portfolio,  and
portfolio ݒ must be the minimum-variance zero-beta of risky assets.  Since equation (73) is
the same as equation (48), we can see equation (72) still applies to all risky assets even when
there are riskless borrowing and investment opportunity.
Let ݓ௞௠ ,ݓ௞௭,	and ݓ௞௙ be the weights on portfolio ݉, ݖ and riskless portfolio f, and ݇	be the
efficient portfolio. Since the return on portfolio ݖ is independent of return on portfolio ݉, the
expected return and variance of portfolio ݇ will be
ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௞൯ = ݓ௞௠ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௠൯ + ݓ௞௭ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௭൯ + ݓ௞௙ ௙ܴ (75)
ݒܽݎ൫ ෨ܴ௞൯ = ݓ௞௠ଶݒܽݎ൫ ෨ܴ௠൯ + ݓ௞௭ଶݒܽݎ൫ ෨ܴ௭൯ (76)
The weights also satisfy
ݓ௞௠ + ݓ௞௭ + ݓ௞௙ = 1	 (77)
ݓ௞௙ ≥ 0 (78)
If ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௭൯ is less than or equal to ௙ܴ, then we can increase ݓ௞௙ and decrease ݓ௞௭  by the same
amount, and the variance of portfolio ݇ changes accordingly. When portfolio ݇is the market
portfolio, the weight ݓ௞௠ must be unity, and ݓ௞௭  must be zero. If ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௭൯ is greater than or
equal to ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௠൯, then we can decrease ݓ௞௠ by a very small amount and increase ݓ௞௭  by the
same amount, and variance of portfolio ݇ will be change. In either situation, this means that
portfolio is not efficient.
Therefore, the expected returns must satisfy the following inequality,
௙ܴ < ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௭൯ < ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௠൯	 (79)
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When ݓ௞௙ is greater than zero, portfolio ݇ is a mixture of portfolio risky and riskless asset.
From equation (77), we get the presentation ofݓ௞௙ in  terms  of ݓ௞௠ and ݓ௞௭ . We get ݓ௞௙ =
1 − ݓ௞௠ − ݓ௞௭ . Substitute this into equation (75) and (76), we get
ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௞ − ௙ܴ൯ = ݓ௞௠ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௠ − ௙ܴ൯ + ݓ௞௭ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௭ − ௙ܴ൯	 (80)
ݒܽݎ൫ ෨ܴ௞ − ௙ܴ൯ = ݓ௞௠ଶݒܽݎ൫ ෨ܴ௠ − ௙ܴ൯ + ݓ௞௭ଶݒܽݎ൫ ෨ܴ௭ − ௙ܴ൯ (81)
Since equation (80) and (81) hold for any portfolio containing riskless asset, they must hold
for the efficient portfolio ݐ. Since the efficient portfolio must maximize equation (80) subject
to variance equation (81), which is equivalent to maximize,
ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௞ − ௙ܴ൯
ߪ൫ ෨ܴ௞ − ௙ܴ൯
	
(82)
Where ߪ൫ ෨ܴ௞ − ௙ܴ൯ is the standard deviation.
If we plot on the graph with ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௞ − ௙ܴ൯ on the y-axis, and ߪ൫ ෨ܴ௞ − ௙ܴ൯ on the x-axis, the
value of ݇ that satisfies the maximization is the value of ݇ that maximizes the slope of a line
drawn from the original to point ݇. So the efficient portfolio ݐ is the tangent portfolio to the
efficient set.
Therefore the introduction of riskless borrowing opportunity only changes the market
equilibrium in terms of portfolio composition. In the presence of riskless asset, there are two
kind of efficient portfolios. The less risky efficient portfolio is a mixture of portfolio ݐ, which
is a combination of portfolio ݉  and ݖ ,  and  the  riskless  asset.  The  more  risky  efficient
portfolios continue to be mixtures of portfolio ݉ and ݖ as when there is no riskless asset
available. The expected return on portfolio ݖ must now be greater than the return on the
riskless asset. Therefore we show that the empirical results are consistent with an
equilibrium in which there is restricted borrowing at the riskless interest.
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We find that the expected return on any risky asset is a linear function of its beta regardless
with the existence of restricted on riskless asset. If there is a riskless asset, the slope of the
line relating the expected return on a risky asset to its beta must be smaller than it without
riskless borrowing restriction. The risky portion of every portfolio is a weighted
combination of market portfolio and minimum-variance zero-beta portfolio. The zero-beta
portfolio has covariance with risky asset ݅ proportional to 1 − ߚ௜ .  If  there  is  a  riskless  asset,
then the efficient portfolios that contain the riskless asset are all weighted combinations of
the riskless asset and a single risky portfolio ݐ. The portfolio ݐ is the efficient portfolio of risk
assets with the highest ratio of the expected difference between the return on the portfolio
and the return on the riskless asset to the standard deviation of the return on the portfolio.
The line relating the expected return on an efficient portfolio to its beta is composed of two
straight line segments, where the segment for the lower-risk portfolios has a greater slope
than the segment for the higher-risk portfolios. The above derivation is consistent with the
arguments in Shanken (1985, 1986),  in  which  they  find  the  true  market  portfolio  can  be
constructed from any two efficient portfolios on the efficient frontier.
312
313
APPENDIX B
SPECIAL FEATURE OF ZERO-BETA CAPM
Many papers have tested the existence zero-beta CAPM. There are a few fundamental
differences between the basic CAPM and zero-beta CAPM. Zero-beta CAPM finds that
identification of the market portfolio ܯ defined in the CAPM as the tangent portfolio with
respect to a ray from the riskless rate to the efficient frontier is not a necessary condition for
examining the CAPM. This is because studies found that identification of any orthogonal
pair of minimum-variance index portfolios ܫ  and ܼܫ  on the mean-variance parabola is
sufficient. And the real market portfolio is the one consist of the weighted average of all
individual portfolios on the market. Furthermore, different from traditional CAPM, zero-
beta CAPM allows both long and short positions in assets to construct portfolios ܫ and ܼܫ.
According to zero-beta CAPM notation from Liu et al (2012), we rewrite minimization of
portfolio variance subject to the constraints of expected return and asset weight,
min
ఠ
12߱ᇱ෍߱ + ߟൣܧ൫ ෨ܴ௉൯ − ߱ᇱܧ( ෨ܴ)൧ + ߢ(1 − ߱ᇱ݁)	 (83)
Where ߱ is the weights vector, ݁ is a vector of ones, ܧ൫ ෨ܴ൯ = ൣܧ൫ ෨ܴଵ൯,ܧ൫ ෨ܴଶ൯, … ,ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௡൯൧ is the
expected return vector for n assets. All of these vectors have dimension ݊ × 1. ∑ is the
covariance matrix for ݊ assets with dimension ݊ × ݊.
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Take the first order derivative with respect to ߱, ߟ and ߢ, we get the following equations:
߱:			∑߱ − ߟܧ( ෨ܴ) − ߢ݁ = 0		
ߟ:			ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௉൯ − ߱ᇱܧ൫ ෨ܴ൯ = 0	
ߢ:			1 −߱ᇱ݁ = 0	 (84)
The optimal weights ߱∗ from the above simultaneous equation is,
߱∗ = ܥܧ൫ ෨ܴ௉൯ − ߙ
ܤܥ − ߙଶ
∑ିଵܧ൫ ෨ܴ൯ + ܤ − ߙܧ൫ ෨ܴ௉൯
ܤܥ − ߙଶ
∑ିଵ݁ ≡ ߶ + ߰ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௉൯	 (85)
Where,
ܣ = ܧ൫ ෨ܴ൯ᇱ∑ିଵ݁	
ܤ = ܧ൫ ෨ܴ൯ᇱ∑ିଵܧ൫ ෨ܴ൯	
ܥ = ݁ᇱ∑ିଵ݁	
߶ = ܤ∑ିଵ݁ − ܣ∑ିଵܧ൫ ෨ܴ൯
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
	
߰ = ܥ∑ିଵܧ൫ ෨ܴ൯ − ܣ∑ିଵ݁
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
	
(86)
ܣ,ܤ  and ܥ  are known scalars, and ߶  and ߰  are know vectors with dimension ݊ × 1 .
Therefore, the variance of the efficient portfolio ܲ is
ߪ௉
ଶ = 1
ܥ
+ ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴ௉൯ − ܣܥቃଶ
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
	
(87)
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In a return-standard deviation space, take derivative of equation (87) with respect to ߪ௣,
ߪ௣ = ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴ௉൯ − ܣܥቃܤܥ − ܣଶ ߲ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௉൯߲ߪ௣ 	
߲ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௉൯
߲ߪ௣
= ܤܥ − ܣଶ
ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴ௉൯ −
ܣ
ܥቃ
ߪ௣	
(88)
Therefore for a line passing through the tangent point ൣߪெ ,ܧ൫ ෨ܴெ൯൧ is
ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௉൯ − ܧ൫ ෨ܴெ൯ = ܤܥ − ܣଶ
ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴெ൯ −
ܣ
ܥቃ
ߪெ(ߪ௉ − ߪெ)	 (89)
GEOMETRIC INTERPRETATION OF ZERO-BETA CAPM
We have shown the quantitative derivation of zero-beta CAPM from the previous work. In
addition, there are many literatures have studied the geometrical presentation of the zero-
beta CAPM. Following from Roll (1980), in the return-variance space, we set the y-axis as
expected return, and x-axis as variance. The minimum-variance portfolio is the one with the
smallest variance on the efficiency frontier, and let denote this portfolio as ܩ. For any give
market index ܫ on the efficient frontier, a line extending from and passing through minimum
variance portfolio ܩ to the y-axis gives the expected return on the zero-beta index ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯.
Using this expected return as a reference point, the portfolio ܼܫ can be located on the inferior
part of the frontier. There are infinite pairs of these minimum variance portfolios ܫ and ܼܫ
which can be identified in this way. Roll (1980) shows that the market portfolio can be
replaced by any market index that is an efficient portfolio. The uniqueness is true only when
the market index is mean-variance efficient. When the index is not efficient, there are zero-
beta portfolios at all levels of expected return.
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The line passing through tangent point in Equation (89) is under return-standard deviation
space. We continue to derive the notation for the return-variance space. We take derivative
for both side of equation (88) with respective to ߪ௉ଶ,
1 = 2ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴ௉൯ − ܣܥቃ
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
߲ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௉൯
߲ߪ௣2 	
(90)
Therefore,
߲ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௉൯
߲ߪ௣2 = ܤܥ − ܣଶ2ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴ௉൯ − ܣܥቃ	 (91)
For a given portfolio ܫ  at position ൣߪூ2,ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯൧ , the line passing though ܫ  and global
minimum-variance portfolio ܩ: ቂଵ
஼
, ஺
஼
ቃ is
ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௉൯ − ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ = ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܣܥ
ߪூ2 − 1ܥ ൫ߪ௣2 − ߪூ2൯	
(92)
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The expected return on portfolio ܼܫ orthogonal to ܫ is the intercept of equation (92) to y-axis,
ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯ = ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܣܥ
ߪூ2 − 1ܥ ߪூ2	
= ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܧ(ܴூ)෪ −ܣܥ
ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ −
ܣ
ܥቃ
ଶ
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
൦
ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ −
ܣ
ܥቃ
ଶ
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
+ 1
ܥ
൪
= ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܣܥ
ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ −
ܣ
ܥቃ
ଶ
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
൦
ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ −
ܣ
ܥቃ
ଶ
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
+ 1
ܥ
൪	
= ܣ
ܥ
−
1
ܥ
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ −
ܣ
ܥቃ
		
(93)
Substituting equation (93) into equation (87), we get the variance
ߪ௓ூ
ଶ = 1
ܥ
+ ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯ − ܣܥቃଶ
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
= 1
ܥ
+ ܥ ൦(
ܣ
ܥ −
1
ܥ
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ −
ܣ
ܥቃ
ଶ) − ܣܥ൪ଶ
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
= 1
ܥ
+ ܥ
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
× (ܤܥ − ܣଶ)ଶ
ܥସ
× 1
ቀܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ −
ܣ
ܥቁ
ଶ	
ߪ௓ூ
ଶ = 1
ܥ
+ ܤܥ − ܣଶ
ܥଷ ቀܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ −
ܣ
ܥቁ
ଶ	
(94)
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Above discussion provide a presentation of Roll (1980) geometric approach for zero-beta
CAPM. Many other studies have also provides geometric derivation of the properties of
ZACPM in the return-variance space. Kandel (1986) has explored geometric relations among
sample frontier, the maximum likelihood estimator, and two other estimators of the zero-
beta return. It is also demonstrated that a partition of the portfolio space is determined by a
family of parabolas; the zeros of each parabola are the maximum likelihood estimators
associated all portfolios on the parabola.
However a new geometric approach has been studied in Liu et al (2012).  The approach
begins with choosing any portfolio expected return ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௑൯ on the y-axis to tangent points on
the superior and inferior curves of the symmetric mean-variance parabola. Liu et al (2012)
conclude that these two tangent points on the parabola are the zero-beta CAPM portfolios ܫ
and ܼܫ. To prove this we start by using the same orthogonal portfolios portfolios ܫ and ܼܫ as
in Roll (1980). The equation passing through tangent ൣߪூ2,ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯൧  and y-axis intercepts[0,ܧ( ෨ܴ௑)], with gradient, the equation is as following,
ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௉൯ − ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ = ܤܥ − ܣଶ2ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܣܥቃ ൫ߪ௣2 − ߪூ2൯	 (95)
Setting ߪ݌ଶ = 0, we get the presentation of ܧ( ෨ܴ௑) as
ܧ( ෨ܴ௑) = ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܤܥ − ܣଶ2ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܣܥቃ ߪூ2		 (96)
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Substitute equation (87) into (96) for ߪூଶ, we get,
ܧ( ෨ܴ௑) = ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܤܥ − ܣଶ2ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܣܥቃ × (1ܥ + ܥ ቂܧ൫
෨ܴூ൯ −
ܣ
ܥቃ
ଶ
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
)
= ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܤܥ − ܣଶ2ܥଶ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܣܥቃ − ቂܧ൫
෨ܴூ൯ −
ܣ
ܥቃ2
= ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ + ܣܥቃ2 − ܤܥ − ܣଶ2ܥଶ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܣܥቃ		
(97)
In order to prove the new geometric approach also gives the orthogonal pair, we need to
prove the tangent passing through portfolio ܼܫ  also intercept with y-axis at the same
expected return ܧ( ෨ܴ௑). We get the tangent line at point ൣߪ௓ூ2,ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯൧ is,
ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௉൯ − ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯ = ܤܥ − ܣଶ2ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯ − ܣܥቃ ൫ߪ௣2 − ߪ௓ூ2൯ (98)
Suppose the intercept is [0,ܧ( ෨ܴ௑ᇲ)],
ܧ( ෨ܴ௑ᇲ) = ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯ − ܤܥ − ܣଶ2ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯ − ܣܥቃ ߪ௓ூ2 (99)
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Substitute equation (93) and (94) into (99), we get,
ܧ( ෨ܴ௑ᇲ) = ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯ − ܤܥ − ܣଶ2ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯ − ܣܥቃ ߪ௓ூ2
= ܣ
ܥ
−
1
ܥ
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ −
ܣ
ܥቃ
+ ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܣܥቃ2 × [1ܥ + ܤܥ − ܣଶ
ܥଷ ቀܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ −
ܣ
ܥቁ
ଶ]
= ܣ
ܥ
−
ܤܥ − ܣଶ2ܥଶ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܣܥቃ + ቂܧ൫
෨ܴூ൯ −
ܣ
ܥቃ2 	
= ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ + ܣܥቃ2 − ܤܥ − ܣଶ2ܥଶ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܣܥቃ = ܧ( ෨ܴ௑)	
(100)
The equation (100) gives the same result as in equation (97), and ܧ( ෨ܴ௑ᇲ) = ܧ( ෨ܴ௑), which
shows the tangent passing through points ܫ and ܼܫ have the same intercept y-axis expected
returns. Therefore we conclude that the new geometric approach gives the same pair of
orthogonal ܫ and ܼܫ portfolios as those obtained in Roll (1980). The notation of two tangent
lines is as following:
ܫ:												ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௉൯ = ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܤܥ − ܣଶ2ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܣܥቃ ൦ܥ ቂܧ൫
෨ܴூ൯ −
ܣ
ܥቃ
ଶ
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
+ 1
ܥ
൪		
ܼܫ:											ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௉൯ = ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯ − ܤܥ − ܣଶ2ܥ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯ − ܣܥቃ ൦ܥ ቂܧ൫
෨ܴ௓ூ൯ −
ܣ
ܥቃ
ଶ
ܤܥ − ܣଶ
+ 1
ܥ
൪
(101)
321
If we extend two rays from the expected return of global minimum-variance portfolio ܧ൫ ෨ܴீ൯
to the tangent points on the mean-variance parabola, the intercept of the tangents will be ஺
஼
,
from equation(97) and (100), we get
ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ + ܣܥቃ2 − ܤܥ − ܣଶ2ܥଶ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܣܥቃ = ܣܥ
ܤܥ − ܣଶ2ܥଶ ቂܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ܣܥቃ = ቂܧ൫
෨ܴூ൯ −
ܣ
ܥቃ2
൤ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ൯ −
ܣ
ܥ
൨
ଶ = ܤܥ − ܣଶ
ܥଶ
	
(102)
The solutions above give the expected returns of this special case of the zero-beta CAPM
staring from minimum-variance expected return ܩ.
ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ∗൯ = ܣܥ + ඨܤܥ − ܣଶܥଶ
ܧ൫ ෨ܴூ∗൯ = ܣܥ + ඨܤܥ − ܣଶܥଶ 	 (103)
This is important because according to Black (1972) and Roll (1980) that examining the zero-
beta CAPM does not require an exclusive pair of market index ܫ	and companion zero-beta
index ܼܫ.
To verify this, assume there a pair of market index and zero-beta index portfolio ܯ and ܼܯ
that are the real market and zero-beta portfolio, and we can represent ܫ  and ܼܫ  by real
market portfolio index ܯ and ܼܯ.
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ܧ	൫ ෨ܴூ൯ = ߚூ,ெܧ	൫ ෨ܴெ൯ + (1 − ߚூ,ெ)ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௓ெ൯
ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯ = ߚ௓ூ ,ெܧ	൫ ෨ܴெ൯ + ൫1 − ߚ௓ூ ,ெ൯ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௓ெ൯	 (104)
Where ߚூ,ெ and ߚ௓ூ ,ெ are the beta risks of portfolios ܫ and ܼܫ with respect to market portfolio
ܯ.
We can solve ܧ	൫ ෨ܴெ൯ and ൫ ෨ܴ௓ெ൯ in terms of ܧ	൫ ෨ܴூ൯ and ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯, we get
ܧ	൫ ෨ܴெ൯ = 1 − ߚ௓ூ,ெߚூ,ெ − ߚ௓ூ,ெ ܧ	൫ ෨ܴூ൯ + ߚூ,ெ − 1ߚூ,ெ − ߚ௓ூ ,ெ ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯
ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௓ெ൯ = ߚ௓ூ ,ெߚ௓ூ,ெ − ߚூ,ெ ܧ	൫ ෨ܴூ൯ − ߚூ,ெߚ௓ூ ,ெ − ߚூ,ெ ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯ (105)
Therefore, for any ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௜൯ the zero-beta CAPM when there is no riskless asset can be written
as
ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௜൯ = ߚ௜,ெܧ	൫ ෨ܴெ൯ + ൫1 − ߚ௜,ெ൯ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௓ெ൯			
= ߚ௜,ெ − ߚ௓ூ ,ெ
ߚூ,ெ − ߚ௓ூ,ெ ܧ	൫ ෨ܴூ൯ + (1 − ߚ௜,ெ − ߚ௓ூ ,ெߚூ,ெ − ߚ௓ூ ,ெ)ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯
= ߚ௜,ூܧ	൫ ෨ܴூ൯ + ൫1 − ߚ௜,ூ൯ܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯ (106)
Equation (106) has shown that it is not necessary to identify the true market and zero-beta
portfolios ܯ and ܼܯ when testing the zero-beta CAPM. Any pair of portfolio ܫ and ܼܫ on the
mean-variance parabola can be identified, and an equivalent zero-beta CAPM can be
specified.
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When a riskless asset exists, given any efficient portfolio ܭconsisting  of  some  weights  of
orthogonal market and zero-beta portfolios ܯ and ܼܯ plus the riskless assets, the zero-beta
CAPM is
ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௞൯ = ߱ெܧ൫ ෨ܴெ൯ + ߱௓ெܧ൫ ෨ܴ௓ெ൯ + ௙߱ ௙ܴ
߱ெ + ߱௓ெ + ௙߱ = 1 (107)
Substituting equation (105) into (107), we obtain
ܧ൫ ෨ܴ௞൯ = ߱ூܧ	൫ ෨ܴூ൯ + ߱௓ூܧ	൫ ෨ܴ௓ூ൯ + ௙߱ ௙ܴ (108)
Where ߱ூ and ߱௓ூ  are combination of ߱ெ and ߱௓ெ , and߱ூ + ߱௓ூ + ௙߱ = 1 remains the same.
This zero-beta CAPM deviation releases the constraint in Black (1972) ௙߱ ≥ 0	 and ߱௓ூ > 0,
which shows under the zero-beta CAPM, ߱௓ூ  can take negative to allow for short selling.
324
325
APPENDIX C
APPLICATION OF EXPECTATION-MAXIMIZATION ALGORITHM
The expectation-maximization algorithm is commonly used when the observed data are
considered to be part of the complete data that include latent unobserved data. In general,
the complete data likelihood has a simple expression but can not be used for valid statistical
inference due to dependence on latent variables. In order to make valid inference, the latent
variable distribution should be integrated out from the complete data likelihood. The EM
algorithm has the advantage of avoiding such integration and still yields valid inference.
The algorithm iterates between an expectation-step and maximization-step until the iteration
reaches the convergent point. The first step of algorithm is to calculate the conditional
expectation of the complete data log-likelihood given the observed data and the estimates of
the parameter. Then we maximize the conditional expectation obtained from the previous
step until the estimates converge to the maximum likelihood estimates.
Let { ෨ܴ௜௧ ,ܦ௜௧} be the complete data set, and the observed data set be { ෨ܴ௜௧}. The likelihood of
the complete data set is
ℒ(ߠ௜) = ෑܲ(்
௧ୀଵ
෨ܴ௜௧|ܦ௜௧)ܲ(ܦ௜௧) (109)
Where
ܲ(ܦ௜௧) = ݌௜ூ(஽೔೟ୀଵ)(1 − ݌௜)ூ(஽೔೟ୀିଵ)
ܲ( ෨ܴ௜௧|ܦ௜௧) = 1
ට2ߨߪ௜ଶ ݁ݔ݌ ൝− ൫ ෨ܴ௜௧ − ௙ܴ௧ − ߙ௜ − ߚ௜,௔൫ ෨ܴ௔௧ − ௙ܴ௧൯ − ܼ௜,௔ܦ௜௧ߪ෤௔௧൯
ଶ2ߪ௜ଶ ൡ	 (110)
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The estimates of the parameter ߠ௜ is ߠ௜ᇱ = (ߙ௜ᇱ,ߚ௜,௔ᇱ ,ܼ௜,௔ᇱ , (ߪ௜ᇱ)ଶ,݌௜ᇱ). We then take log expectation
of the equation (109), and get
ܳ௜(ߠ௜ ,ߠ௜ᇱ) = ܧൣlog൫ℒ(ߠ௜)൯ |{ ෨ܴ௜௧},ߠ௜ᇱ൧	 (111)
Let
݌̂௜௧ = ܲ൫ܦ௜௧ = 1ห ෨ܴ௜௧ ,ߠ௜ᇱ൯ (112)
Therefore, the expected ܦ௜௧ is
ܦ෩௜௧ = ܧ൫ܦ௜௧ห ෨ܴ௜௧ ,ߠ௜ᇱ൯ = ܲ൫ܦ௜௧ = 1ห ෨ܴ௜௧ ,ߠ௜ᇱ൯ − ܲ൫ܦ௜௧ = −1ห ෨ܴ௜௧ ,ߠ௜ᇱ൯
= ݌̂௜௧ − (1 − ݌̂௜௧) = 2݌̂௜௧ − 1 (113)
Equation (111) can be written as
ܳ௜(ߠ௜ ,ߠ௜ᇱ) = ܧൣlog൫ℒ(ߠ௜)൯ |{ ෨ܴ௜௧},ߠ௜ᇱ൧
= ෍൝[݌෡ ௜௧݈݋݃݌௜ + (1 − ݌̂௜௧)log	(1 − ݌௜)] − 12 log	(2ߨߪ௜ଶ)்
௧ୀଵ
−
൫ ෨ܴ௜௧ − ௙ܴ௧ − ߙ௜ − ߚ௜,௔൫ ෨ܴ௔௧ − ௙ܴ௧൯ − ܼ௜,௔ܦ෩௜௧ߪ෤௔௧൯ଶ2ߪ௜ଶ
−
ܼ௜,௔ଶ (1 −ܦ෩௜௧ଶ )ߪ෤௔௧ଶ2ߪ௜ଶ ൡ
(114)
The next step of EM algorithm is obtain ߠ௜  from maximizing ܯܽݔܳ௜(ߠ௜ ,ߠ௜ᇱ) . However,
different initial values of ߙ௜  can generate different local maximization points of the
likelihood function, which is not uniquely tracked by the model. Since ZCAPM assumes
efficient market, which rules out mispricing of assets, we can set ߙ௜ = 0 for all assets. The
restriction ߙ௜ = 0 does not appear to affect cross-sectional tests of asset pricing model.
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Apply Bayes’ rule to ݌̂௜௧ = ܲ൫ܦ௜௧ = 1ห ෨ܴ௜௧ ,ߠ௜ᇱ൯ and get
݌̂௜௧ = ܲ൫ ෨ܴ௜௧หܦ௜௧ = 1,ߠ௜ᇱ൯ܲ(ܦ௜௧ = 1)	ܲ൫ ෨ܴ௜௧หܦ௜௧ = 1,ߠ௜ᇱ൯ܲ(ܦ௜௧ = 1) + ܲ൫ ෨ܴ௜௧หܦ௜௧ = −1,ߠ௜ᇱ൯ܲ(ܦ௜௧ = −1)	 (115)
Where,
ܲ൫ ෨ܴ௜௧หܦ௜௧ = ±1,ߠ௜ᇱ൯ 1
ඥ2ߨ(ߪ௜ᇱ)ଶ ݁ݔ݌ ൝− ൫ ෨ܴ௜௧ − ௙ܴ௧ − ߙ௜ − ߚ௜,௔൫ ෨ܴ௔௧ − ௙ܴ௧൯ ∓ ܼ௜,௔ߪ෤௔௧൯ଶ2(ߪ௜ᇱ)ଶ ൡ	 (116)
Give an estimate of probability ݌̂௜ related to signal variable ܦ௜௧ in sample period ݐ = 1, … ,ܶ,
we can rewrite the empirical ZCAPM as the following equation:
෨ܴ௜௧ − ௙ܴ௧ = ߚ௜,௔൫ ෨ܴ௔௧ − ௙ܴ௧൯ + ܼ௜,௔∗ ߪ෤௔௧ + ݑ෤௜௧ (117)
Where, ܼ௜,௔∗ = ܼ௜,௔(2݌̂௜ − 1).
We  list  out  the  step-by-step  procedure  in  the  following  section  for  applying  the  EM
algorithm:
(1) Initialize the set of parameter ߠ෠௜଴ = (ߚመ௜଴, መܼ௜,௔଴ , ൫ߪො௜଴൯ଶ, ݌̂௜଴) for the ݅ݐℎ asset.
              To begin, estimate the simple OLS regression with no mispricing error:
෨ܴ௜௧ − ௙ܴ௧ = ߚ௜,௔൫ ෨ܴ௔௧ − ௙ܴ௧൯ + ߝ௜̃௧ 	,								ݐ = 1, … ,ܶ	 (118)
D is the signal variables, and set ܦ௜௧଴ = 1 when ߝ௜̃௧>0 or ܦ௜௧଴ = −1 when ߝ௜̃௧<0.
Compute the initial probability
݌̂௜
଴ = 1ܶ ෍ 1(ܦ௜௧଴்
ଵ
= 1) (119)
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Next, estimate the zero-beta CAPM regression to obtain ߚመ௜଴, መܼ௜,௔଴  and the initial
variance ൫ߪො௜଴൯
ଶ = ଵ
்
∑ (ݑ෤ ௜௧)ଶ்ଵ :
෤ܴ ݅ݐ − ܴ݂ݐ = ߚ݅,ܽ൫෤ܴܽݐ − ܴ݂ݐ൯ + ܼ݅,ܽܦ݅ݐ0ߪ෤ܽݐ + ݑ෤݅ݐ			 (120)
Set these initials as the current estimates of the parameters, ߠ௜
ᇱ = ߠ෠௜଴.
(2) Compute:
݌ො݅ݐ = ߟ݅ݐ+݌݅′(ߟ݅ݐ+݌݅′ + ߟ݅ݐ−(1 − ݌݅′) (121)
             With
ߟ݅ݐ
± = ݁ݔ݌ ൝− ൫෤ܴ ݅ݐ − ܴ݂ݐ − ߚ݅,ܽ൫෤ܴܽݐ − ܴ݂ݐ൯ ∓ ܼ݅,ܽܦ݅ݐߪ෤ܽݐ൯22ߪ2݅ ൡ (122)
(3) Solving the following linear equations to get updated estimates of ߚመ௜,௔ and መܼ௜,௔:
൭෍൫෤ܴܽݐ − ܴ݂ݐ൯
2ܶ
ݐ=1 ൱ߚ݅,ܽ + ൭෍ܦො ݅ݐ൫෤ܴܽݐ − ܴ݂ݐ൯ߪ෤ܽݐ
ܶ
ݐ=1 ൱ ܼ݅,ܽ = ෍(෥ܴ ݅ݐ − ܴ݂ݐ
ܶ
ݐ=1 )൫෤ܴܽݐ − ܴ݂ݐ൯
൭෍ܦො ݅ݐ൫෤ܴܽݐ − ܴ݂ݐ൯ߪ෤ܽݐ
ܶ
ݐ=1 ൱ ߚ݅,ܽ + (෍(ߪ෤ܽݐ)2ܶݐ=1 )ܼ݅,ܽ = ෍ ܦො ݅ݐ(෥ܴ ݅ݐ − ܴ݂ݐܶݐ=1 )ߪ෤݅ݐ (123)
               Where ܦ෡௜௧ = 2݌̂௜௧ − 1 with ݌̂௜௧ obtained from step (2).
(4) Compute the updated variance:
ߪො2݅ = 1ܶ ෍ቄ( ෤ܴ ݅ݐ − ܴ݂ݐ − ߚො݅,ܽ൫෤ܴܽݐ − ܴ݂ݐ൯ − ොܼ݅,ܽܦො ݅ݐߪ෤ܽݐ)2 + ܼ݅,ܽ2 (1 − ܦො ݅ݐ2 )ߪ෤ܽݐ2 ቅܶ
ݐ=1
(124)
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(5) Compute the updated probability:
݌ො݅ = 1ܶ ෍ ݌ො݅ݐܶ
ݐ=1
(125)
(6) Define the vector
Δߠ = ቆቤߚመ௜,௔ −ߚ௜,௔′
ߚ௜,௔′ ቤ , ቤ መܼ௜,௔ − ܼ௜,௔′ܼ௜,௔′ ቤ , ቤ(ߪො௜)ଶ − (ߪ௜′)ଶ(ߪ௜′)ଶ ቤ , ቤ݌̂௜ − ݌௜′݌௜ᇱ ቤቇ (126)
We can declare convergence obtained when ܯܽݔ(Δߠ) < 0.1%. If convergence is not
achieved, update ߠ௜ᇱ to the recent value of ߠ௜ obtained from step (3) to step (5), and
repeat steps (2) to (5).
